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Reflections About The United States Supreme Court
Arthur J. Goldberg*
The widely publicized book The Brethren1 has not, in any substan-
tive sense, contributed to an understanding of the role of the Supreme
Court. The Brethren, after all, is essentially a gossip book about the
Justices. Of course, we all like gossip and engage in it. But gossip does
not answer basic questions about the Supreme Court.
Indeed it may be that The Brethren's single contribution to an un-
derstanding of the Supreme Court is its emphasis that the Justices are
human. If this is the case one may well comment, "So What's New?"
I propose to discuss what is myth and what is reality about the
Court's decision making process.
The very first myth which apparently must be laid to rest in every
generation is that the Court has usurped the function of passing upon
the constitutionality of state and federal laws and action. This myth,
always revived during times of storm over the Court, has no solid basis
in history. Chief Justice John Marshall did not write on a clean slate in
asserting in Marbury v. Madison2 the right and duty of the Court to
declare void an act of Congress contravening the Constitution. His ac-
tion was forecast in the debates in the Constitutional Convention and
urged by proponents as one of the solid reasons for the Constitution's
adoption. Professor Charles L. Black, Jr., in his excellent book, The
People and the Court,$ has summarized the historical evidence. It sup-
ports his conclusion that "It seems very clear that the preponderance of
the evidence lies on the side of judicial review."4 And the very first
Congress, composed of men whose memories of the making of the Con-
* Former Justice of the United States Supreme Court and Distinguished Visiting
Professor of Constitutional Law at Nova University Center for the Study of Law, Fall
1980.
1. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN (1979).
2. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
3. C.L. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT (1960).
4. Id. at 23.
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stitution were fresh, enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789, 5 which, from
that date to this, has expressly authorized the Court to review the con-
stitutionality of state legislation. This enactment was shortly followed
by a succession of laws providing for the Court's ultimate review of
judgments of the lower federal courts. 6
Thus the reality rather than the myth about the Court is that it
exercises judicial review as a consequence of intent as well as tradition.
Judicial review is not a usurped power, but a part of the grand design
to ensure the supremacy of the Constitution as law, supreme law to
which all branches of government -- executive, legislative and judicial,
state and federal - are subject. This is what the Constitution clearly
imports.
The next great myth is that, even though judicial review was in-
tended and is sanctioned, it is nevertheless undemocratic and that
therefore it is to be regarded with alert suspicion and its exercise to be
dimly viewed. The argument has an obvious, albeit superficial, appeal.
The Justices are appointed for life7 and not elected by the people for
limited terms, as the President and Congress are. The latter, so the
argument goes, being representative of the popular will, should have
their way; otherwise, democracy will be forsaken; a guardianship, how-
ever benevolent, negates popular government.
This reasoning, however, overlooks the first facts about our Consti-
tution: that its source is the people. It is the people who mandated that
the individual be protected and safeguarded in his constitutional rights
even against the popular will of the moment, as voiced by the legisla-
ture, the executive, or even public opinion polls. In large part, our
courts were entrusted with the responsibility of judicial review to pro-
tect individuals and minorities in their fundamental rights against
abridgment by both government and majorities.
It is not a denial, therefore, but rather a supreme manifestation of
democracy that the fundamental rights of the least among us are pro-
tected from government or transient majorities by the Constitution and
safeguarded by an independent judiciary. History teaches that democ-
5. Judiciary Act of 1789, Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
6. Circuit Court Act of 1801, Ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89 (1801) (repealed 1802); Act of
March 3, 1803, Ch. 40, 2 Stat. 244 (1803).
7. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 read in conjunction with U.S. CONST. art. III, §
4
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racy and an independent judiciary are one and inseparable. A country
where judges are faithful to the popular will, to the executive, or to the
legislature, rather than to the rule of law, will not be a democratic
country worthy of the name.
Another myth disseminated about the Court is that the Court
reaches out and determines troublesome cases that would be best
avoided. It enters, so it has been said at times, into thickets of contro-
versy. The reality is that the cases which the Court decides are pressed
upon it. It does not seek out cases or invite their filing. Under our Con-
stitution it issues no advisory opinions8 - it decides only actual cases
and controversies.9 These must be genuine and current; otherwise, ju-
risdiction will be summarily declined.
But what of cases seeking protection of political rights - should
not the Court have shunned them? The answer to this is that most of
the cases before the Court deal with public issues of the first moment
in our society - issues like reapportionment - commonly called politi-
cal. As de Tocqueville said, "scarcely any political question arises in
the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial
question." 10
My former colleague Justice Brennan accurately observed in
Baker v. Carr - the germinal decision of the reapportionment cases -
that "the mere fact that the suit seeks protection of a political right
does not mean it presents a political question. Such an objection is little
more than a play upon words."11 If a claim is justiciable, there is no
escaping the responsibility of decision just because the constitutional
right asserted is a political one.
Whatever the justification in another age or time for seeking out
ways of avoiding decisions on the merits of a case, the temper of the
modern world demands that judges, like men in all walks of public and
private life, avoid escapism, and squarely and frankly confront even the
most controversial and troublesome justiciable problems.
And surely it should be agreed by all supporters and critics of the
Court alike that the least possible justification for the Court to avoid
8. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
9. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
10. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 290 (P. Bradley ed. 1954).
11. 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962).
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adjudicating a claim of constitutional right is that the Court may in-
jure itself if it decides the case. Is this not another way of saying that
the Court should avoid unpopular decisions? I have always conceived it
to be the first duty of any judge worthy of the name and office to ab-
jure popularity in decision making. Lord Mansfield long ago stated the
creed of any worthy judge:
I will not do that which my conscience tells me is wrong upon this occa-
sion to gain the huzzas of thousands, or the daily praise of the papers
which come from the press. I will not avoid doing what I think is right;
though it should draw on me the whole artillery of libels; all that false-
hood and malice can invent, or the credulity of a deluded populace can
swallow. . . . Once for all, let it be understood, "that no endeavors of
this kind will influence any man who at present sits here."12
The Court should - the Court must - decide the cases and con-
troversies properly coming before it, however difficult and controversial
they may be, by doing what the justices are appointed and sworn to do.
They must faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the du-
ties of their office and "administer justice . . . according to the best of
[their] . . . abilities and understanding, agreeably to the Constitution
and laws of the United States."'13 Judicial timidity is far more likely to
be the undoing of the Court as an institution than the faithful exercise-
of judicial responsibility.
There is a myth that the Court coddles criminals. In fact, what the
Court is doing can be justified on strict constitutional and stare decisis
grounds.
But the Court's criminal law decisions are fundamental because
they reinforce an old principle that where there is a right, that right
will not remain unenforceable because of the defendant's poverty, igno-
rance or lack of remedy. These decisions lie close to the essence of our
great constitutional liberties. The controversial criminal law decisions
are designed to give practical effect to the protections afforded by the
Bill of Rights, 14 and to deal with the realities of the varying situations
confronting the Court in the area of criminal justice.
12. Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527, 2562, 98 Eng. Rep. 327, 347 (1770).
13. 28 U.S.C. § 453 (1970).
14. U.S. CoNsT. amends. I-X.
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If I am right that the Court's criminal law decisions have in-
creased the effectivensss of our cherished constitutional protections
without significantly affecting the crime rate, then one must recognize
their significance in a democratic society.
As Winston Churchill, then Britain's Home Secretary, said in the
House of Commons on July 20, 1910:
The mood and temper of the public in regard to the treatment of crime
and criminals is one of the most unfailing tests of any country. A calm,
dispassionate recognition of the rights of the accused, and even of the
convicted criminal, against the State - a constant heart-searching by all
charged with the duty of punishment - a desire and eagerness to reha-
bilitate in the world of industry those who have paid their due in the
hard coinage of punishment: tireless efforts towards the discovery of cur-
ative and regenerative processes: unfailing faith that there is a treasure,
if you can only find it, in the heart of every man. These are the symbols,
which, in the treatment of crime and criminal, mark and measure the
stored up strength of a nation and are sign and proof of the living virtue
within it.15
There is a myth that the Court is against states' rights, oblivious
of the great interests of federalism - interests which reflect not only
our history and traditions but which require constant and vigilant at-
tention if we are to avoid over-centralism of our national government
and if we are to preserve viable local government.
There was considerable substance to this myth during three de-
cades early in this century when the Court, in the name of due process,
invalidated social and economic legislation of the states as well as the
nation. But, as current decisions demonstrate, the Court does not strike
down state or federal legislation because it deems laws of this type un-
wise or unsound. The nation and the states are free to experiment, and
never have their interests in federalism been better safeguarded than
they are now by the Court.
But it is asserted that the Court intervenes far more frequently
than in the past to protect individuals in their constitutional rights
against state action. Particularly is this true, so the argument goes, in
connection with criminal prosecutions. The Court, critics charge, is fol-
15. 19 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1354 (1910).
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lowing a double standard: it denies the application of the due process
clause to economic cases; it applies the clause energetically to cases
involving impairment of personal liberties.
There is a simple answer to this charge. There is no evidence that
the framers intended the fifth and fourteenth amendments to deny to
the nation and the states their right of economic experimentation.16
There is every evidence that they intended the Bill of Rights and the
fourteenth amendment to safeguard the fundamental personal rights
and liberties of all persons against governmental impairment or
denial. 17
There is a myth, very popular these days, that the Court is divided
into "liberal" and "conservative" wings, or, as some would put it, into
"activists" and those who practice "judicial restraint." Labels of this
kind are convenient but not accurate. Members of the Court, applying
general constitutional provisions, understandably differ on occasion as
to their meaning and application. This is inevitable in the interpretation
of a document that is both brief and general by a human institution
composed of strong-minded and independent members charged with a
grave and difficult responsibility. But the inappropriateness of these la-
bels becomes apparent upon even the most perfunctory analysis.
A judge may believe, as I did during my tenure on the Court, that
under the Constitution a court without a jury may not adjudge guilty a
defendant charged with serious criminal contempt.1 8 Is he a liberal or a
conservative, particularly where the defendant is a governor resisting
integration of a state university? Is he an activist or a believer in judi-
cial restraint? Or a judge may refuse to hold a litigant or newspaper in
contempt for biting comment on the guilt or innocence of a criminal
16. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502 (1934); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); Olsen v.
Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941); Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron &
Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421
(1952); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372
U.S. 726 (1963).
17. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Aptheker v. Secre-
tary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).




Nova Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1981], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol5/iss2/1
Reflections About The Supreme Court5:1981
defendant.1 9 Is he an activist or a follower of judicial restraint? Is he a
liberal or a conservative? May not the denial of a claim of constitu-
tional right be more activist in its effects upon our constitutional struc-
ture than the allowance of the claim?
Examples could be multiplied, but inevitably the classification of
the justices as liberal or conservative, or activist or believer in judicial
restraint, will depend upon the outlook of, or the criteria employed by;
the classifier.
I could continue this recital of myths about the Court, but I shall
conclude with one that emanates from those who seek to support rather
than condemn the Court. It is the myth that the Supreme Court is
infallible. A simple and correct answer to this myth is the oft-quoted
bon mot of Justice Jackson: "We are not final because we are infallible;
we are infallible because we are final."'20
The reality is that, as a human institution, the Court is bound to
err. It is a tribute to its awareness of human frailty, and the extent to
which the Court seeks to avoid mistakes, that so few really serious ones
have been made in the Court's history. And, of course, it is only proper
to note that reserved to the people is the right to change the course of
the Court's opinions - right or wrong - through the process of consti-
tutional amendment 21
There are more sophisticated mythologists who would seek to pre-
serve the illusion of infallibility by banning dissenting opinions. The
Court, by their lights, would then speak with a single authoritative
voice not to be gainsaid. Some courts in other lands function in this
fashion, burying their differences in a single opinion and judgment. But
I, for one, would not have it this way, for I profoundly believe that in
the long run the Court benefits, and certainly the people do, by the free
expression of dissenting views. They educate and sometimes eventually
prevail, and they always demonstrate that our judicial air, like all of
the air of American life, is - and, God willing, will remain - free.
So long as the Supreme Court sits, myths about it will exist.
Myths are not necessarily all or entirely bad as the literature of my-
thology proves. But because we must live in this world and not in a
19. United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964).
20. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
21. U.S. CONST. art. V.
165 1
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make-believe world, myths about the Court or any other human institu-
tion must yield to reality. Otherwise our society will be the victim of
our fantasies rather than the servant of our purposes.
10
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Florida Inverse Condemnation Law:
A Primer for the Litigator
by
Roger D. Schwenke* and Donald E. Hemke**
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1. INTRODUCTION
Florida Constitutions have always prohibited the state from "tak-
ing" private property without paying just or full compensation to its
owners.1 Presently, Fla. Const. art. 10, § 6(a), often called the "prop-
* B.A., Ohio State University, 1966; J.D., University of Florida, 1969; Partner
with Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler (1970-present); Chairman,
Environmental Law Section of the Florida Bar (1980-81); Member, ABA Standing
Committee On Environmental Law (present).
** B.A., Vanderbilt University, 1971; J.D., University of Virginia, 19,74; Attorney
with Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler (1980-present).
1. Section 14 of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution of 1838
provided that "private property shall not be taken, or applied to public use; unless just
compensation be made therefor." FLA. CONSr. of 1838; § 14. Section 14 was repeated
verbatim in the Florida Constitution adopted in 1865. The language was amended in
section 8 of the Florida Constitution of 1868 to provide that "private property [shall
not] be taken without just compensation." FLA. CONST. of 1838, § 8. Section 8 of the
11
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erty clause," provides that "[n]o private property shall be taken except
for a public purpose and with full compensation therefor paid to each
owner or secured by deposit in the registry of the court and available to
the owner."'2 Section 6(a) applies to the state, its agencies, and political
Florida Constitution of 1868 was repeated verbatim in section 12 of the Declaration of
Rights of the Florida Constitution of 1885. The constitutional revisions in 1968 relo-
cated the provision from the Declaration of Rights to article X, miscellaneous § 6.
2. Note that the 1968 constitutional revisions changed the requirement from
"just" to "full" compensation. No definitive pronouncement has been made concerning
whether the change has any significance. At least in the context of being compensated
for business losses and attorney's fees in eminent domain proceedings, the Supreme
Court of Florida reached the same results under both the Florida Constitution of 1968
requiring "full compensation" and the predecessor constitutions requiring "just com-
pensation." Jamesson v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 322 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1975);
Tosohatchee Game Preserve, Inc. v. Central & S. Fla. Flood Control Dist., 265 So. 2d
681, 684-85 (Fla. 1972); State Rd. Dep't v. Bramlett, 189 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1966). But
see Riverside Military Academy v. Watkins, 19 So. 2d 870, 872 (Fla. 1944). The 1968
constitutional revisions also included a "public purpose" requirement. See Eckert, Ac-
quisition of Development Rights: A Modern Land Use Tool, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV.
347, 353-56 (1968-69).
A prohibition against taking private property without full compensation also exists
in FLA. CoNsT. art. I, § 9 (1968). That section provides that "[n]o person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . . ." See State Plant
Bd. v. Smith, 110 So. 2d 401, 407 (Fla. 1959); Lewis K. Liggett Co. v. Amos, 104 Fla.
609, 141 So. 153, 156 (1932); Estuary Properties, Inc. v. Askew, 381 So. 2d 1126 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979), affid in part rev'd in part sub nom., Graham v. Estuary
Properties, Inc., 1981 Fla. L. Weekly 275 (April 16, 1981).
As a matter of federal constitutional law, the fifth amendment prohibition against
the federal government's "taking" property without "just compensation" applies to the
states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Chicago B. & Q.
R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
FLA. CoNST. art. 16, § 29 (1885) also added a related, but different, provision that
"[n]o private property nor right of way shall be appropriated to the use of any corpora-
tion or individual until full compensation therefor shall be made to the owner, or first
secured to him by deposit of money. . . ." Section 29 applied to private corporations
and individuals rather than to the state, its agencies, and political subdivisions. State
Rd. Dep't v. Bramlett, 189 So. 2d 481, 483 (Fla. 1966); Carter v. State Rd. Dep't, 189
So. 2d 793, 795 (Fla. 1966); DeSoto County v. Highsmith, 60 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 1952);
Ellison v. State Rd. Dep't, 169 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 1964); Daniels v. State Rd. Dep't, 170
So. 2d 846 (Fla. 1964); Hav-A-Tampa Cigar Co. v. Johnson, 149 Fla. 148, 5 So. 2d
433, 438 (1941). Some courts incorrectly applied section 29 to state agencies and sub-
divisions. City of Jacksonville v. Shaffner, 107 Fla. 367, 144 So. 888 (1932); Pinellas
County v. General Tel. Co., 229 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Wilson v.
1 168 Nova Law Journal 5:19811
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subdivisions.3
Florida courts have recognized section 6(a) and its predecessors as
"fundamental" law, "universal" law, and "basic" to American democ-
racy.4 In State Road Department v. Tharp,5 Justice Terrell wrote:
American democracy is a distinct departure from other democracies in
that we place the emphasis on the individual and protect him in his per-
sonal property rights against the State and all other assailants. The State
may condemn his property for public use and pay a just compensation
for it, but it will not be permitted to grab or take it by force and the
doctrine of nonsuability should not be so construed. Forceful taking is
abhorrent to every democratic impulse and alien to our political concepts
.... [W]here the sovereign has a right to condemn for public use, it
will not be permitted to appropriate except by orderly processes."
Section 6(a) is self-executing; it does not require enabling legisla-
tion to be effective.7 The legislature, however, has implemented section
6(a) in chapters 73 and 74 of the Florida Statutes. The statutes are
particularly important "in those matters which are not specifically de-
fined or prohibited" by section 6(a).8
State Rd. Dep't, 201 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Jacksonville Express-
way Auth. v. Bennett, 158 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1963); State Rd. Dep't
v. Bramlett, 179 So. 2d 137 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 189
So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1966); Carlann Shores, Inc. v. City of Gulf Breeze, 26 Fla. Supp. 94
(Fla. 1st Cir. Ct. 1966). See State Rd. Dep't v. Chicone, 148 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1962). Those cases must be viewed in light of the Supreme Court of Florida's
earlier unwillingness to determine whether section 29 applied to the state, its agencies,
and political subdivisions. See, e.g., Seban v. Dade County, 102 So. 2d 706, 708 (Fla.
1958); Shavers v. Duval County, 73 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1954); State Rd. Dep't v. Fore-
hand, 56 So. 2d 901, 903 (Fla. 1952).
3. State Rd. Dep't v. Bramlett, 189 So. 2d 481, 483 (Fla. 1966); Daniels v. State
Rd. Dep't, 170 So. 2d 846, 851 (Fla. 1964); Cheshire v. State Rd. Dep't, 186 So. 2d
790, 791 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
4. 146 Fla. 745, 1 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1941).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 870.
7. Flatt v. City of Brooksville, 368 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979)
(citing Jacksonville Expressway Auth. v. Henry G. Dupree Co., 108 So. 2d 289, 294
(Fla. 1958)); Division of Administration v. Grant Motor Co., 345 So. 2d 843, 845 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
8. Seban v. Dade County, 102 So. 2d 706, 707 (Fla. 1958).
13
et al.: Nova Law Review Full issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1981
170 Nova Law Journal 5:1981
Although Florida courts will often follow other jurisdictions in
construing provisions similar to section 6(a), 9 the Supreme Court of
Florida has noted that "[wie have our own Constitution and adjudi-
cated cases by this Court which are controlling . ... "-0
If a governmental body "takes" property without formally acquir-
ing it by purchase, eminent domain pursuant to chapters 73 and 74, or
otherwise, the property owner may sue the state, its agencies, or its
political subdivisions in equity on the theory of inverse condemnation."'
As the First District Court of Appeal noted in City of Jacksonville v.
Schumann,'2
inverse condemnation has been defined as the popular description of a
cause of action against a governmental defendant to recover the value or
property which has been taken in fact by the governmental defendant,
even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been
attempted by the taking agency . . . . [I]nverse condemnation is a
method of compensation wherein "an owner asserting a claim of appro-
priation of his property may pursue his right by an action in equity for
an injunction, and for damages; the court may then, as an alternative to
the injunction, make an award for the taking . . .-.
The sovereign immunity defense does not protect the government
9. See Belcher v. Florida Power & Light Co., 74 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1954).
10. Adams v. Housing Auth., 60 So. 2d 663, 665 (Fla. 1952).
11. As the Supreme Court of the United States recently noted in United States
v. Clarke, - U.S. -, 100 S.Ct. 1127, 1130 (1980), "[t]he phrase inverse condemna-
tion appears to be one that was coined simply as a shorthand description of the manner
in which a landowner recovers just compensation for a taking of his property when
condemnation proceedings have not been instituted." The term inverse condemnation
has been used in at least sixty-six opinions of the Supreme Court of Florida and the
district courts of appeal. E.g., Stanton v. Morgan, 127 Fla. 34, 172 So. 485 (1937);
Hillsborough County v. Kensett, 107 Fla. 237, 138 So. 400 (1931); Hillsborough
County v. Kensett, 107 Fla. 237, 144 So. 393 (1932); Wilson v. State Rd. Dep't, 201
So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1967); City of Jacksonville v. Schumann, 167 So.
2d 95 (Fia. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1964), cert. denied, 172 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1965).
12. City of Jacksonville, 167 So. 2d 95.
13. Id. at 98. Accord, Kirkpatrick v. City of Jacksonville, 312 So. 2d 487, 488
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Estuary Properties, Inc. v. Askew, 381 So. 2d 1126
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979), affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom., Graham v.
Estuary Properties, Inc., 1981 Fla. L. Weekly 275 (April 16, 1981).
14
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from being sued in inverse condemnation.14
The basic policy issue involved in inverse condemnation is simple
enough; it can be framed in one question: Should the individual prop-
erty owner bear the economic cost of government actions or should
those costs be distributed across the taxpaying community? As the
First District Court of Appeal recently noted,
while government clearly has the right to expropriate private property
for purposes beneficial to the general public, it cannot require a single
property owner to bear the cost of such general benefits. This principle,
which is the essence of the property clauses of the United States and
Florida Constitutions, commands that the cost of public benefits be
borne by the public.15
This article will discuss the elements of the prima facie case of
inverse condemnation, possible defenses to an inverse condemnation
claim, and the procedures involved in establishing such a lawsuit. It
will focus on recent developments and issues in Florida and federal case
law. Practice "pointers" have been suggested to aid the attorney who
sues the government in inverse condemnation.
2. THE PRIMA FACIE CASE
A. Private Property
Like its predecessors, the 1968 Florida Constitution clearly re-
quires a taking of "private property" in order for a plaintiff to prevail
in an inverse condemnation lawsuit. 16 It is questionable whether section
6(a) forbids the taking of government-owned property, even if the
14. State Rd. Dep't v. Bender, 147 Fla. 15, 2 So. 2d 298 (1941); State Rd. Dep't
v. Tharp, 1 So. 2d 868, 869 (Fla. 1941) (Sovereign immunity "will not be permitted as
a City of refuge for a State Agency which appropriates private property before the
value has been fixed and paid."). If a taking has not occurred, sovereign immunity may
bar a suit against the state. Venezia A., Inc. v. Askew, 363 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1978).
15. Estuary Properties, Inc. v. Askew, 381 So. 2d 1126, 1138 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1979), aff'd in part rev'd in part sub nom., Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc.,
1981 Fla. L. Weekly. Accord, Pitz v. State Rd. Dep't, 32 Fla. Supp. 55, 62 (Fla. 11th
Cir. Ct. 1966); Agins v. City of Tiburon, - U.S. __, 100 S. Ct. 2138 (1980).
16. FLA. CoNsT. art. 10, § 6(a).
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government holds the property in its proprietary capacity. 17
The property may either be real or personal.18 It may be a fee
simple estate or less than a fee simple estate.19 The method of acquisi-
tion, i.e., by purchase, gift, or even lottery, is immaterial.20
Tangible property, such as sand and shells,21 oil and minerals,22
timber and trees,23 billboards,24 shrubbery and topsoil, 25 are the clear-
est examples of private property. Monies also fit the definition. 6
Private property includes franchises and other contract rights, 7
easements,2 s riparian rights,29 airspace,30 the common law rights for
17. See Myers v. Board of Pub. Assistance, 21 Fla. Supp. 177, 184 (Fla. 13th
Cir. Ct. 1963) (citing City of Key West v. Love, 116 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1959), and City
of Orlando v. Evans, 132 Fla. 609, 182 So. 264 (1938)).
18. Flatt v. City of Brooksville, 368 So. 2d 631, 632 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1979). See Kirkpatrick v. City of Jacksonville, 312 So. 2d 487, 489 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct.
App. 1975).
19. Edwards Dairy, Inc. v. Pasco Water Auth., 378 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1978); Pitz v. State Rd. Dep't, 32 Fla. Supp. 55, 62 (Fla. llth Cir. Ct. 1966).
20. Dade County v. General Waterworks Corp., 35 Fla. Supp. 71, 79 (Fla. 11th
Cir. Ct. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 267 So. 2d 633, 639-41 (Fla. 1972).
21. State Rd. Dep't v. Bender, 147 Fla. 15, 2 So. 2d 298 (1941).
22. Valls v. Arnold Indus. Inc., 328 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1976).
23. Corneal v. State Plant Bd., 95 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1957).
24. City of Ormond Beach v. Lamar-Orlando Outdoor Advertising, 49 Fla.
Supp. 196 (Fla. 7th Cir. Ct. 1979).
25. Florida Power Corp. v. McNeely, 125 So. 2d 311, 313 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1960).
26. Venditti-Siravo, Inc. v. City of Hollywood, 39 Fla. Supp. 121 (Fla. 17th Cir.
Ct. 1973). See Janis Dev. Corp. v. City of Sunrise, 40 Fla. Supp. 41 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct.
1973); Carlann Shores, Inc. v. City of Gulf Breeze, 26 Fla. Supp. 94 (Fla. 1st Cir. Ct.
1966).
27. Pinellas County v. General Tel. Co., 229 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1969). See North Dade Water Co. v. Florida State Turnpike Auth., 114 So. 2d 458
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
28. City of Jacksonville v. Shaffner, 107 Fla. 367, 144 So. 888 (1932).
29. Kendry v. State Rd. Dep't, 213 So. 2d 23, 28 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1968);
Thiesen v. Gulf, F. & A. R.R. Ry., 75 Fla. 28, 78 So. 491, 507 (1918); Brickell v.
Trammell, 77 Fla. 544, 82 So. 221, 227 (1919).
30. Benitez v. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth., 26 Fla. Supp. 53 (Fla. 13th
Cir. Ct. 1966), aff'd, 200 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1967), cert. denied, 204
So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1967).
16
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hunting and fishing on one's land,$' the difference in water elevation to
operate a millrace,32 rights to "lateral support" for property in its un-
improved condition," ingress and egress,3 4 rights to exclude others
from one's property,3 5 and statutory, common law, permit or contract
rights to develop one's land.36 Section 6(a) protects more than title to
property; it also guards "the right to acquire, use and dispose of [prop-
erty] for lawful purposes."3
Other definitions of private property have included the opportunity
of a regulated utility to earn a fair rate of return on its invested capi-
tal,38 a railroad's expenses in operating certain required services,39 and
the right to use one's property free of an invalid exercise of the police
power.40
If the law does not recognize the interest as a private property
31. Alford v. Finch, 155 So. 2d 790, 793 (Fla. 1963).
32. State Rd. Dep't of Fla. v. Tharp, 146 Fla. 745, 1 So. 2d 868, 869 (1941).
33. See Weir v. Palm Beach County, 85 So. 2d 865, 868 (Fla. 1956).
34. Anhoco Corp. v. Florida State Turnpike Auth., 116 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1959);
Weir v. Palm Beach County, 85 So. 2d 865, 868 (Fla. 1956). See Awbrey v. City of
Panama City Beach, 283 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Benerofe v. State
Rd. Dep't, 210 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Meltzer v. Hillsborough
County, 164 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
35. South Dade Farms, Inc. v. B & L Farms Co., 62 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 1952).
36. Beck v. Littlefield, 68 So. 2d 889, 890 (Fla. 1953) (dictum that if the city
attempted to preclude construction, "[s]uch an effort would run afoul of the guarantee
of due process."); Griffin v. Sharpe, 65 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 1953); Askew v. Gables-by-
the-Sea, Inc., 333 So. 2d 56, 61 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
37. Estuary Properties, Inc. v. Askew, 381 So. 2d 1126, 1138 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1979) (citing Kass v. Lewin, 104 So. 2d 572, 578 (Fla. 1958)), affid in part rev'd
in part sub nom., Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 1981 Fla. L. Weekly 275 (April
16, 1981); Benitez v. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth., 26 Fla. Supp. 53, 65 (Fla.
13th Cir. Ct. 1966), affd, 200 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1967), cert. denied,
204 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1967); Pitz v. State Rd. Dep't, 32 Fla. Supp. 55, 58 (Fla. 11th
Cir. Ct. 1966).
38. Gulf Power Co. v. Bevis, 289 So. 2d 401, 403 n.1 (Fla. 1974). See also West-
wood Lake, Inc. v. Dade County, 246 So. 2d 156, 158 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1971);
Volusia County Kennel Club v. Florida Racing Comm'n, 4 Fla. Supp. 103 (Fla. 2d Cir.
Ct. 1953).
39. State v. Georgia S. & F. Ry. Co., 139 Fla. 115, 190 So. 527, 531-32 (1939).
40. Pinellas County v. Jasmine Plaza, Inc., 334 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1976) (county ordinance requiring a permit to remove certain trees, but failing to
provide standards for issuing such permits).
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right, there is no constitutional guarantee to "full compensation." As
an example, the rights created by restrictive covenants, or so-called
"negative easements," do not qualify as private property.4' Nor does
Florida recognize a property right to lateral support for improved prop-
erty. 42 And because the unprotected right of a landowner to the "rea-
sonable" use of underground water is merely a qualified right to use, it
cannot form the basis of a claim for inverse condemnation. 3
Florida courts, without elaborating, have refused to define other
interests, such as the loss of profit and business damages, as property
within the meaning of section 6(a)." Loss of profits, when combined
with the taking of a recognized property right, does, however, warrant
compensation under the Florida Constitution."
B. Taking
Like the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution, sec-
tion 6(a) of the state constitution requires that compensation be paid
only if property is "taken.""
Florida courts have long noticed that the state constitution, unlike
constitutions in approximately twenty-five other states, mandates com-
pensation only for "taking" or "appropriations" and not for "dam-
ages. 14 7 Without such a taking, the Supreme Court of Florida has
41. Board of Pub. Instruction v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 81 So. 2d 637
(Fla. 1955).
42. Weir v. Palm Beach County, 85 So. 2d 865, 867 (Fla. 1956).
43. Village of Tequesta v. Jupiter Inlet Corp., 349 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 371 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1979). But see Volls v.
Arnold Indus., Inc., 328 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
44. Jamesson v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 322 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1975) (citing
Backus v. Fort Street Union, 169 U.S. 547 (1898)); Pinellas County v. Austin, 323 So.
2d 6 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
45. FLA. CONST. art. 10, § 6(a).
46. Id.
47. Village of Tequesta v. Jupiter Inlet Corp., 349 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 371 So. 2d 663, 669 (Fla. 1979); Weir v. Palm
Beach County, 85 So. 2d 865, 867 (Fla. 1956); Rabin v. Lake Worth Drainage Dist.,
82 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1955); Board of Pub. Instruction v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands,
81 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 1955); Kendry v. State Rd. Dep't, 213 So. 2d 23, 29 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1968); Northcutt v. State Rd. Dep't, 209 So. 2d 710, 712 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1968); Moviematic Indus. Corp. v. Dade County, 44 Fla. Supp. 30, 37 (Fla. 1 lth
18
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ruled that "the damages suffered are damnum absque injuria and com-
pensation therefor by a [public agency] cannot be compelled."48
Determinations of a taking are made on a case-by-case basis.49
The distinction between a taking and damages is much clearer in con-
cept than in practice. The Supreme Court of Florida recently has noted
that "[t]here is no settled formula for determining when the valid exer-
cise of police power stops and an impermissible encroachment on pri-
vate property rights begins."'' '1 The Fourth District Court of Appeal
was correct when it noted that the law requiring compensation for tak-
ing and appropriation is "easier to state than [it is] to apply."50 More-
over, as that court observed, "Florida courts have not, over the years,
been in consistent agreement on [what constitutes a taking], particu-
larly where. . . there was no actual entry by the governmental author-
ity on the owner's land.""1 Similarly, the First District Court of Appeal
has commented that Florida courts have found takings where techni-
cally only damage to the property existed.52 The trend to relax the let-
Cir. Ct. 1976).
48. Weir v. Palm Beach County, 85 So. 2d 865, 867 (Fla. 1956).
49. Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 1981 Fla. L. Weekly 275 (April 16,
1981); South Dade Farms, Inc. v. B & L Farms Co., 62 So. 2d 350, 357 (Fla. 1952);
Pitz v. State Rd. Dep't, 32 Fla. Supp. 55, 59 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. 1956).
49.1. 1981 Fla. L. Weekly at 278.
50. Kendry v. State Rd. Dep't, 213 So. 2d 23, 27 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
Commentators also have observed in Florida case law "the absence of a cohesive doc-
trinal basis for judicial decisions, the inconsistency in cases holding 'a taking' or 'not a
taking', and the need for predictive guidelines in this area of law." Haigler, Mclnerny
and Rhodes, The Legislature's Role in the Taking Issue, 4 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3
(1976). Florida courts have not been alone in their inability to establish a useable test.
As the United States Supreme Court has noted, "there is no set formula to determine
where regulation ends and taking begins." Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S.
590, 594 (1962). Accord, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Arvo
Van Alstyne has noted that "judicial efforts to chart a useable test for determining
when police power measures impose constitutionally compensable losses have, on the
whole, been notably unsuccessful. With some exceptions, the decisional law is largely
characterized by confusing and incompatible results, often explained in conclusionary
terminology, circular reasoning, and empty rhetoric." A. Van Alstyne, Taking or Dam-
aging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CALIF. L.
REv. 1, 2 (1971).
51. Jupiter Inlet Corp.'v. Village of Tequesta, 349 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 371 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1979).
52. Department of Transp. v. Burnette, 384 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
19
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ter of the rule, the court explained, reflected "the stresses to which tak-
ing concepts were subjected during years in which sovereign immunity
was regarded as barring more direct judicial remedies for damage by
the State's drainage trespasses and nuisances. ' 3
Despite the existence of an occasional difficult question, much con-
sistency runs throughout Florida case law. Certain governmental ac-
tions will invariably result in the judiciary determining a taking has
occurred. For example, government improvements which cause physical
removal or invasion of a landowner's property on a permanent or peri-
odic, but recurring, basis warrant compensation. 4 A taking also may
consist of an entirely negative physical act, such as the destruction of a
residence, shrubbery, or trees,55 or the "washing away" of plaintiff's
land, rendering it unusable.56 A taking may also occur when land is
1980).
53. Id. at 921.
54. E.g., State Rd. Dep't v. Bramlett, 179 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1965) (installation of streets and canals on plaintiff's land), rev'd on other grounds,
189 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1966); Kendry v. Division of Administration, 366 So. 2d 391 (Fla.
1978) (placing fill on plaintiff's land to raise elevation of roadway); City of Miami v.
Romer, 73 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1954) (paving sidewalk on plaintiff's land); City of Miami
Beach v. Belle Isle Apartment Corp., 177 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965)
(public road on defendant's property); Florida Power Corp. v. McNeely, 125 So. 2d
311 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (placing electrical towers on plaintiff's land held to
be a taking, even though electrical company had pre-existing right to string electrical
transmission lines across plaintiff's land because, inter alia, merely stringing electrical
lines across the land did not preclude certain uses under those lines); Kendry v. State
Rd. Dep't, 213 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (state filled and claimed
bottomlands and flooded certain other lands); Florida Power Corp. v. McNeely, 125
So. 2d 311, 313 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (removal of property such as timber or
top soil from the private premises); State Rd. Dep't v. Darby, 109 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (construction causing clay, sand, and silt to be washed onto plain-
tiff's property held to be a taking over dissenting judge's claim that there was no evi-
dence that the invasion was permanent). A temporary physical invasion is generally
held not to be a taking. Dudley v. Orange County, 137 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1962) (temporary flooding). But see Pitz v. State Rd. Dep't, 32 Fla. Supp. 55
(Fla. 11 th Cir. Ct. 1966).
55. E.g., State Plant Bd. v. Smith, 110 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1959); Kirkpatrick v.
City of Jacksonville, 312 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
56. Elliott v. Hernando County, 281 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973);
Pinellas County v. Austin, 323 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (A taking may
occur when a street is vacated, even though it reverts back to adjacent property owners
20




taxed as municipal land when in fact no actual or potential municipal
use is possible."'
Once beyond these clear-cut cases, Florida courts have used a vari-
ety of factors and tests for determining whether governmental actions
have resulted in a taking of private property. Unfortunately, the courts
have not always applied them in a consistent manner. The Supreme
Court of Florida has recently indicated six non-exclusive factors which
have been considered in determining whether there has been a taking:
(1) whether there has been a physical invasion; (2) the degree of dimi-
nution in value; (3) whether the regulation confers a public benefit or
prevents a public harm; (4) whether the regulation promotes public
health, safety, welfare, and morals; (5) whether the regulation is arbi-
trarily and capriciously applied; and (6) whether the regulation curtails
investment-backed expectations.: 1
SOME FACTORS AND TESTS
Police Power. Florida courts often had indicated that the reasonable
exercise of the state's police powers5 did not constitute a taking of
private property. 9
rather than to the government.). But a tort or trespass does not constitute a constitu-
tional taking. Rabin v. Lake Worth Drainage Dist., 82 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1955).
57. See Bair v. Central & S. Fla. Flood Control Dist., 144 So. 2d 818 (Fla.
1962). See also City of Coral Gables v. State ex rel. Landis, 129 Fla. 834, 177 So.
290, 291 (1937); State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. City of Avon Park, 108 Fla. 641, 149
So. 409, 416 (1933).
57.1. Graham, 1981 Fla. L. Weekly 275.
58. The state has police power to provide for and conserve the public health,
safety, morals, welfare, comfort and general well-being of the public. See, e.g., Hay-A-
Tampa Cigar Co. v. Johnson, 149 Fla. 148, 5 So. 2d 437 (1941). The police power also
may be used to protect aesthetic values. Compare Hay-A-Tampa, 5 So. 2d at 439-40
(Brown, C.J., concurring specially), with Anderson v. Shackleford, 74 Fla. 36, 76 So.
343, 345, Annot., 1918A L. R. A. 139 (1917). See generally Nachwalter, Substantive
Due Process in Florida, 21 U. Miami L. Rev. 99, 118 (1966).
59. See City of Miami v. St. Joe Paper Co., 364 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1978); Sara-
sota County v. Barg, 302 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1974); Keating v. State, 173 So. 2d 673, 677
(Fla. 1965); Adams v. Housing Auth., 50 So. 2d 663, 666 (Fla. 1952); City of Miami
v. Romer, 58 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1952); Garvin v. Baker, 59 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1952); Hay-
A-Tampa Cigar Co. v. Johnson, 149 Fla. 148, 5 So. 2d 543 (1941) (sustaining dismis-
sal of complaint alleging that prohibition of advertising signs within so many feet of
177 1Florida Inverse Condemnation Law5:1981
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Even prior to Graham, this principle was not sacrosanct;51 it was
well-established that an overly restrictive exercise of the state's police
power,60 or an "unreasonable" exercise of police power61 may result in
the appropriation of private property. Similarly, exercises of the police
power that are unnecessarily restrictive,6 2 or standardless,63 or arbitrar-
ily applied 4 may give rise to a claim of inverse condemnation.
Like other judicially created tests, the police power test had its
own assortment of problems. Courts frequently disagreed over where
the line should be drawn between a reasonable exercise and an un-
reasonable or overly restrictive exercise of the police power. Further-
more, because of the ease with which one could mechanically apply the
test, courts frequently used it without reasoned analysis. In referring to
the conclusional character of this test, the Third District Court of Ap-
peal in Moviematic Industries Corp. v. Board of County Commission-
ers65 recognized that under certain circumstances even a valid exercise
of the police power may constitute a taking. In Moviematic, the court
found that a rezoning of certain land from heavy industrial use to resi-
dential use was reasonably related to the public health and welfare.66
public highways took property even though plaintiff alleged that the only purpose to
which it could be used was for the maintenance of advertising); John A. Swisher &
Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 149 Fla. 148, 5 So. 2d 441 (1941); Flaxe v. State of Florida Dep't
of Agriculture, 383 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Kirkpatrick v. City of
Jacksonville, 312 So. 2d 487, 490 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (the city could prove
as an affirmative defense to a taking claim whether, in destroying certain property, it
"acted in the exercise of valid police power"); City of Miami v. Girtman, 104 So. 2d 62
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1958). See also Dutton Phosphate Co. v. Priest, 67 Fla. 370, 65
So. 282 (1914); City of Miami v. Ocean & Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 So. 2d 364
(1941). Cf. Southern Dade Farms, Inc. v. B & L Farms Co., 62 So. 2d 350, 351 (Fla.
1952).
59.1. 1981 Fla. L. Weekly at 278.
60. Estuary Properties, Inc. v. Askew, 381 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1979), affid in part rev'd in part sub nom., Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 1981
Fla. L. Weekly 275 (April 16, 1981).
61. Grand Union Co. v. City of Tampa, 23 Fla. Supp. 113 (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct.
1963).
62. Field v. City of Miami, 18 Fla. Supp. 179 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. 1961).
63. Pinellas County v. Jasmine, 334 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
64. See Mayer v. Dade County, 82 So. 2d 513, 519 (Fla. 1955).
65. 349 So. 2d 667, 670-71 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
66. Id. at 672.
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Under the traditional police power test, such a conclusion should have
ended the court's inquiry; instead, the court asked a second question:
Whether the legitimate exercise of the police power so impaired the use
of the property as to be a compensable appropriation? 7 The court held
that a taking did not occur only because the plaintiff could still use the
property for residential purposes.68 An insufficient "reduction of the
property's market value" 69 did not render the property valueless; conse-
quently, the plaintiff failed to satisfy the second part of the two-part
analysis fashioned by the court.
Laws requiring land developers to dedicate land and to maintain
certain minimal lot sizes and the condition of the development have
been sustained as valid exercises of the police power. In Garvin v.
Baker,7 0 the city refused to approve certain plats or maps of property
which failed to meet the specifications of a local ordinance. The trial
court held the enactment, which required that at least sixty feet of land
be dedicated for streets, sidewalks, and curb purposes and prohibited
the platting of lots less than fifty feet in width and one hundred feet in
depth, was reasonable.7" The Supreme Court of Florida noted that re-
quiring specifications of street widths may prevent "hazardous traffic
conditions," thus involving the "public welfare and safety to a high de-
gree."7 2 Referring to the mandatory minimum lot size, the court wrote:
"the size of lots upon which a one-family, two-family, or four-family,
building may be erected was a subject for police regulation and when
not unreasonable, such regulations do not deprive a person of his prop-
erty without due process of law."73
67. Id. at 670-71.
68. Id. at 670.
69. Id. at 671. In noting that the exercise of the police power may be reasonable
and yet still take property, Moviematic was logically correct. The United States Su-
preme Court later agreed, recognizing that even a valid exercise of the police power
may seriously interfere with private property rights. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of
New York, - U.S. -, 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978). Accord, Graham 1981 Fla. L. Weekly
275 (April 16, 1981).
70. 59 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1952).
71. Id. at 362.72. Id.
73. Id. at 364-65. Garvin is not a definitive holding. It involved a petition for
mandamus. The Supreme Court of Florida noted that the granting of a writ of manda-
mus was largely discretionary and would be granted only where "[t]he legal right...
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In Wald Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County,7 4 the Third District
Court of Appeal sustained a county ordinance requiring dedication of
drainage ways, streams, and rights-of-way as a condition of approval of
a subdivision plat. These dedications, the court held, had a "rational
nexus" to community needs. 5 More recently, the Supreme Court of
Florida upheld the constitutionality of the Marketable Record Title
Act.716 In sustaining the Act's validity, the court wrote in City of
Miami v. St. Joe Paper Co.:17
[D]ue process has never been an absolute prohibition against state
legislation adversely affecting property rights. It has been held over and
over again that general limitations on state actions do not extinguish the
state's police power to enact legislation "reasonably necessary to secure
the health, safety, good order, comfort or general welfare of the
community."
In determining whether state action violates due process principles,
a court must choose between protecting the individual's guaranteed
rights on one hand, and the welfare of the general public on the other.
This method of determining whether a state meets the requirements of
due process is called the 'balancing of interests' test . ... 8
Environmental restrictions have also been sustained as reasonable
exercises of the police power.79 In Sarasota County v. Barg,80 certain
landowners filed a complaint in circuit court, claiming that the statute
to an order compelling the performance of some particular act [is] clear and com-
plete." Id. at 361.
74. 338 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
75. Id. at 868.
76. City of Miami v. St. Joe Paper Co., 364 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1978) (sustaining
FLA. STAT. § 712.01 (1979)).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 444.
79. FLA. CONST. art. 2, § 7 (1968) requires the legislature to make "adequate
provision" by law "for the abatement of air and water pollution and of excessive and
unnecessary noise" to "conserve and protect" Florida's natural resources and beauty.
See Graham, 1981 Fla. L. Weekly 275 (April 16, 1981); Smith v. City of Clearwater,
383 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Cross Key Waterways v. Askew, 351 So.
2d 1062 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
80. 302 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1974).
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creating the Manasota Key Conservation District l was unconstitu-
tional. The litigants argued, among other things, that section four of
that law took their property. Among the law's prohibitions are (1) that
no land in the district may be used for commercial or multi-family pur-
poses; and (2) that newer structures within the district may not be con-
structed over two stories high.8 2 The circuit court found the law uncon-
stitutional.8 3 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida sustained the
statute's validity, holding that section four did not violate the due pro-
cess clause.
Section four of the Act does not deprive appellees of their property, or of
the use of their property; it simply regulates the use of that property.
Reasonable restrictions upon the use of property in the interest of the
public health, welfare, morals, and safety are valid exercises of the
State's police power. . . . The restrictions imposed by Section 4 of the
Act are reasonable, in light of the legislative intent-expressed in Sec-
tion 1 of the Act-to preserve the natural beauty of Manasota Key."
Nor does loss of business due to competition with the government
deserve constitutional protection. In Coast Cities Coaches, Inc. v. Dade
County,"5 the county planned to extend its bus service in an area al-
ready worked by a common carrier. Plaintiff claimed that the competi-
tion would reduce its business, eventually causing the company to fail.
The Supreme Court of Florida, citing precedent from the United States
Supreme Court,88 held that "loss of business, through competition with
a governmental agency, is not a taking of property .... ,,87 The court
admitted a taking would have occurred had the county taken the com-
mon carrier's physical property or certificate of necessity; but the





84. Id. at 741.
85. 178 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1965).
86. Skaneateles Water Works Co. v. Village of Skaneateles, 184 U.S. 354
(1902).
87. 178 So. 2d at 709.
88. Id. at 710.
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OTHER FACTORS THAT MAY DETERMINE WHETHER A TAKING
HAS OCCURRED
[a] Physical Invasion.
It is well-established that the state may take land without physi-
cally invading it,89 although Florida courts incline to find a taking
where there is a physical encroachment. 90
[b] Deprivation of Beneficial Use.
In order to constitute a taking, some courts indicate that the plain-
tiff must be "deprived of the beneficial use of his property."9 1 Other
cases imply that the landowner must suffer "total" deprivation before
compensation will be paid.92 Florida courts, however, have never de-
fined the word taking to mean a total deprivation. In Graham v. Estu-
ary Properties, the Supreme Court of Florida found there was no tak-
ing in part because the developer could still construct almost 13,000
residential units and commercial facilities; on the other hand, the court
specifically noted that "[w]e do not hold that anytime the state requires
a proposed development to be reduced by half it may do so without
compensation to the owner ...... " In Griffin v. Sharpe,98 the Su-
89. See, e.g., Benitez v. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth., 26 Fla. Supp. 53
(Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. 1966) (a landowner could recover for taking of an aviational ease-
ment even though jets did not fly directly over his property), afJ'd, 200 So. 2d 194 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1967), cert. denied, 204 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1967).
90. City of Miami v. Romer, 58 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1952); Kirkpatrick v. City of
Jacksonville, 312 So. 2d 487, 489-90 (Fla. 1975); Northcutt v. State Rd. Dep't, 209
So. 2d 710, 711-12 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1968). See Graham v. Estuary Properties,
Inc., 1981 Fla. L. Weekly 275 (April 16, 1981).
91. City of Miami v. Romer, 58 So. 2d 849, 852 (Fla. 1952) (condemnation of a
ten-foot strip for street purposes not considered a taking because the landowner was
"free to use such strip of land in any lawful manner and for any lawful purpose, except
for the construction of a building thereon").
92. Estuary Properties, Inc. v. Graham, 381 So. 2d 426 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1979), aff'd in part rev'd in part sub nom., Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 1981
Fla. L. Weekly 275 (April 16, 1981); Askew v. Gables-By-The-Sea, Inc., 333 So. 2d
56, 61 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1970) ("totally useless"); Zabel v. Pinellas Water &
Navigation Control Auth., 171 So. 2d 376, 381 (Fla. 1965) ("only beneficial use").
The landowner carries the burden of proving the taking. Adams v. County of Dade,
325 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
92.1. 1981 Fla. L. Weekly at 279.
26
Nova Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1981], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol5/iss2/1
5:1981 Florida Inverse Condemnation Law 183
preme Court of Florida held, inter alia, that a statute extending certain
platted restrictions against any buildings other than apartments and
residences had taken plaintiff's contractual rights to develop his land.
The plaintiff had intended to build a medical office and clinic on his
property. Even though his land retained substantial value despite the
statutory restrictions, the court awarded the plaintiff compensation. 4
In Benitez v. Hillsborough County Aviation Authority,95 the Second
District Court of Appeal affirmed a circuit court decision which found
a taking of an aviational easement from certain landowners. Even
though the property retained substantial value, i.e., persons continued
to live on it, the court backed the award of compensation,9"
[c] Systematic Impacts.
Florida courts have also considered the impacts that finding a tak-
ing would have on governmental planning and developing. In Northcutt
v. State Road Department,97 the plaintiffs alleged that the construction
and operation of a highway near them had deprived them of the benefi-
cial use of their property. In particular, the complainants argued that
the highway had caused excessive shock waves, vibrations, and noises in.
their homes. The complaint read that the disturbances impaired the
93. 65 So. 2d 751 (1953).
94. Id. at 751-52. The court, in rejecting the argument that the statute involved
was purely an exercise of the police power, wrote:
This court has long recognized [the principle of the police power], but with the
qualification that there must be present a reasonable use of such power and rea-
sonable limitations thereto, else we let the gates down, as advocated here, and
the whole field of private contract would be invaded and infected to the extent
that security of contract in this respect would be lost and irreparable harm and
damage to the legal, constitutional, and economic facets of what we know as the
business and financial world of the State and the Nation, would inevitably and
necessarily follow.
Id. at 752.
95. 26 Fla. Supp. 53 (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. 1966), aff'd, 200 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1967), cert. denied, 204 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1967).
96. Id. at 200. In Pinellas County v. Austin, 323 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1975), the court held that the existence of some access to the property would not pre-
clude the finding of a taking even though it might reduce the amount of recovery.
97. 209 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1968). Northcutt was followed in
Travis v. Department of Transp., 333 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
27
et al.: Nova Law Review Full issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1981
184 Nova Law Journal 5:1981
plaintiffs' health and welfare, causing them to become ill and nervous
and depriving them of the maximum use and aesthetic beauty of their
property. The trial judge dismissed the plaintiffs' amended complaint,
which sought injunctive relief, for failure to state a cause of action. In
affirming the dismissal,98 the Third District Court of Appeal made it
clear that the plaintiffs' reliance on City of Jacksonville v. Schumann"
was misplaced. The court wrote: "there is a substantial difference be-
tween the use of an airport by airplanes and the use of highway and
access roads by motor vehicles. The noise intensity factor is different;
the safety factors are different; and the use factors are different." 100
The complaint, however, had alleged that the plaintiffs had been
permanently deprived of the use, benefit, and enjoyment of their prop-
erty.10' The Third District Court of Appeal overlooked these allega-
tions, yet these averments and the inferences which could have been
drawn from them should have been accepted as true in testing the suffi-
ciency of the complaint; instead, the perceived possibility of virtually
unlimited liability appears to have influenced the district court's deci-
sion to dismiss. The court commented:
An airport may be placed at a considerable distance from a city
while it is a public necessity for roads and highways to be built close to,
or directly through a city, and sometimes through its most heavily popu-
lated areas. To sustain the amended complaint of the plaintiffs as suffi-
cient for inverse condemnation would bring to an effective halt the con-
struction, operation and maintenance of access roads and highways
within the State of Florida. It would be impossible to determine and pre-
pare with any degree of accuracy, a reasonable budget for the construc-
tion of highways and access roads in the future in Florida. After the
access roads and highway were constructed and in operation, each indi-
vidual land owner adjacent thereto could seek damages from the state
for a "taking" of their property resulting from the increased noises, dust
and vibrations, coming from the motor vehicles using the adjacent
highway. 02
98. Id.
99. 167 So. 2d 95 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1964), cert. denied, 172 So. 2d 597
(Fla. 1965).
100. 209 So. 2d at 711.
101. Id. at 710.
102. Id.
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Notwithstanding the position of the Third District Court of Ap-
peal, the impacts of overflights and the impacts of highway traffic on
the beneficial use of property may be similar. A taking can occur in
both situations. Commentators have rightfully criticized the reasoning
in Northcutt.10 3
[d] Fraud or Abuse of Discretion.
Courts have at times applied improper standards to determine
whether a taking has occurred. In Northcutt v. State Road Depart-
ment,'" the plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the state did not condemn
sufficient land for a highway. In spite of the fact that purely legal and
constitutional issues were raised by the complainants, 10 5 the Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeal focused exclusively on whether a "clear showing"
of fraud or abuse of discretion 0" colored the state's decision to con-
demn. The court, in citing two Florida cases, 107 failed to recognize that
the fraud or abuse of discretion standard is a proper standard only for
determining the propriety of a decision to initiate condemnation pro-
ceedings and not for testing a decision to refrain from initiating those
proceedings. 108
[e] Profit-seeking Activity.
Until recently, single-family residence owners may have had a bet-
ter chance of sustaining a condemnation claim than large-scale devel-
opers. In Wald Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County,109 the Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeal intimated that a taking will be found more often
in a private setting than in a business setting. The district court, in
103. Little, New Attitudes About Protection for Remains of Florida's Natural
Environment, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 459, 488-91 (1970-71).
104. 209 So. 2d 710.
105. The Northcutts requested the court to order the State Road Department to
institute eminent domain proceedings against their property so that they could recover
compensation for the agency's taking. Id.
106. Id.
107. Broward County Rubbish Contractors Ass'n v. Broward County, 112 So. 2d
898 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Wilton v. St. Johns County, 98 Fla. 26, 123 So. 527
(1929).
108. 209 So. 2d 710.
109. 338 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
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sustaining the constitutionality of a county ordinance requiring a subdi-
vider to dedicate certain rights of way,110 wrote that "[w]hile the [indi-
vidual landowner] may not ordinarily have his property appropriated
without an eminent domain proceeding, the [subdivider] may be re-
quired to dedicate land where the requirement is part of a valid regula-
tory scheme." '111 But the Supreme Court of Florida recently noted that
investment-backed expectations may be a factor in finding a taking.,"
[f] Miscellaneous Considerations.
For a taking to occur, the governmental action must be pursuant
to a plan or program. Damages caused by the commission of a tort do
not in and of themselves constitute a compensable injury. For example,
allegations that an agency sprayed plaintiff's land with a chemical
herbicide, damaging and destroying his crops, do not state a cause of
action under inverse condemnation.11  The recurrence of a tort may be
one factor in favor of finding an appropriation.113
Kirkpatrick v. City of Jacksonville114 presents an interesting study
of the distinctions sometimes made between a taking and damages. In
that case, the complaint contained allegations that the city had de-
stroyed buildings without sufficient proof that these buildings were ad-
versely affecting the health or safety of the public. Holding that a one-
year statute of limitations governing trespass actions was applicable to
the case, the trial court dismissed the complaint."" 5 In explaining the
distinction between a taking and damage, the First District Court of
Appeal wrote:
Compensation to the owner [is] required as to [a taking], but not as to
110. Id.
111. Id. at 868.
111.1. Graham, 1981 Fla. L. Weekly at 279.
112. Rabin v. Lake Worth Drainage Dist., 82 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1955). See White
v. Pinellas County, 185 So. 2d 468, 471 (Fla. 1966) (cutting down trees and shrubs on
plaintiff's land pursuant to a planned program of highway development was a taking).
113. Levinson, Florida Constitutional Law, 28 U. MIAMI L. REV. 551, 662
(1973-74).
114. 312 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
115. Id.
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[a damage]. The distinction is valid but does not necessarily prohibit
appellants from recovering herein. "Taking" has been defined as "enter-
ing upon private property for more than a momentary period and 'under
the warrant or color of legal authority,' devoting it to public use or
otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a
way as substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment thereof."'' 16
As was noted in Graham, Florida courts are likely to consider cer-
tain intangibles in determining the existence of a taking. For example,
where a private person purchases land from the state which can be
used for limited purposes, and then the state restricts those uses, these
actions will be a factor in favor of finding a taking. Conversely, where a
person purchases land knowing that it is subject to certain restrictions,
that knowledge will be a factor against finding an appropriation. 6e.1
C. Owner
The Florida Constitution requires that a person be an "owner" of
property before he may recover for the taking of that property."17 The
owner of a fee simple absolute estate obviously satisfies the ownership
requirement." 8 The holder of a valid leasehold also is an owner within
contemplation of the constitution, regardless of whether he is a tenant
for a term of years,"x9 or a tenant at will, 20 or even a tenant at suffer-
ance.12 ' A vendor under a contract for deed does not possess sufficient
indicia of ownership to be able to assert a claim for inverse condemna-
tion. 22 Only the owner at the time of the taking may sue for inverse
116. Id. at 489 (emphasis in original, citing 12 Fla. Jur. Eminent Domain § 68
(1957)).
116.1. Graham, 1981 Fla. L. Weekly at 279.
117. FLA. CONsT. art. 10, § 6(a). See Dade City v. Simpson, 290 So. 2d 530
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
118. Id.
119. Carter v. State Rd. Dep't, 189 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 1966); Statp Rd. Dep't v.
White, 161 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1964).
120. Pensacola Scrap Processors, Inc. v. State Rd. Dep't, 188 So. 2d 38, 41 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
121. Wingert v. Prince, 123 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
122. Florida Dep't Transp. v. Trost Int'l Ltd., 47 Fla. Supp. 175 (Fla. 2d Cir.
Ct. 1978). Trost characterized the vendor's title under an agreement for deed as "a
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condemnation, unless the deed of conveyance specifies otherwise or un-
less there has been an assignment of the cause of action from the owner
at the time of the taking."2 3 Department of Transportation v. Bur-
nette124 provides a good illustration. The plaintiff purchased the land in
1977, approximately eight years after the government's interference
with the property deprived the prior owners of its beneficial use. The
First District Court of Appeal, in reversing the lower court's finding
that the plaintiff's property had been taken, quoted with approval from
the Minnesota case of Brooks Investment Co. v. City of Blooming-
ton.125 In that case, the Supreme Court of Minnesota reasoned that
[w]hen the government interferes with a person's right to possession and
enjoyment of his property to such an extent so as to create a "taking" in
the constitutional sense, a right to compensation vests in the person own-
ing the property at the time of such interference. This right has the sta-
tus of property, is personal to the owner, and does not run with the land
if he should subsequently transfer it without an assignment of such right.
The theory is that where the government interferes with a person's prop-
erty to such a substantial extent, the owner has lost part of his interest in
the real property. Substituted for the property loss is the right to com-
pensation. When the original owner conveys what remains of the realty,
he does not transfer the right to compensation for the portion he has lost
without a separate assignment of such right. If the rule was otherwise,
the original owner of damaged property would suffer a loss and the pur-
chaser of that property would receive a windfall. Presumably, the pur-
chaser will pay the seller only for the real property interest that the
seller possesses at the time of the sale and can transfer.126
The subsequent owner is not, however, without protection. First,
the rationale for the rule enunciated in Burnette lacks persuasion when
the transferor and transferee do not know of the taking at the time of
naked legal title as security for the indebtedness." Id. at 177 (citing Mid-State Invest-
ment Corp. v. O'Steen, 133 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
123. Marianna & B. R. Co. v. Maund, 62 Fla. 538, 56 So. 670 (1911); Depart-
ment of Transp. v. Burnette, 384 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Florida
Power Corp. v. McNeely, 125 So. 2d 311, 318 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1960); State Rd.
Dep't v. Bender, 147 Fla. 15, 2 So. 2d 298 (1941).
124. 384 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
125. 305 Minn. 305, 232 N.W.2d 911 (1975).
126. Id. at 315, 232 N.W.2d at 918.
1 188 5:19811
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the conveyance.127 Moreover, the equities in such a case rest with the
plaintiff because the sales price would not reflect the diminution in the
value of the property for the taking, that is, it is the plaintiff who bears
the ultimate burden.1 28
Second, as previously noted, the subsequent owner may sue if he
has received an assignment of the cause of action. In Florida Power
Corp. v. McNeely,12 9 the action which formed the basis of a taking
claim occurred in 1955, one year prior to the purchase of the lot by the
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs in this case were permitted to sue because they had
"bought an assignment of the cause of action [which the earlier owner]
had against the defendant. 130
Third, the subsequent owner may have remedies other than a suit
in inverse condemnation. He may seek to enjoin the state from continu-
ing its conduct. In Burnette, although the plaintiff was unsuccessful in
making out a case for inverse condemnation, he nevertheless succeeded
in enjoining the state from continuing to burden his land. 31 The court,
in answering the defendant's argument that the plaintiff was not the
proper party to assert ownership, stated that "[i]t is no defense to this
action, so conceived, that the drainage system was already in place
when Burnette bought this acreage and so 'came to the nuisance.' 182
Of equal interest was the court's intimation that it may be necessary to
the state to use its eminent domain powers should the tort continue.
Quite possibly the Department is unable to restore the old northwest
drainage pattern without casting unmanageable water on North Florida
Junior College. Condemnation of some land or easements may be appro-
priate to manage this drainage and compliance with the injunction, but
127. In Burnette, Judge Booth wrote: "the rule [holding that the owner of the
property at the time of the taking is entitled to compensation] does not apply in inverse
condemnation proceedings in the absence of a showing that the plaintiff and his prede-
cessor in title were aware of the existence of a cause of action at the time title was
transferred." 384 So. 2d at 924 (citing Cox Enterprises v. Phillips Petroleum, 550 P.2d
1324 (Okla. 1976)).
128. Id. at 924-25.
129. 125 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
130. Id. at 313.
131. 384 So. 2d 916.
132. Id. at 922 (citing Lawrence v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 81 So. 2d 632, 634
(Fla. 1955)).
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the manner and method of so relieving [plaintiff's] land are for the De-
partment to determine in the exercise of its lawful powers.'33
Regardless of whether the subsequent purchaser acquires an as-
signment or sues in tort, his conduct should be beyond reproach be-
cause courts hesitate to provide a remedy if they find that the pur-
chaser did not buy in good faith, but rather for "the sole purpose of
[instituting] a vexatious lawsuit."13
D. Public Purpose
The Florida Constitution specifically provides that no property
may be taken except for a "public purpose" without full compensa-
tion.1 " The requirement of a public purpose limits the government's
right to take and may not be used defensively by the state in an inverse
condemnation proceeding. 3" In Kirkpatrick v. City of Jacksonville,"'7
the city argued that the plaintiff was not entitled to compensation be-
cause the government did not have a public purpose for destroying his
building. The First District Court of Appeal rejected the city's argu-
ment because the constitutional requirement that private property be
taken only for public purpose serves to protect the landowner, and not
the municipality.38 The state may avoid altogether the issue of
whether a public purpose exists if it can prove that the damage stems
from an isolated trespass or tort rather than from a planned govern-
mental program.139
133. Id. at 923.
134. Id. at 922 (quoting Prosser, LAW OF TORTS 611 (4th ed. 1971)).
135. FLA. CONST. art. 10, § 6(a).
136. See, e.g., Baycol, Inc. v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 315 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1975);
City of Lakeland v. Bunch, 293 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 1974); Demeter Land Co. v. Florida
Pub. Serv. Co., 99 Fla. 954, 128 So. 402 (1930); Brest v. Jacksonville Expressway
Auth., 194 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), affid, 202 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1967).
What constitutes a "public purpose" may be broad. See, e.g., Deseret Ranches of
Florida, Inc. v. Bowman, 349 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 1977); Stein v. Darby, 126 So. 2d 313
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
137. 312 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
138. Id.
139. See White v. Pinellas County, 185 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 1966). In Kirkpatrick,
312 So. 2d 487, the First District Court of Appeal misconstrued White. White held
that a plaintiff would prevail in inverse condemnation only if governmental action was
34
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E. Full Compensation
If a plaintiff succeeds in making out a prima facie case of inverse
condemnation, the Florida Constitution demands that "full compensa-
tion [be] paid to each owner.1 140 The public body is liable to the same
extent in an inverse condemnation proceeding as it is in a direct con-
demnation proceeding.1'4 The award of compensation seeks to make
the property owner "whole so far as is possible and practicable."'142 The
constitutional provision does not seek to put the owner in a better posi-
tion than he would have been in if there had been no taking."3
Full compensation generally means the fair market value of the
property taken.' 4 If less than the complete parcel is taken, severance
damages should be awarded for the remainder of the parcel. 45 The
government bears the burden of proving the value of the property; the
property owner has the burden of proving damage to the remainder of
pursuant to a valid government program.
140. FLA. CONST. art 10, § 6(a).
141. Flatt v. City of Brooksville, 368 So. 2d 631, 632 n.1 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1979) (citing State Rd. Dep't v. Lewis, 190 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1966)).
See Division of Administration v. West Palm Beach Garden Club, 352 So. 2d 1177,
1180 n.3 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
142. Dade County v. General Waterworks Corp., 35 Fla. Supp. 71, 73 (Fla. l1th
Cir. Ct. 1971) (citing Dade County v. Brigham, 47 So. 2d 602, 604 (Fla. 1950)), rev'd
on other grounds, 267 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1972). Accord, Division of Bond Fin. v. Rainey,
275 So. 2d 551, 554 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Cheshire v. State Rd. Dep't, 186
So. 2d 790, 791 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Jacksonville Expressway Auth. v. Ben-
nett, 158 So. 2d 821, 827 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1964) ("the guiding light . . . is to
secure to the owner of the property taken full compensation - to make him whole -
nothing less, nothing more").
143. See Shavers v. Duval County, 73 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1954).
144. Dade County v. General Waterworks Corp., 267 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1972)
(stating that the property might have been acquired for less than fair market value is
immaterial).
145. Kendry v. Division of Administration, 366 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1978); Daniels
v. State Rd. Dep't, 170 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 1964); City of Hollywood v. Jarkesy, 343 So.
2d 886 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977). But see Stanton v. Morgan, 127 Fla. 34, 172 So.
485 (1937) (government liable for property taken but not for tort damages to other
property). If the taking directly enhances the value of the remaining parcel, the en-
hancement may be offset against the severance damages. Limmiatis v. Canal Auth.,
253 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
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his property. 146 Once a taking has occurred, the landowner may recover
for consequential damages to the remainder of his parcel.147 Fair mar-
ket value may be insufficient in certain circumstances. 4 , Full compen-
sation may at times require replacement value. 49 Any evaluation
methods serve merely as tools in ascertaining full compensation.1 50 If
the court determines a taking has occurred, it may order the state to
pay compensation. Some courts will give the state the option of discon-
tinuing its action; other courts will enjoin the state from
appropriating.151
The Florida Legislature occasionally has tried to establish artificial
limits on the amount of compensation for a governmental taking.15 2
Courts generally exhibit an antipathy towards these ceilings, occasion-
ally striking them down as unconstitutional in violation of the full com-
pensation requirement and of the separation of powers mandate in the
Florida Constitution.15" Despite their negative reception, legislative de-
terminations of full compensation, "while not conclusive or binding, are
persuasive and will be upheld unless clearly contrary to the judicial
146. Kendry, 366 So. 2d 391. See City of Fort Lauderdale v. Casino Realty,
Inc., 313 So. 2d 649, 652 (Fla. 1975) (Overton, J., concurring).
147. Kendry, 366 So. 2d 391; Division of Administration v. Grant Motor Co.,
345 So. 2d 843, 845 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Glessner v. Duval County, 203 So.
2d 330, 334 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Dean v. State Rd. Dep't, 165 So. 2d 257
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Benitez v. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth., 26 Fla.
Supp. 53, 64 (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. 1966), affd, 200 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1967). But see Division of Administration v. West Palm Beach Garden Club, 352 So.
2d 1177 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
148. Dade County v. General Waterworks Corp., 267 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1972)
(citing Jacksonville Expressway Auth. v. Henry J. Dupree Co., 108 So. 2d 289 (Fla.
1959)). But see State Plant Bd. v. Smith, 110 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1959).
149. State Rd. Dep't v. Bender, 147 Fla. 15, 2 So. 2d 298 (1941). See Rice v.
City of Fort Lauderdale, 281 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973). But see Hill v.
Marion County, 238 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
150. Dade County v. General Waterworks Corp., 267 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1972);
Division of Bond Fin. of the Dep't of Gen. Servs. v. Rainey, 275 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
151. Mayer v. Dade County, 82 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1955); City of Ormond Beach
v. Lamar-Orlando Outdoor Advertising, 49 Fla. Supp. 196 (Fla. 7th Cir. Ct. 1979);
Field v. City of Miami, 18 Fla. Supp. 179 (Fla. llth Cir. Ct. 1961).
152. Daniels v. State Rd. Dep't, 170 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 1964).
153. Id.
1 192 Nova Law Journal 5:1981 1
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view of the matter." 1 4
The jury takes its directions from the trial judge in determining
the amount of money which should be awarded an injured plaintiff.155
The jury may not make an independent determination of the value of
the property, but may evaluate, interpret, and weigh expert testi-
mony.156 In Behm v. Division of Administration,1 57 the Supreme Court
of Florida made it clear that "compensation . . .is by our constitultion
committed for final determination to the jury, not to an expert."1 58
Three limitations still exist to check the principle enunciated in Behm.
First, substantial evidence must support the jury determination.159 Sec-
ond, the jury verdict must be at least equal to the state's admission of
damages. g10 Third, the judge may grant a new trial if the verdict
"shocks" him by being contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence,
even where the jury returns a verdict within the range of testified
values."'1
Florida law grants reasonable attorney's fees in inverse condemna-
tion and eminent domain proceedings.6 2 In State Road Department v.
Lewis,16 3 the government argued that an award of attorney's fees was
improper in an inverse condemnation action. The First District Court
154. Id. at 853.
155. State Plant Bd. v. Smith, 110 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1959) (citing Spafford v.
Brevard County, 92 Fla. 617, 110 So. 451 (1926)). Accord, Behm v. Division of Ad-
ministration, 383 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 1980); Daniels v. State Rd. Dep't, 170 So. 2d 846
(Fla. 1964); State ex rel. State Rd. Dep't v. Wingfield, 101 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1958); Dade County v. General Waterworks Corp., 35 Fla. Supp. 71 (Fla.
11 th Cir. Ct. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 267 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1972); Pitz v. State
Rd. Dep't, 32 Fla. Supp. 55 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. 1966).
156. Behm v. Division of Administration, 326 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 1976).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 582.
159. Meyers v. City of Daytona Beach, 158 Fla. 859, 30 So. 354 (1947); Bain-
bridge v. State Rd. Dep't, 139 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
160. Meyers, 158 Fla. 859, 30 So. 354.
161. Bennett v. Jacksonville Expressway Auth., 131 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 1961).
162. FLA. STAT. § 73.092 (1979). Askew v. Gables-By-The-Sea, Inc., 333 So. 2d
56 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976); State Rd. Dep't v. Bender, 190 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Dratch v. Dade County, 105 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1958).
163. 190 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
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of Appeal called the state's argument "absurd." 64
[W]e find [the state's] position to be that if [the state] complies with the
law of this State by instituting an eminent domain action, it is liable for
attorneys' fees; but if it unlawfully appropriated a citizen's property
without instituting such an action, it thus escapes liability for the attor-
neys' fees incurred by the aggrieved owner. The absurdity of this argu-
ment disposes of this point contra to the [state's] contention., 5
The services performed by attorneys and experts in attempting to
obtain federal relocation payments have been held not to be
compensable.1 66
Attorneys may receive sizeable amounts in inverse condemnation
cases. In State of Florida v. Gables-By-The-Sea, Inc., 1 7 the Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeal rejected the state's argument that fees must be
calculated upon a time and hourly-rate basis. The court noted that
"[i]n an inverse condemnation proceeding, attorneys' fees must be
viewed as entirely contingent until a 'taking' is judicially deter-
mined." 168 Rejecting the contention that $850,000 in attorney's fees for
legal services over a five-year period was excessive, the district court
cited to a number of factors which are permissible in establishing the
propriety of a fee: the benefit to the client, the novelty, difficulty, and
importance of the questions involved, and the attorney's skill and talent
may all influence the amount of the award given.'6 9
Expert witnesses must testify at trial concerning the value of ser-
164. Id. at 600.
165. Id. Because attorney's fees in an inverse condemnation proceeding remain
contingent until a taking has been determined and the proceeding itself is more com-
plex than in eminent domain, the fees should be substantially greater than in a suit for
eminent domain. See generally cases cited notes 167-69 infra.
166. Division of Administration v. Grant Motor Co., 345 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
167. 374 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 383 So. 2d 1203
(Fla. 1980).
168. Id. at 584.
169. Id. The court used in part the factors outlined in the Code of Professional
Responsibility and in FLA. STAT. § 73.092 (1977) as guidelines for determining the
appropriate fee. As one expert testified in the litigation, "the skill required" to prevail
in this complex case was "ten" on a one-to-ten scale. Id.
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vices performed by the attorney.1 70 One should also keep accurate
records of time and expenses. 7
Full compensation also includes interest on the value of the prop-
erty taken from the time of its appropriation . 7 A property owner may
also recover his costs. 7 3 These include reasonable and necessary ex-
penses for appraisers and expert witnesses, at least when the testimony
relates directly to the establishment of the prima facie case.274
Business losses are not compensable injuries under section 6(a).
Arguably, a plaintiff suffers just as much when he loses the goodwill of
his trade and future income as he does when he must relinquish a fee
simple interest.'" But Florida courts have adhered rigidly to the gen-
eral rule that the proprietor lacks a complete remedy. Several ratio-
170. Lyle v. Lyle, 167 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (involving a
dissolution of marriage action); Central & S. Fla. Flood Control Dist. v. Scott, 30 Fla.
Supp. 37 (Fla. 19th Cir. Ct. 1968); Division of Administration v. Condominium Int'l,
317 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Breitbort v. State Rd. Dep't, 116 So. 2d
458 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1959). Reasonable fees for obtaining those experts' testi-
mony also may be recovered. Central & S. Fla. Flood Control Dist., 30 Fla. Supp. 37.
The attorney may also testify concerning the value of his services, and the jury award
may not exceed that value. State v. Gables-By-The-Sea, Inc., 374 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
171. City of Miami Beach v. Manilow, 253 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1971); Division of Administration v. Condominium Int'l, 317 So. 2d at 812 n.2. See
State v. Gables-By-The-Sea, Inc., 374 So. 582 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
172. State Rd. Dep't v. Lewis, 190 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1966);
FLA. STAT. § 74.091 (1979).
173. FLA. STAT. § 73.091 (1979); State Rd. Dep't v. Bender, 147 Fla. 15, 2 So.
2d 298 (1941). But see Corneal v. State Plant Bd., 101 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1958).
174. Florida Coast Ry. Co. v. Martin County, 171 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1965); Dade
County v. Brigham, 47 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 1950); City of Miami Beach v. Manilow, 253
So. 2d 910 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1971); Cheshire v. State Rd. Dep't, 186 So. 2d 790
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1966); City of Miami Beach v. Belle Isle Apartment Corp.,
177 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (expert witness fees part of costs). But
see Inland Waterway Dev. Co. v. City of Jacksonville, 38 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 1948).
175. Behm v. Division of Administration, 383 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 1980); Division of
Administration v. Grant Motor Co., 345 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977);
State Rd. Dep't v. Abel Inv. Co., 165 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1964). See
City of Tampa v. Texas Co., 107 So. 2d 216, 225 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1970). Where
an interest of less duration than a fee is taken, the value of that interest has been held
to be the loss in rental income. Pitz v. State Rd. Dep't, 32 Fla. Supp. 55 (Fla. 11th Cir.
Ct. 1966).
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nales have been offered, none compelling. For the most part, courts fear
that permitting recovery in a commercial setting would expand the
scope of liability to unmanagable limits. 17 As a final argument, the
state may claim that because the proprietor can relocate and continue
his business elsewhere, he never suffers a true loss. 177
Although business losses themselves rarely constitute compensable
injuries, the value of the property to be condemned may reflect the
property's earning potential.' 7 8 The court, in calculating the size of an
award, considers all those items in which a "willing buyer" would be
interested if he were "purchasing the entire package.' 9 Thus, factors
such as past investments and projected future income influence the
amount of compensation awarded.
Relief may also exist by statute; one in particular authorizes re-
covery for certain types of business losses under limited circum-
stances. 80 As one court has noted "the right to business damages is a
matter of legislative grace . . ... ,81 It follows, then, that in order to
receive an award under this enactment, the injured businessman bears
the burden of proving his entitlement."i 2 And he may not use this stat-
ute for a "second recovery" of severance damages: "such a result, upon
principles of justice and fair play, should not be allowed.' ' 3
176. See, e.g., State Rd. Dep't v. Bramlett, 189 So. 2d 481, 483-84 (Fla. 1966)
("[W]e think we would be less than cautious and far from practical if we were to
sanction what could well lead to a stampede into the field of damages in eminent do-
main proceedings. Allowing [business damages] could start the rush. We would hold
the line."). See also Northcutt v. State Rd. Dep't of Fla., 209 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1968).
177. Dade County v. General Waterworks Corp., 267 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1972).
178. Division of Bond Fin. of the Dep't of Gen. Servs. v. Rainey, 275 So. 2d 551
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
179. Id. at 554.
180. FLA. STAT. § 73.071(3)(b) (1979).
181. Tuttle v. Division of Administration, 327 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1976), aff'd, 336 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 1976).
182. City of Fort Lauderdale v. Casino Realty, Inc., 313 So. 2d 649, 654 (Fa.
1975) (Overton, J., concurring).
183. Glessner v. Duval County, 203 So. 2d 330, 335 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1967).
1 196 5:1981 1
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3. DEFENSES
First, the state may claim that it has merely committed a trespass
or other tort. Such an allegation, if successfully maintained, is fatal to
a suit for inverse condemnation.
Second, the state may claim that it did not take property but
merely exercised its police power."" The First District Court of Appeal
has suggested that the state has the burden of proving as an affirmative
defense the proper exercise of its police power.185
A defense may exist if the landowner gave the property interest to
the state or otherwise "consented" or "acquiesced" to the taking.186
Similarly, if the taking conferred a privilege to the owner, the state
may use this reciprocal exchange as a defense.1 87 Prescription, laches,
and dedication may also be asserted by the state,1 88 although the one-
year statute of limitations for tort actions does not apply to an equita-
ble action in inverse condemnation. 89 An estoppel can, according to at
least one court, prevent a private property owner from asserting that a
taking has occurred.1 90
184. FLA. CONST. art 10, § 6(a).
185. Kirkpatrick v. City of Jacksonville, 312 So. 2d 487, 490 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1975).
186. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Rader, 306 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1975). Compare Alford v. Finch, 155 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 1963), with City of Coral
Gables v. State ex rel. Landis, 129 Fla. 834, 177 So. 290 (1937). Because a taking
consists of an entry and appropriation, consent to entry will not in and of itself consti-
tute a defense to suit. Edwards Dairy, Inc. v. Pasco Water Auth., Inc., 348 So. 2d 866
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
187. See State v. Georgia S. & F. Ry. Co., 139 Fla. 115, 190 So. 527 (1938).
188. Smith v. City of Melbourne, 211 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
Benitez v. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth., 26 Fla. Supp. 53 (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct.
1966), aff'd, 200 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1967), cert. denied, 204 So. 2d 328
(Fla. 1967). See Delaney v. Department of Transp., 306 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1975).
189. Hillsborough County v. Kensett, 107 Fla. 237, 144 So. 383 (1932). But see
Benitez, 200 So. 2d 194.
190. Compare Division of Administration v. West Palm Beach Garden Club, 352
So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977), with Mayer v. Dade County, 82 So. 2d 513
(Fla. 1955). See also City of Miami v. Romer, 73 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1954).
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4. PROCEDURES
In general, the judge determines whether governmental action has
resulted in a taking.'"" If compensation is to be awarded, the judge
should order the state to institute condemnation proceedings. 192 At
these proceedings, the jury determines the extent of the appropriation
and the amount of damages.9 3 The Florida Administrative Procedure
Act cannot, consistent with the state constitution, relegate questions
concerning a taking to administrative determination.9 4 Finally, the
court, as part of its inherent power to enforce judgments and pursuant
to the constitution, may order the agency to issue the necessary author-
ization to the state treasurer to pay the award, at least in those situa-
tions in which funds are available.195
5. PRACTICE POINTERS
In preparing an inverse condemnation lawsuit, the attorney should
not overlook other federal and state constitutional guarantees. Govern-
ment action may violate the due process or equal protection clauses of
the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Other
obvious challenges also exist. For example, in State ex reL Furman v.
Searey,'98 the Fourth District Court of Appeal invalidated permit re-
191. Estuary Properties, Inc. v. Askew, 381 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1979), aff'd in part revd in part sub nom., Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 1981
Fla. L. Weekly 275 (April 16, 1981). Sarasota - Manatee Airport Auth. v. Alderman,
238 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
192. State Rd. Dep't v. Bender, 147 Fla. 15, 2 So. 2d 298 (1941); Florida Power
Corp. v. McNeely, 125 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (citing Broward
County v. Douldin, 114 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1959) and State Rd. Dep't
v. Tharp, 146 Fla. 745, 1 So. 2d 868 (1941)); Askew v. Gables-By-The-Sea, 333 So. 2d
56 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
193. FLA. STAT. § 73.10 (1979). Flatt v. City of Brooksville, 368 So. 2d 631
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979). But there is no constitutional right to a jury determina-
tion. See Carter v. State Rd. Dep't, 189 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 1966).
194. Department of Rev. v. Young American Builders, Inc., 330 So. 2d 864 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976); State v. State, 326 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976);
FLA. CONST. art. 2, § 3.
195. State Rd. Dep't v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 166 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
196. 225 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
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quirements on a substantive due process ground. Ordinances have also
fallen to vagueness and overbreadth challenges. 1 7
Both the Florida and the United States Constitutions may be re-
lied upon by the property owner. Because no election problem exists,
the attorney should attempt to base his claim on both constitutional
guarantees. If federal case law gives less protection to his client, the
attorney may still prove his case under the Florida Constitution.9 8
Courts should hesitate before granting summary judgment in an
inverse condemnation action.199 Authority exists for the proposition
that all doubts should be resolved against the state.20 0 As with other
cases, legally competent, substantial evidence must support the plain-
tiff's prima facie case. 20 1 The attorney should exhaust his available ad-
ministrative remedies.0 2
197. Admiral Dev. Corp. v. City of Maitland, 338 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1972).
198. See Little, New Attitudes About Legal Protection for Remains of Florida's
Natural Environment, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 459 (1970-71).
199. Wilson v. State Rd. Dep't, 201 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
200. Alford v. Finch, 155 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 1963); Benitez, 26 Fla. Supp. 53
(citing Alford), aff'd, 200 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1967), cert. denied, 204
So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1967).
201. Walters v. State Rd. Dep't, 239 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
202. See Kasser v. Dade County, 344 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
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Electoral Graffiti: The Right to Write-in
Robert Batey*
The election of 1980 focused unprecedented attention on the discon-
tented voter. The presidential candidacies of John Anderson, Ed Clark
of the Libertarian Party, and Barry Commoner of the Citizen's Party
appealed directly to those unhappy with the choice offered by the two-
party system.1
While the presence on the ballot of an independent or third-party
candidate can provide the discontented with an alternative to not vot-
ing, this option is not frequently available. When it is not, the voter's
only affirmative way of expressing his discontent is to write on the bal-
lot the name of an individual who meets the qualifications for the office
involved, but who is hot a declared candidate. The right to cast such a
"write-in vote," and to have that vote counted, is the subject of this
article.
The implementation of electronic voting2 sparked recent legal in-
terest in write-in voting in Florida. First permitted in 1973,3 electronic
voting did not become a significant part of Florida's electoral system
until 1977, when the earlier legislation was overhauled.4 Also in 1977,
the Legislature systematically removed virtually every reference in the
election laws to write-in voting.5 Robert L. Shevin, then Florida's At-
* Associate Professor, Stetson University College of Law. B.A., Yale University,
1970; J.D., University of Virginia, 1974; LL.M., University of Illinois, 1976. The au-
thor, who was plaintiff and counsel pro se in the case discussed in the text at notes 34-
40 infra, wishes to thank the following Stetson law graduates for their assistance in the
preparation both of that lawsuit and of this article: Deborah A. Bushnell and Sara M.
Fotopulos. Of course, Ms. Bushnell and Ms. Fotopulos bear no responsibility for any of
the views expressed by the author.
1. See generally A. HADLEY, THE EMPTY POLLING BOOTH (1978).
2. See Electronic Voting Systems Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 101.5601-.5615 (1979).
3. Ch. 73-156, 1973 Fla. Laws 298.
4. Ch. 77-175, 1977 Fla. Laws 903.
5. See, e.g., id. § 66, repealing FLA. STAT. § 101.091 (1975) (providing in part
"nothing in this code [shall be] construed to prevent any elector, at any general elec-
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torney General, concluded that "[s]ince . . . there are no longer any
provisions in the election code for write-in ballots .... they have been
effectively prohibited."
One can only guess at the motivations of the 1977 legislators who
voted to prohibit write-in voting. One factor, however, may have been
the recognition that write-in voting complicates the electronic tabula-
tion of votes.7 Accordingly, a prohibition on write-in votes would facili-
tate the adoption of electronic voting.
This article describes methods of resisting the Florida Legisla-
ture's attempt to ban write-in voting. Part I explores the federal consti-
tutional challenge to such a ban. Part II considers the impact of the
Florida Constitution on the action of the 1977 Legislature. In the latter
context, the 1979 decision in Smith v. Smathers,8 which partially re-
vived the practice of write-in voting, will be discussed.
I
Although no specific language exists in the United States Consti-
tution guaranteeing the right to vote, this right has long been accorded
constitutional status.9 It can be argued persuasively that this right in-
cludes the right to cast a write-in vote.
tion, from voting at a general election for any qualified person other than those whose
names are printed on the ballot").
Interestingly, there was one oversight. Section 101.5606, which sets out the
requirements that an electronic voting system must meet, indicates that every such
system used in Florida must provide "a method for write-in voting." Id. § 101.5606
(1979). Perhaps this requirement was retained in order that the systems could be used
in municipal elections, in which the 1977 legislation permitted write-in voting. See note
6 infra.
6. Letter from Robert L. Shevin to Robert Batey, dated July 20, 1978 (on file
with the author). Attorney General Shevin added, however, "This action would not
prohibit the use of such voting in a municipal election unless said municipality adopted
the state election code." Id.
7. Tabulation by "data processing machines" is the essential feature of an elec-
tronic voting system. FLA. STAT. § 101.5602 (1979). Not only must write-in votes be
hand counted, but they also require close examination of the ballot cards in order to
prevent multiple voting.
8. 372 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1979).
9. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554-56 (1964) (collecting cases).
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ATo restrict a voter to only those candidates whose names appear on
the ballot arguably denies him any affirmative method of expressing his
dissatisfaction with the listed candidates. He faces one choice: he must
either select from a group of candidates, all of whom he deems un-
worthy, or not vote at all. In Socialist Labor Party v. Rhodes,10 a
three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio recognized that forcing such a choice on a voter is
constitutionally intolerable. Under then prevailing Ohio law, a voter
could cast a write-in ballot in a given election only if there were no
names on the ballot for that contest. Members of the Socialist Labor
Party and of the American Independent Party, unable to have the
names of their parties' presidential and vice-presidential nominees
placed on the official Ohio ballot, sought injunctive relief assuring that
they would at least be able to write in the names of their candidates. In
a per curiam opinion, the three-judge court ordered such relief:
Voters are often not content to vote for one of the candidates nominated
by the two major parties. A write-in ballot permits a voter to effectively
exercise his individual constitutionally protected franchise. . .. A blan-
ket prohibition against the use of the write-in ballots denies . . . quali-
fied electors. . . the right to freely participate in the electoral process as
guaranteed by the Constitution .... 11
The plaintiffs in Socialist Labor Party appealed because they
sought not just the right to write-in but also a place on the official
ballot for their respective nominees. The United States Supreme Court
granted this additional relief to the American Independent Party plain-
tiffs, but not to the Socialist Labor Party plaintiffs. In its opinion, the
Supreme Court did not address the write-in voting question because no
appeal had been taken from that portion of the three-judge panel's
opinion granting plaintiffs the right to write-in. 2
10. 290 F. Supp. 983 (S.D. Ohio 1968), aff'd in part and modified in part sub
nom. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). For a discussion of the case on appeal,
see text at notes 12 & 36-37 infra.
11. 290 F. Supp. at 987 (citation omitted).
12. 393 U.S. at 26. Other readings of the Supreme Court's opinion are possible.
See text at notes 36 & 37 infra.
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Socialist Labor Party is one of only three reported cases that fully
considers the claim that there is a federal constitutional right to write-
in. The others are Thompson v. Willson,"3 a Georgia case, and Kamins
v. Board of Elections,4 a case arising in the District of Columbia.
As in Socialist Labor Party, the court in Thompson found that
the United States Constitution guarantees the voter "the right to write
the name of his choice and to strike the name presented to him. ... "I'
In voiding a statute that prohibited write-in voting, the Georgia Su-
preme Court wrote, "We have heard of similar methods of holding
elections in other so-called democratic countries . . .. but this is not
the American way .... ,,16
In Kamins, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals all but up-
held the federal constitutional claim asserted by the plaintiff. Faced
with a statute that allowed the counting of votes only for candidates
"whose name[s] appear on the general election ballot, ' 17 plaintiff ob-
jected, alleging a violation of the constitutional right to vote for an
otherwise qualified candidate whose name was not on the ballot. Quot-
ing extensively from Socialist Labor Party, the court construed the rel-
evant statutory language to permit write-in voting. 8 Considering the
plain language of the statute and the court's heavy reliance on Social-
ist Labor Party, the result in Kamins is tantamount to a holding that a
prohibition on write-in voting would be unconstitutional.
Numerous reported cases have dealt with the right to write-in as a
matter of state constitutional law. Indeed, Thompson held that the
statute struck down in that case violated both the United States and
the Georgia Constitutions.1 These state constitutional law holdings are
relevant to the federal constitutional question because few of these
cases rely on specific constitutional language regarding the right to
write-in; instead, the cases consider whether this right derives from the
general concept of a right to vote. Thus, these decisions are persuasive
authority for a similar interpretation of the federally guaranteed right
13. 223 Ga. 370, 155 S.E.2d 401 (1967).
14. 324 A.2d 187 (D.C. 1974).
15. 223 Ga. at -, 155 S.E.2d at 404.
16. Id.
17. D.C. CODE § 1-1110(a)(2) (1973).
18. 324 A.2d at 193-94.
19. 223 Ga. at -, 155 S.E.2d at 404.
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to vote.
Besides the Georgia Supreme Court, the highest courts in Colo-
rado,20 Florida,21 Iowa,22 and Maryland 23 have invalidated statutes
prohibiting write-ins on state constitutional grounds. Four courts have
reinterpreted statutes that appear to outlaw write-in voting, specifically
in order to save the enactments from violating state constitutional
law.24 Furthermore, several other courts have expressed in dicta that
their state constitutions guarantee the right to write-in.25
Of all the cases dealing with write-in voting as a matter of state
constitutional law, the most thorough discussion appears in Jackson v.
Norris, a 1937 decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals.26 In that
case, a voter sued to nullify a contract, executed by the Baltimore City
Voting Machine Board pursuant to statute, for the purchase of voting
machines that did not permit write-in voting. The trial court granted
the desired relief, and the court of appeals affirmed. The appellate
court emphatically determined that the right to vote included the right
to write-in: "An election is not free, nor does the elector enjoy a full
and fair opportunity to vote, if the right of suffrage is so restricted by
statute that he may not cast his ballot for such persons as are his
choice for the elective office." '27
Considering the argument that one vote is a trivial concern, the
court responded that it was "no minor matter":2 8
20. Littlejohn v. People ex reL. Desch, 52 Colo. 217, 121 P. 159 (1912).
21. Smith v. Smathers, 372 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1979); State ex reL. Lamar v. Dil-
lon, 32 Fla. 545, 14 So. 383 (1893). But see Pasco v. Heggen, 314 So. 2d 1 (Fla.
1975). For a detailed discussion of these cases, see text at notes 51-71 infra.
22. Barr v. Cardell, 173 Iowa 18, 155 N.W. 312 (1915).
23. Jackson v. Norris, 173 Md. 579, 195 A. 576 (1937).
24. Conn v. Isensee, 45 Cal. App. 531, 188 P. 279 (1920); Stewart v. Cart-
wright, 156 Ga. 192, 118 S.E. 859 (1923); Mayor v. State ex rel. Howie, 102 Miss.
663, 59 So. 873 (1912) (but see McKenzie v. Boykin, I11 Miss. 256, 71 So. 382
(1916)); Park v. Rives, 40 Utah 47, 119 P. 1034 (1911).
25. People ex rel. Hoyne v. McCormick, 261 Ill. 413, 103 N.E. 1053 (1914);
Cole v. Tucker, 164 Mass. 486, 41 N.E. 681 (1895); Westcott v. Scull, 87 N.J.L. 410,
96 A. 407 (1915); People ex rel. Bradley v. Shaw, 133 N.Y. 493, 31 N.E. 512, 19
N.Y.S. 302 (1892); Oughton v. Black, 212 Pa. 1, 61 A. 346 (1905); State ex rel.
Runge v. Anderson, 100 Wis. 523, 76 N.W. 482 (1898).
26. 173 Md. 579, 195 A. 576 (1937).
27. Id. at -, 195 A. at 586.
28. Id.
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It must be considered in this connection that every voter has but a single
vote to cast. This vote, whether cast with the majority or the minority, is
as important in terms of personal value and constitutional significance as
every other vote. The futility of the elector's vote is not the measure of
his constitutional right. The civic and political importance of an un-
abridged and unhampered choice lie in the freedom of the elector to ex-
ercise fully this right on any occasion. .... 29
From this argument of a single votes insignificance, the court in
Jackson turned to a consideration of the would-be write-in voter's main
alternative: seeking a place on the official ballot for his candidate. But
this, according to the Maryland Court of Appeals, was not an
"equivalent . . . constitutional substitute. . . . [D]eprivation of [the
elector's] right to vote for his own choice is not compensated by the
privilege to make the costly, precarious, and laborious efforts to unite
"930the large group of voters . . . which would be necessary ....
Not all courts have followed this reasoning. 31 The contrary deci-
sions lack support for the conclusion that write-in voting may be pro-
hibited without abridging the right to vote; typically, there is only ref-
erence to the legislature's general power to regulate the conduct of
elections.3 2 Surveying these cases, one can conclude, as did the Mary-
land Court of Appeals in Jackson, that "[t]he decisions of [these]
states . . . are opposed by a preponderance of authority, and the
grounds on which they rest are not persuasive in view of the reasons
assigned in support of the majority view."33
29. Id. at_, 195 A. at 587.
30. Id. at _, 195 A. at 586.
31. Davidson v. Rhea, 221 Ark. 885, 256 S.W.2d 744 (1953) (5-2 decision);
Pasco v. Heggen, 314 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1975); State ex rel. Mize v. McElroy, 44 La. Ann.
796, 11 So. 133 (1892); McKenzie v. Boykin, 111 Miss. 256, 71 So. 382 (1916);
Mullholand v. Batt, 164 Ohio St. 362, 130 N.E.2d 805 (1955) (upholding the statute
declared unconstitutional in Socialist Labor Party v. Rhodes); Chamberlin v. Wood,
15 S.D. 216, 88 N.W. 109 (1901) (2-1 decision). For a discussion of Pasco v. Heggen,
see text at notes 56-65 infra. For a discussion of Socialist Labor Party v. Rhodes, see
text at notes 10-12 supra.
32. See, e.g., Davidson v. Rhea, 221 Ark. at -, 256 S.W.2d at 746, quoting
Chamberlin v. Woods, 15 S.D. at -, 88 N.W. at 111. Pasco v. Heggen, see note 31
supra, is not typical of such cases. Pasco develops a unique restriction on the right to
write-in and supports it with unique reasoning. See text at notes 56-65 infra.
33. 173 Md. at -, 195 A. at 588.
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The Right To Write-In
Examination of the cases dealing with the right to write-in reveals
substantial recognition of that right. No reported case explicitly dealing
with a federal constitutional argument questions the existence of such a
right. In addition, a preponderance of the cases considering a state con-
stitutional argument supports the proposition that the right to vote in-
cludes the right to cast a write-in ballot. Thus, there is considerable
force to the contention that the United States Constitution guarantees
the right to write-in.
B
In an unreported decision rendered in November of 1978, the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida rejected
this contention,3' finding no federal constitutional violation in Florida's
prohibition on write-in voting. The district court reached this conclu-
sion, which is of major significance in Florida, in two main steps.
First, the court considered the significance of Socialist Labor
Party v. Rhodes,35 the only other federal court decision directly on
point. The court considered the opinion of the three-judge panel in So-
cialist Labor Party undercut by the action taken by the United States
Supreme Court on appeal.
The plaintiffs in Socialist Labor Party sought either a place on the
ballot for their candidates or the right to write-in those candidates'
names. The three-judge panel considered each of these claims sepa-
rately. According to the Florida federal court, however, "[T]he Su-
preme Court's analysis . . . took a different approach. There was no
discussion of the right to vote as a matter completely distinct from bal-
lot access." 36 Rather, continued the district court, the reasoning of the
Supreme Court implied that "the right to vote is intimately related to
the right of access to the ballot (indeed, The Supreme Court has ...
stated [in another case] that the rights of voters to vote and of candi-
dates to ballot access are 'intertwined.') ' 37 Thus, the Florida federal
court concluded that the constitutional status of the right to write-in
could not be judged without reference to those constitutional decisions
34. Batey v. Krivanek, No. 78-815 (M.D. Fla., Nov. 22, 1978) (Krentzman, J.).
35. See text at notes 10-12 supra.
36. No. 78-815, slip op. at 5.
37. Id. (quoting Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 715 (1974)).
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concerning a candidate's right of access to the ballot. Because the lower
court's decision in Socialist Labor Party had not done this, the district
court reasoned that case's holding was questionable.
This reasoning foreshadowed the second step in the federal district
court's analysis: examination of the ballot access cases. The district
court emphasized the recognized right of a state to "keep its ballots
within manageable, reasonable limits"3 8 by "limiting places on the bal-
lot to those who can demonstrate substantial popular support."3 9 Then
the court related these holdings to the "intertwined" right to vote. The
court wrote: "If the number of places on the ballot can be so limited, it
follows that there cannot simultaneously exist an unrestricted right to
cast write-in votes for whomever the voter thinks should be a
candidate."'40
This sentence forms the crux of the district court's opinion, and its
logic is quite simple. The state's power to keep a candidate's name off
the official ballot necessarily includes the power to prevent individual
voters from adding that name to their ballots. While simple, this logic
is not unassailable. Indeed, both steps in the district court's analysis
invite criticism.
The federal court erred in its reading of the action taken by the
Supreme Court in Socialist Labor Party. First, the district court failed
to consider the fact that the defendants in Socialist Labor Party did
not appeal.41 Thus, the only issue properly before the Supreme Court
was the three-judge panel's refusal to place plaintiffs' candidates on the
official ballot. Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court did not view the
right to vote as a matter separate from ballot access.
Nonetheless, considerable authority does exist to support the pro-
position that the rights to vote and to ballot access are intertwined. But
attentive reading of the ballot access cases shows that they are not as
38. Id. at 6, (citing Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972)).
39. Id. (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)).
40. Id.
41. This oversight is understandable because both parties to the Florida lawsuit
also overlooked this fact in the memoranda they filed with the district court. See, e.g.,
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Batey v.
Krivanek, No. 78-815, slip op. at 2-3 (M.D. Fla., filed Sept. 28, 1978) (arguing errone-
ously that the Supreme Court had affirmed the write-in holding of the three-judge
panel).
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closely interrelated as the district court found.
A state may, under certain circumstances, deny a candidate a
place on its official ballot without violating the federal constitution.42
But the state interest that is served by such a limitation is the desire to
keep "ballots within manageable, understandable limits.1 43 The con-
cern is that " 'laundry list' ballots [will] discourage voter participation
and confuse and frustrate those who do participate. . . ."" Seen in
this light, a limit on ballot access does not conflict with the right to
write-in. Allowing write-in votes does not expand the ballot (except to
add a blank space under each office), nor does it confound or deter the
would-be voter. Thus, the ballot access cases do not implicitly deny the
right to write-in.
In fact, the ballot access cases provide arguments supporting the
right to write-in, rather than reasons for denying that right. The
United States Supreme Court has frequently cited the fact that a state
permits write-in votes as a reason for allowing that state to limit a can-
didate's access to the ballot. In Jenness v. Fortson,'4 5 the Court upheld
a set of Georgia laws keeping off the ballot any minor-party or inde-
pendent candidate who could not garner the signatures of five percent
of the voters in the previous general election. In approving these laws,
the Court noted:
[T]hese procedures relate only to the right to have the name of a candi-
date or the nominee of a "political body" printed on the ballot. There is
no limitation whatever, procedural or substantive, on the right of a voter
to write in on the ballot the name of the candidate of his choice and to
have that write-in vote counted.46
Therefore, the fact that a voter could write in the name of a candidate
denied ballot access was one reason for allowing the state to limit that
access. Similar reliance on the availability of write-in votes is found in
Storer v. Brown, 7 and in American Party v. White,'8 companion cases
42. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
43. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 715 (1974) (emphasis added).
44. Id.
45. 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
46. Id. at 434.
47. 415 U.S. 724, 736 n.7 (1974) (upholding California's requirement that
5:1981
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applying the ballot access principles of Jenness. Considering Jenness,
Storer, and American Party, one court has concluded that they lend
credence to the argument that there is a federal constitutional right to
write-in .4
Contrary to the reasoning of the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Florida, the ballot access cases decided by the
Supreme Court do not necessitate denial of the existence of a constitu-
tional right to write in. This right and the right to a place on the ballot
are not that closely intertwined. Rather, the rights are complamentary.
The Supreme Court's cases imply that, because a state may limit one
of these political rights, access to the ballot, it must honor the other the
right to cast a write-in vote.
II
The case for write-in voting draws support not only from the
United States Constitution, but also from the constitutions of the sev-
eral states.50 In Florida, the status of write-in voting as a matter of
state constitutional law has developed in a decidedly distinctive fashion.
With respect to this issue, no other state's constitutional documents
have been interpreted as Florida's have. Almost a century of Florida
jurisprudence has produced this result: there is a state constitutional
right to cast a write-in vote, but only if the vote is cast for someone
who has "qualified" as a write-in candidate.
This interpretation of the Florida Constitution, while better than a
denial of the right to write-in, is unsatisfactory on many counts. The
Florida Supreme Court should abandon this interpretation, replacing it
with a broader recognition of the right to cast a write-in vote.
minor-party and independent candidates have been disaffiliated from the major parties
for at least a year).
48. 415 U.S. 767, 772 n.3 (1974) (upholding Texas's requirement that minor-
party and independent candidates show substantial support through either previous bal-
loting, nominating conventions, or petitions).
49. Kamins v. Board of Elections, 324 A.2d 187, 193 n. 11 (D.C. 1974).
50. See text at notes 19-25 supra.
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The right to write-in was first found in the state constitution in
1893. In State ex rel. Lamar v. Dillon,5" the state attorney general
brought a quo warranto action against thirteen councilmen of the city
of Jacksonville. Attorney General Lamar contended that the council-
men had been elected pursuant to an unconstitutional statute and,
therefore, had unlawfully usurped the offices of their predecessors.
Among the allegedly unconstitutional features of the statute was a pro-
hibition on write-n voting in the Jacksonville election.52
While rejecting the rest of the attorney general's challenges to the
election statute, the Florida Supreme Court agreed that the ban on
write-in voting violated the state constitution's pledge that "in all elec-
tions by the people, the vote shall be by ballot."5' 3 Construing this gen-
eral recognition of the right to vote, the court held:." [T] he legislature
cannot, in our judgment, restrict an elector to voting for some one of
the candidates whose names have been printed upon the official ballot.
He must be left free to vote for whom he pleases. . . ." After finding
one portion of the statute unconstitutional, the state supreme court
went on to uphold the challenged election, because there was no allega-
tion by the attorney general that any Jacksonville voter had wanted to
cast a write-in vote.55
The broad language of this 1893 decision, recognizing a right to
vote as one "pleases," remained an unchallenged facet of Florida's
jurisprudence for more than eighty years. For this reason, the plaintiffs
in Pasco v. Heggen,56 a 1975 decision of the state supreme court, must
have been surprised to find that court undercutting its previous
position.
51. 32 Fla. 545, 14 So. 383 (1893).
52. There was no explicit prohibition; however, the state supreme court con-
cluded that "the only fair and reasonable construction [of the statute] restrict[s] the
voter to a choice of candidates printed on the ballot." Id. at 582, 14 So. at 394.
53. This provision appeared in article VI, section 6, of the 1885 Constitution.
54. 32 Fla. at 579, 14 So. at 393-94. This language echoes an earlier decision,
State v. Anderson, 26 Fla. 240, 8 So. 1 (1890): "The distinguishing theory of the ballot
system is that every voter shall be permitted to vote for whom he pleases. Id. at
259, 8 So. at 5, quoted at 32 Fla. at 579, 14 So. at 393.
55. 32 Fla. at 585-86, 14 So. at 396.
56. 314 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1975).
I
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Plaintiffs Pasco and Perkins wanted to cast write-in votes in a Tal-
lahassee city commission election. They were prevented from doing so
by the combined effect of two state statutes: one prescribing the means
by which a person may qualify as a write-in candidate, and another
providing a space on the ballot for write-in votes only when a write-in
candidate has qualified.57 Because no one had registered as a write-in
candidate for the Office of Tallahassee City Commissioner, Group 1,58
Pasco and Perkins were not allowed to write in any name for the office.
Their lawsuit claimed that the operation of these two statutes violated
the right to vote guaranteed them by the state constitution. Despite the
broad language of State ex rel. Lamar v. Dillon, the Florida Supreme
Court disagreed, upholding the statutes in question.
The court, in an opinion written by Justice Ben Overton, cited Dil-
lon with approval,59 but then indicated two major reasons why the
challenged statutes did not offend the principle enunciated in that case.
First was the need "to protect the integrity of [the] political process
from frivolous or fraudulent candidacy."60 Requiring write-in candi-
dates to register prior to an election 6 1 and prohibiting write-in votes
unless someone does register are constitutionally permissible means of
guarding against the last-minute candidate and the nonexistent one.
The second reason offered by the supreme court was the need "to
protect the right of privacy for the individual who does not desire to be
a candidate."62 A decade before Pasco, the state supreme court had
held in Battaglia v. Adams 5 that an individual had a legal right to
keep his name off the official election ballot.6 4 According to Justice
57. Both statutes have since been revised to omit all reference to write-in voting.
Ch. 77-175, §§ 16 & 66, 1977 Fla. Laws 903, amending FLA. STAT. §§ 99.023,
101.251 (1975). But see Smith v. Smathers, 372 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1979) (reviving FLA.
STAT. § 99.023 (1975)). For a discussion of Smith v. Smathers, see text at notes 67-71
infra.
58. Under the qualification statute, FLA. STAT. § 99.023 (1975), a write-in can-
didate must file a notice of his candidacy forty-five days prior to the election.
59. 314 So. 2d at 3.
60. Id.
61. See note 58 supra.
62. 314 So. 2d at 3.
63. 164 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 1964). For a further discussion of Battaglia, see text at
notes 82-91 infra.
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Overton, the right not to be on the ballot was equivalent to a right not
to be voted for, and this second right applied whether or not the indi-
vidual's name appeared on the official ballot.6 5
Pasco undoubtedly emboldened those in the state legislature who
wanted to do away with write-in voting entirely. Within two years, even
the limited form of write-in voting upheld in Pasco was gone; in 1977
the Legislature repealed the statutes at issue in that case, leaving no
provision for write-in votes in the election code.6
In the first general election following this repeal, Lee Smith, a mi-
nor party candidate for the United States House of Representatives,
sought to become a write-in candidate when he failed to meet Florida's
requirements for ballot access. When informed that write-in votes
would not be allowed in the general election, Smith brought suit, claim-
ing a violation of his state constitutional rights. In Smith v.
Smathers,67 the Florida Supreme Court agreed that Smith's rights had
been abridged.
Justice Overton's opinion in Smith adhered closely to the reason-
ing he used for the court in Pasco. Once again, the court cited with
approval State ex rel. Lamar v. Dillon.68 The Smith opinion under-
scored the importance of Dillon by establishing the similarity of the
constitutional provisions at issue in both cases. 9 Because the concerns
mentioned in Pasco are absent when there is an active write-in candi-
date (the candidate exists, he must be considered serious, and he has
waived any privacy right), the principle enunciated in Dillon con-
trolled, and Smith's constitutional claim was upheld.70
Yorty, see text at notes 82-91 infra.
65. A third reason, the need to keep "ballots within manageable limits," was also
mentioned. 314 So. 2d at 3. For a critique of another court's use of the same argument,
see text at notes 42-44 supra.
66. See text at notes 5-6 supra.
67. 372 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1979).
68. Id. at 429.
69. Id. at 429 & n.2. Article VI, section 1, of the 1068 constitution provides:
"All elections by the people shall be by direct and secret vote." In dissent, Justice
Alderman argued that the omission from the 1968 constitution of the word "ballot,"
which appeared in the 1885 constitution, see text at note 53 supra, rendered Dillon
irrelevant to the constitutional issue in Smith v. Smathers. Id. at 430-31 (Alderman,
J., dissenting).
70. Nevertheless, Smith was denied the relief he sought. Because of the brief
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The supreme court's solution to the problem posed by this finding
of unconstitutionality was novel. The court declared certain of the re-
pealed statutes relating to write-in voting "revived," to "remain in
force and effect . . . until properly changed by the legislature. 7 1 In
other words, the court made part of the statutory scheme upheld in
Pasco unrepealable.
The Florida Supreme Court has thus recognized only a limited
right to write-in. If there exists a qualified write-in candidate seeking
write-in votes, there is a right to cast a vote for such a person, even
though his name does not appear on the official ballot. But if no such
candidate exists, there is no right to write-in.
B
Florida's limited recognition of a state constitutional right to cast
a write-in vote should no longer be followed. In an appropriate case,
the Florida Supreme Court should overrule its decision in Pasco and
return to the more expansive right to write-in recognized in Dillon.72
The limited right now accorded Florida citizens does not give full scope
to the right to vote, nor is the limitation necessary to support the two
goals mentioned in Pasco .7
Florida's limited right to write-in fails to give adequate scope to
the right to vote. The rights of the potential write-in voter are contin-
gent upon the actions of another, the would-be write-in candidate. This
places the candidate in a position superior to the voter, violating the
cardinal principle of Dillon that the voter "must be left free to vote for
time period between the filing of the lawsuit and the general election, the state supreme
court denied Smith's application for a writ of mandamus. See 372 So. 2d at 428. The
court's declaration that Smith's rights had been violated came months after the
election.
71. Id. at 429. The revived provisions are FLA. STAT. §§ 99.023, 101.011(2),
101.151(5)(a), (b) (1975), which were amended by Ch. 77-175, 1977 Fla. Laws 903.
Section 99.023 deals with the qualification of write-in candidates, see note 58 supra,
while §§ 101.151(5) and 101.011(2) concern the preparation and marking of official
ballots, respectively.
72. These steps would necessarily undercut the language in Smith v. Smathers
restricting its holding to situations in which there is a qualified write-in candidate.
73. See text at notes 59-65 supra.
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whom he pleases."74 Furthermore, Florida's current conception of the
constitutional right to write-in suggests that the process for qualifying a
write-in candidate somehow provides an adequate substitute for writing
in the person most qualified, whether a candidate or not. But the pro-
cess is burdensome, requiring persuasion of the desired candidate sub-
stantially in advance of the election.7 5 The court in Jackson v. Norris,76
an influential decision regarding write-in voting, held that such substi-
tutes cannot justify abridging the right to vote for any qualified person,
on the ballot or off."7 The Florida Supreme Court would do well to
adopt the expansive concept of the right to vote recognized by the
Maryland courts in Jackson.
Pasco v. Heggen cited the need to maintain the integrity of the
election ,process as a reason for recognizing only a limited right to
write-in. 8 While it is appropriate to be concerned about a "frivolous or
fraudulent candidacy, '7 this concern does not provide an adequate
reason for restricting write-in voting. Some thirty-eight jurisdictions
manage to maintain the integrity of their electoral process while per-
mitting virtually unrestricted write-in voting.80 The number of states
74. 32 Fla. at 579, 14 So. at 394 (emphasis added). See text at note 54 supra.
75. See note 58 supra.
76. 173 Md. 579, 195 A. 576 (1937). See text at notes 26-30 supra.
77. Id. at _, 195 A. at 586. See text at note 30 supra.
78. See text at note 60 supra.
79. 314 So. 2d at 3.
80. ALA. CODE § 17-8-5 (1977); ALASKA STAT. § 15.15.030 (1976); ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 16-844 (1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-309 (Supp. 1977); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 15, § 4502 (Supp. 1970); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1110 (Supp. 1978), construed
in Kamins v. Board of Elections, 324 A.2d 187 (D.C. 1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-
1224 (1980); IDAHO CODE § 34-906 (Supp. 1980); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 24A-7
(Supp. 1978); IowA CODE § 49.31 (Supp. 1978); KAN. STAr. ANN. §§ 25-616, 25-617
(Supp. 1979); Ky. REV. STAT. § 117.265 (Supp. 1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 702 (1965); MD. ELEC. CODE ANN., art. 33, § 14-1 (1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 54, § 42 (West 1980); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 168.737 (1967); MINN. STAT.
§ 203A.12 (Supp. 1978); Mo. REV. STAT. § 115.439.1 (Supp. 1978); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 13-12-208 (1980); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-428 (1978); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 59:58 (1970); N.J. REV. STAT. § 19:15-28 (1964); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-8-36
(1978); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 7-106 (McKinney 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-151
(Supp. 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16-12-06 (1971); OR. REV. STAT. § 254.145 (1979);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 3063 (Purdon 1980-1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-19-31
(1969); S.C. CODE § 7-13-1380 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-7-117 (1979); *UTAH
5:1981
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allowing such voting suggests that the practical problems posed by
write-in votes are far from insurmountable; a state can find ways of
resolving these problems without restricting the scope of the right to
vote." '
A potentially more compelling reason for limiting the right to
write-in is mentioned in Pasco: the need to protect the privacy rights of
the person for whom the write-in vote is cast. 2 On close examination,
however, this reason loses its appeal. Being the recipient of a write-in
vote is a negligible intrusion on privacy, one which does not justify a
limitation on write-in voting.
In Battaglia v. Adams,83 the state supreme court held that putting
Richard Nixon's name on the 1964 Republican presidential primary
ballot over his objection violated Nixon's right to privacy." In Pasco,
the court cited Battaglia in holding that a person has a privacy interest
in not receiving a write-in vote."5 While case law in another jurisdiction
does support the idea that including a person's name on the official
election ballot can violate his right of privacy,8 6 the dictum in Pasco
extending this reasoning to write-in voting is unprecedented. The "in-
trusion" upon privacy occurring when one is the recipient of a write-in
vote seems much too slight to meet the threshold requirement of pri-
vacy law that the intrusion be "highly offensive to a reasonable per-
son."87 Furthermore, the risk of such an intrusion could justly be
characterized as part of the price we each pay for our system of free
elections.
CODE ANN. § 20-7-20 (Supp. 1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2472 (Supp. 1980); VA.
CODE § 24.1-129 (1980); WASH. REV. CODE § 29.51.170 (Supp. 1977); W. VA. CODE
§ 3-4-8 (1979); Wis. STAT. § 7.50 (1967); WYO. STAT. § 22-10-101 (1977).
81. For example, the Oregon Legislature was concerned about the campaign ex-
penditures of write-in candidates. Rather than requiring such candidates to file expen-
diture statements prior to the election and prohibiting write-in votes for candidates who
did not file, Oregon provided that no write-in candidate who won would be deemed
elected until he had filed a campaign expenditure statement. OR. REV. STAT. § 260.245
(1977). Accord, WYO. STAT. § 22-16-120 (1977).
82. See text at notes 62-65 supra.
83. 164 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 1964).
84. Id. at 197 (following Op. ATr'Y GEN. FLA. 060-171 (1960)).
85. 314 So. 2d at 3-4.
86. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 812 & n.12 (4th ed. 1971).
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977).
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The Florida Supreme Court recognized as much in a related con-
text. In Yorty v. Stone,88 a presidential candidate who wanted to com-
pete in some states' primaries, but not Florida's, sought to remove his
name from the Florida presidential primary ballot. In 1972, candidate
Sam Yorty relied on 1964 noncandidate Richard Nixon's success in
obtaining similar relief in Battaglia v. Adams. The state supreme court
distinguished Battaglia because Yorty (unlike Nixon in 1964) re-
mained an announced candidate. His interest in privacy was thus less-
ened,89 and this reduced interest was outweighed by the public interest:
"A matter of such magnitude as the selection of the best possible can-
didate for the highest position in this nation should be controlled by the
public's right to a complete expression of their views and not by the
individual's personal and tactical choices .... ",0
Just as the public's right to express its views through voting out-
weighed Yorty's privacy interest in keeping his name off the primary
ballot, so the public's right to vote should outweigh the far smaller pri-
vacy interest of the citizen who desires not to receive any write-in
votes.91 In deciding Pasco v. Heggen, the Florida Supreme Court
should have given as much attention to Yorty as it gave to Battaglia.
The result would have been a less limited concept of write-in voting.
C
The reasons offered for limiting the state constitutional right to
cast a write-in ballot are not compelling, and the Florida Supreme
Court should abandon its limited conception of that right. Further-
more, even for those who consider the proffered reasons sufficient to
justify some limitation on the right to write-in, there is no reason to go
as far as the supreme court has gone. The goals of maintaining the
integrity of elections and preserving personal privacy can be attained
by permitting the disgruntled voter to cast a ballot for "None of the
88. 259 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 1972).
89. Id. at 147-48.
90. Id. at 149.
91. This balancing is analogous to that performed by the United States Supreme
Court when weighing privacy rights against freedom of speech and of the press. See,
e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (recognizing freedom-of-
expression limitations on the law of libel).
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None-of-the-above voting is currently allowed in general elections
only in Nevada.9 2 If adopted in Florida, none-of-the-above voting could
operate in this fashion: under each office listed on the official ballot
would be the names of the qualified candidate or candidates, plus a slot
marked "None of the above." Votes for "None of the above" would be
tallied just like votes for a candidate. "None of the above" could win
an election or earn a place in a runoff. If "None of the above" did win,
the office would become vacant, to be filled as any office vacated by
death or resignation would be.93
None-of-the-above voting poses none of the problems seen in write-
in voting. There is no threat to the integrity of the electoral system
through fraudulent or frivolous candidates, nor is anyone's right of pri-
vacy breached. If the Florida Supreme Court must allow some limita-
tion on write-in voting, substituting none-of-the-above voting would be
the limitation least violative of the right to vote. If the court will not
recognize an unlimited right to cast a write-in ballot, it should recog-
nize a state constitutional right to cast a "None of the above" vote.94
III
The discontented voter has a right to affirmatively express his dis-
appointment with the elective choices offered him. A right to write-in
derives from the federal Constitution and should be recognized by the
federal courts. Dissatisfied Florida voters may also rely on the state
constitution, which should be interpreted as granting an unrestricted
right to write-in (or at least as recognizing a right to cast a "none-of-
92. NEv. REv. STAT. § 293.269 (1979). The provision applies only to statewide
contests, however, and none-of-the-above votes do not affect the outcome of these con-
tests. Id.
93. See W. ADAMS, A SUGGESTED NEW ARTICLE ON ELECTIONS 11 (August,
1977) (testimony before the Florida Constitutional Revision Commission): the state
constitution should "guarantee the right of every voter to cast a negative vote [and] the
right to have the vote counted with the same dignity as votes for candidates."
94. Some may object that there is no basis for reading such a requirement into
the state constitution. While the point is well-taken, the court's action in so reading the
constitution would be no more extreme than its holding that the state constitution
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the-above" vote). Without some judicial action of the sort advocated,
the right to vote will most often be meaningful only for those pleased
with the choices offered by the two-party system, a group whose num-
ber grows smaller with every passing day.
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Advertising, Solicitation, And Indication Of
Specialization: Recent Proposed Rules And Supreme
Court Mandate
Steven J. Greenwald*
A Lawyer who advertises or solicits . . is regarded by his brethren at
the bar as one with whom it is not pleasant to associate on the terms of
cordial intimacy characteristic of the relationship of Lawyers to one
another.'
INTRODUCTION
The American Bar Association (ABA), on January 3, 1980, circulated
a proposed draft for the complete revision of the Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct.' The proposal, now under consideration, contains a
section which would expand the permissible scope of attorney advertis-
ing and solicitation. This new tolerance is the result of a growing inter-
est in expanding public awareness to legal services.
The limitations upon advertising and solicitation have, in the past,
been intended to deter overreaching by unscrupulous lawyers. These
restrictions, however, have been limited by three recent United States
Supreme Court cases which have limited the scope of the ban on com-
mercial advertising: Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,' Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Association," and In re Primus.5 According to these cases,
* General Counsel to F.C. Reiser Co.; B.A. Michigan State; J.D. Umv. of
Detroit.
1. H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETmIcs 211 n.6 (1953).
2. This discussion draft, circulated by the ABA Commission on Evaluation of
Professional Standards, has not yet been officially adopted. The final version of the
Rules were scheduled for subnussion to the ABA's House of Delegates at its February,
1981 meeting.
3. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
4. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
5. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
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(1) commercial speech, which includes attorney advertising, is entitled
to first amendment protection; (2) a state may constitutionally regulate
potentially harmful in-person solicitation; and, (3) only upon a showing
of a compelling interes.t and requisite specificity may a state regulate
solicitation implicating political or associational freedoms. After ana-
lyzing these cases, this article will examine the ABA Proposed Model
Rules to determine whether the limitations it places upon attorney ad-
vertising and solicitation are constitutional in light of these recent
Supreme Court decisions.
Bates: THE SUPREME COURT PERMITS ATTORNEY ADVERTISING
In Bates v State Bar of Arizona,6 the Supreme Court considered
whether a newspaper advertisement which listed prices for routine legal
services fell within the confines of protected speech, or constituted a
form of commercial speech which remained outside the scope of first
amendment protection. J. Bates and Van O'Steen were attorneys li-
censed to practice in Arizona. They operated a legal clinic which pro-
vided standardized legal services for moderate fees. In an attempt to
attract clients for their clinic, they placed an advertisement in a news-
paper, offering routine legal services7 at reasonable rates. The state bar
considered the ad to be in violation of the Arizona Code of Professional
Responsibility, 8 and recommended a six-month suspension.9 The United
States Supreme Court, however, reversed, basing its decision on first
amendment issues which it had reserved in two earlier cases: Valentine
v Chrestensen10 and Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council."1
In Chrestensen, the Supreme Court stated that although the Con-
6. 433 U.S. 350.
7 Routine legal services were deemed to include such matters as personal bank-
ruptcies, name changes, uncontested divorces, and uncontested adoptions. Id. at 354.
8. "[A] lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate as a
lawyer through newspaper or magazine advertisements, radio and television announce-
ments or other means of commercial publicity. " ABA CANONS OF PROFES-
SIONAL ETHIcS, DR 2-101(B) (incorporated into Rule 29(a) of the Supreme Court of
Arizona).
9. The Arizona Supreme Court's final sanction was only a censure.
10. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
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stitution afforded protection to speech concerning social, political, and
economic ideas, the first amendment did not restrain government regu-
lation of purely commercial advertising. 2 This view continued until
1975, when the Court held in Bigelow v. Virginia s that the first
amendment guarantees of speech and press were applicable to a paid
commercial advertisement. The transition from its prior position in
Chrestensen was made complete one year later when the Court in Vir-
ginia Pharmacy held that commercial speech did indeed come within
the ambit of the first amendment.14 This case involved a challenge by a
consumer group to a statute which prohibited pharmacists from adver-
tising prices of prescription drugs, declaring such advertising to be un-
professional conduct of the type that could result in disciplinary ac-
tion.1 5 In support of the statute, the Virginia Board of Pharmacy
maintained that the ban on advertising was necessary to preserve the
professional character of the occupation. In addition, the Board specu-
lated that advertising would have such an adverse effect on prices as to
destroy some pharmacists' profit margin.16 Although these considera-
tions were viewed as adequate to justify regulation absent first amend-
ment protection, the Court found them to be unconvincing when bal-
anced against the need of the consumer for the information; especially
since the effect of the regulation would be to totally suppress informa-
tion concerning the prices of prescription drugs.
The majority opinion in Virginia Pharmacy was the first clear
indication that the interests of the listener (i.e., the consumer) could be
considered in deciding whether to extend protection to commercial
12. 316 U.S. at 54.
13. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). The Court held as unconstitutional a Virginia statute
which made it a misdemeanor to encourage or prompt the procuring of an abortion
through the sale or circulation of any publication.
14. 425 U.S. at 761.
15. VA. CODE § 54-524.35 (1974) provides in part:
Any pharmacist shall be considered guilty of unprofessional conduct who
(3) publishes, advertises or promotes, directly or indirectly, in any manner what-
soever, any amount, price, fee, prermum, discount, rebate or credit term for pro-
fessional services or for drugs containing narcotics or for any drugs which may
be dispensed only by a prescription.
16. 425 U.S. at 766-68.
17. Id. at 770.
223 11 5:1981
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speech. The free flow of commercial information was seen as necessary
to aid consumers in making intelligent, well-informed economic
decisions.18
Relying upon the rationale advanced in Virginia Pharmacy, the
Court in Bates held that the justifications for prohibiting the advertis-
ing of "routine legal services" were insufficient to override the public
interest in maintaining the free flow of information.19 As the Court
stated in Griswold v. Connecticut,20 "[t]he right of freedom of speech
and press include not only the right to utter or print, but [also] . . the
right to receive, [and] the right to read. Without these peripheral
rights, the specific rights would be less secure."2 Proponents for the
continued restrictions upon attorney advertisement, however, argued
that the public would lose respect for the profession (as one geared to
the concerns of justice) if lawyers were allowed to advertise for
financial gain. Rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court stated that
the relation between advertising and loss of professional respect was
quite tenuous since respect for a lawyer is determined to a great extent
by the individual lawyer's own competency.22
Also argued was the possibility that misrepresentation through ad-
vertisement would become so prevalent that a regulation short of an
outright ban would be impossible to enforce. The Court, however, felt
that most lawyers would behave as they always have:
they will abide by their solemn oaths to uphold the integrity and honor
of their profession and of the legal system and, of course, it will be
in the latter's interest, as in other cases of misconduct at the bar, to
assist in weeding out those who abuse their trust.23
Moreover, the Court determined that the states have in the past been
able to regulate the professions quite sufficiently.2 4
The Court, however, did not rule out all regulation of advertising,
18. Id. at 763.
19. 433 U.S. at 363.
20. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
21. Id. at 482-83.
22. 433 U.S. at 369.
23. Id. at 381.
24. Id. at 384.
66
Nova Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1981], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol5/iss2/1
Advertising, Solicitation and Specialization
stating that speech which is false, deceptive, or misleading is still sub-
ject to restraint.2 5 Even truthful statements may warrant restraint if
they have a potential to mislead the public; e.g., statements relating to
the "quality of services," which are often incapable of measurement or
verification. 6 This problem provided the genesis to another argument
in support of the ban: that the advertisement of legal services will inevi-
tably be misleading due to the consumer's inability "to determine in
advance just what services he needs."27 The Court, however, did not
believe that the present alternative (the prohibition of advertising) left
the client with any better information with which to select an attorney.
Instead the Court believed that the organized bar should educate the
public about legal services, especially the kind of "routine" services at
issue. The Court also felt that although laymen may not understand the
technicalities of a certain legal problem, they usually are aware of the
general nature of the service to be performed. As such, the advertise-
ment of an understandable schedule of services and their corresponding
prices could aid the consumer in making an initial decision to hire a
particular lawyer.28 A binding agreement as to price could then be
reached during the lawyer's initial consultation with the client.
The Court was also concerned with the ABA's estimate that "the
middle 70% of [the] population [was] not being reached or served ade-
quately by the legal profession."2' The Court noted that the reasons for
this underutilization included the fear of prohibitive costs and the in-
ability to locate a suitable lawyer.30 The Court maintained that the
disciplinary rule m question, DR 2-101(B),31 served to restrict the pub-
lic's access to legal services, especially for the "not-quite-poor and
25. Id. at 383.
26. Id. at 383-84.
27 Id. at 374.
28. Generally speaking, the public's failure to engage the legal professsion is due
to their misapprehension of the cost of legal services and their unawareness of "contin-
gency" payment possibilities. See Smith, Making the Availability of Legal Services
Better Known, 62 A.B.A. J. 855 (1976).
29. 433 U.S. at 376.
30. Id. See also Smith, Cannon 2: "A Lawyer Should Assist the Legal Profes-
sion in Fulfilling Its Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available," 48 TEx. L. REv 285
(1970).
31. See ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETIcs, DR 2-101(B), supra note 8.
225 115:1981
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unknowledgeable. ' '3 2 The rule was seen as being in conflict with the
bar's ethical obligation to "facilitate the process of intelligent selection
of lawyers, and to assist in making legal services available."33 In ad-
dressing this issue, along with the first amendment issue of the con-
sumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information, the Court
determined that the lawyer's professional duty to make counsel avail-
able outweighed the restriction imposed by DR 2-101(B), and that per-
mitting "restrained advertising" might well contribute to greater avail-
ability of legal services.'
This policy argument provided the basis for the Bates decision:
advertising could no longer be considered an unmitigated source of
harm to the administration of justice; rather, advertising might offer
great benefits. Even though advertising may increase the use of judicial
machinery, the notion that "it is always better for a person to suffer a
wrong silently than to redress it by legal action" could no longer be
accepted.3 5
Recently, however, the United States Supreme Court has indi-
cated what arguably is a mounting reluctance to protect commercial
speech. The 7 to 2 decision in Friedman v. Rogers"8 rejected a first
amendment attack on a Texas law prohibiting the practice of optome-
try under a trade name. The Court was convinced that the law was a
constitutionally permissible state regulation which protected the public
from deceptive and misleading use of optometrical trade names. The
Court insisted that a trade name is "a significantly different form of
commercial speech from that considered in Virginia Pharmacy and
Bates. Here we are concerned with a form of commercial speech
that has no intrinsic meaning. '37 Unlike the advertisements in those
cases, the advertisement of a trade name conveys no information about
prices, products, or services offered.38
32. 433 U.S. at 376-77.
33. ABA CODE OF PROFEssIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 2-1 (1976).
34. 433 U.S. at 376-77
35. Id. at 376.
36. 440 U.S. 1 (1978).
37 Id. at 12.
38. Id.
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Ohralik: ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION ARE
DISTINGUISHABLE
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Bates granted first
amendment protection to the commercial speech of attorneys, questions
still remained as to exactly what kind of speech could be afforded pro-
tection, and in what contexts. The Court in Bates held only that the
justifications advanced for prohibiting" truthful advertising of the avail-
ability and terms of "routine legal services" are insufficient to override
the public interest, protected by the first amendment, in maintaining
the free flow of information. 9 The Bates decision did not, and its au-
thors expressly declined to consider, the state's right to ban attorney
solicitation of clients.40 In spite of this silence, however, proponents of
solicitation have been encouraged by the Court's handling of the com-
mercial speech concept.41 In citing a line of cases including Virginia
Pharmacy and Chrestensen, the Court in Bates demonstrated that it
had never withdrawn protection from speech "merely because it pro-
posed a mundane commercial transaction. 42 Commentators have ar-
gued that the Court's analysis could apply to solicitation as well, in
that solicitation involves the same relation-of-interests between the
speaker and the consumer as direct advertising. 43
The distinction between advertising and solicitation has long been
a point of controversy. 44 However, although gray areas may occasion-
ally appear which will fit within both contexts, the characteristics of
the terms are distinguishable: advertising is a form of notice-giving or
information-giving, 45 while solicitation is the equivalent of asking or en-
ticing or making an urgent request.' 6 Solicitation clearly portends a
more aggressive and more direct form of communication than advertis-
ing. It is this aggressiveness and directness of contact on which the
fears of lawyer overreaching are based.
39. 433 U.S. at 384.
40. Id. at 366.
41. See Simet, Solicitation of Public and Private Litigation Under the First
Amendment, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 93.
42. 433 U.S. at 363-64.
43. Simet, supra note 41, at 104.
44. See Suchman, Ethics and Legal Ethics, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REv 244 (1968).
45. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 31 (1971).
46. Id. at 2169.
227 1
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In Ohralik v Ohio State Bar Association7 the defendant
(Ohralik) argued that his solicitation was indistinguishable from the
advertising in Bates. Ohralik, an Ohio lawyer, personally approached
the victims of an automobile accident and succeeded in obtaining them
as clients for the prosecution of their claims arising out of the accident.
He even approached one of the victims while she was still in traction in
the hospital and offered to represent her. The Supreme Court consid-
ered the attorney's behavior to be a blatant example of "in-person so-
licitation," prohibited under the Code of Professional Responsibility 48
The Court pointed out that because the potential for abuse is
greater when a lawyer, a "professionally trained person in the art of
persuasion," is doing the selling, for purposes of constitutional analysis,
in-person solicitation will not be considered the equivalent of advertis-
ing. 49 As such, if information concerning a lawyer's availability (in-
cluding such items as telephone number, address, and office hours) was
to be disseminated to the general public or a large group of people, the
communication would be considered an allowable advertisement; how-
ever, an in-person communication suggesting the quality of a lawyer's
work and directed to one person or a small group of people goes beyond
the dissemination of general information and thus would be considered
an unallowable solicitation."0
47 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
48. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-104(B) provides in per-
tinent part: "A lawyer who has given unsolicited advice to a layman that he should
obtain counsel or take legal actiot shall not accept employment resulting from that
advice " (Adopted by the Supreme Court of Ohio.)
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-103(A) provides: "A lawyer
shall not recommend employment, as a private practitioner, of himself, his partner, or
associate, to a non-lawyer who has not sought his advice regarding employment of a
lawyer." (Adopted by theSbpreme Court of Ohio.) 436 U.S. at 453 n.9.
49. 436 U.S. at 465. .The Court noted that, unlike advertising, there is little
opportunity to publicly scrutinize in-person solicitation, because there are often no wit-
nesses other than the person being solicited. Id. at 466.
50. Id. See also ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-103 and
DR 2-104.
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Primus: "BENIGN" SOLICITATION Is ALLOWED
In In re Primus,5 the companion case to Ohralik, the Supreme
Court considered whether any special dispensation should be given to
solicitation if done for purposes of political expression. Primus was a
lawyer affiliated with the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).
The ACLU had been acknowledged by the Supreme Court to engage
in litigation as a vehicle for effective political expression and associa-
tion, as well as a means of communicating useful information to the
public. Primus presented a briefing to certain welfare recipients, in-
forming them of their legal rights with respect to a sterilization pro-
gram which was instituted as a condition to their continued receipt of
medical assistance. Subsequently, he mailed a letter to a woman who
had attended the briefing, informing her that free legal assistance was
available from the ACLU. The Disciplinary Board of the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court found the mailing of the letter constituted solicita-
tion, for which Primus was given a public reprimand. The United
States Supreme Court reversed, stating that "[w]here political expres-
sion or association is at issue, this Court has not tolerated the degree of
imprecision that often characterizes government regulation of the con-
duct of commercial affairs. 52
Justice Marshall, in his concurring opinion, noted that, unlike the
situation in Ohralik, the solicitation in Primus "[was] presented in a
noncoercive, non-deceitful, and dignified manner to a potential client
who [was] emotionally and physically capable of making a rational de-
cision either to accept or reject the representation with respect to a
legal claim or matter that [was] not frivolous.15 3 Justice Marshall
called this kind of solicitation "benign" commercial solicitation and
contended that since there are significant benefits that can accrue to
society from benign solicitation, such activity should not be stifled with
a sweeping non-solicitation rule." In addition, he stated that when di-
rectly confronted with the question of the extent to which benign com-
mercial solicitation can constitutionally be restricted, the courts might
afford greater protection to such solicitation than would be allowed
51. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
52. Id. at 434.
53. Id. at 472 n.3 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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under traditional court doctrine or the current ABA Disciplinary
Rules. 55 Thus, while a showing of potential abuse was sufficient to jus-
tify the disciplinary action taken in Ohralik, the Court required a
showing of actual harm, in light of the protection afforded by the first
amendment, to justify the disciplinary action taken in Primus.
These cases reflect the latest views of the Court on the propriety of
attorney solicitation. However, although the two cases may be helpful
in predicting the outcome of solicitation cases involving "ambulance-
chasing" or civil liberties activity, they offer little guidance in deter-
mining the outcome of cases which fall between these polar extremes.
In an effort to solve this problem, the ABA has indicated that it may
adopt a rule which would expand the permissible scope of attorney
solicitation.
ABA PROPOSED RULES ALLOWING ADVERTISING BY LAWYERS
In January, 1980, the American Bar Association Commission on
Evaluation of Professional Standards circulated a proposed draft for a
complete revision of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. In this
proposal are several subsections which have a strong bearing on adver-
tising and solicitation. Proposed Rule 9 is designed to "assist the public
in obtaining legal services.""6 Specifically, Proposed Rule 9.2 is di-
rected to permitting public dissemination of information "that directs
attention to the need for legal services or which might assist in finding
a lawyer."'57 The rule would permit a lawyer to advertise services
through various public communications media, such as radio, news-
paper, television, direct mailing, and telephone directories.58 In addi-
tion, the advertisement may include lawyer's fees for specific services,
names of references, and, with their consent, names of regularly repre-
sented clients.5 The proposed rule is an attempt to codify the Bates
and Virginia Pharmacy mandates that the public be provided with
55. Id. at 477
56. See ABA PROPOSED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 9,
Introduction (Discussion Draft 1980) [hereinafter referred to as PROPOSED MODEL
RULES].
57 See PROPOSED MODEL RULE 9.2, Comment.
58. Id. 9.2(a).
59. Id. 9.2, Comment.
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complete information on the availability, nature, and prices of products
and services.60
"The First Amendment, . . . [however], does not prohibit the
State from insuring that the stream of commercial information flow
cleanly as well as freely." 1 Since the adoption of the first Canons of
Professional Ethics, the ABA has been concerned with the possibility
that unscrupulous lawyers could mislead the public through inflated
claims of legal skills. 2 Following the recognition in Virginia Pharmacy
that freedom of speech is not an unlimited license to talk," all attorney
advertisements allowed under Proposed Rule 9.2 will be subject to the
requirements of Proposed Rule 9.1, which makes clear that misleading
or untruthful speech will not be allowed.6" These limitations are well
within that allowed by the Supreme Court, which has recognized that
the content of a communication may affect the measure of protection
afforded to the speech.6 5 As the Court pointed out in Virginia Phar-
macy, "[s]ome forms of commercial speech regulation are surely per-
missible. . . Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never
been protected for its own sake." 6
60. In Bates, Justice Blackmun, delivering the opinion of the Court, stated:
"[t]he only services that lend themselves to advertising are the routine ones: the uncon-
tested divorce, the simple adoption, [and] the uncontested personal bankruptcy. "
433 U.S. at 372.
.61. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72.
62. See DRINKER, supra note 1, at 112.
63. 425 U.S. 748. See also Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 336 U.S. 36, 50
(1960).
64. PROPOSED MODEL RULE 9.1 provides:
A lawyer shall not make any false, fraudulent, or misleading statement about the
lawyer or the lawyer's services to a client or prospective client. A statement is
false, fraudulent or misleading if it:
(a) contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact
necessary to make the statement as a whole not misleading;
(b) is likely to create an unjustified expectation, or states or implies that
the lawyer can achieve restilts by legally improper means; or
(c) compares the quality of the lawyer's services with that of other law-
yers' services, unless the comparison can be factually substantiated.
65. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 66 (1976).
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ABA PROPOSED RULES ALLOWING SOLICITATION
As noted above, the Court in Primus held that the solicitation of
prospective litigants by nonprofit organizations which engage in litiga-
tion as a form of political expression and political association is entitled
to first amendment protection. In response to this mandate, the ABA
has included within its proposal Rule 9.3(b)(3), which permits a lawyer
to initiate contact with a prospective client if "under the auspices of a
public or charitable legal services organization or a bonafide political,
social, civic, fraternal, employee, or trade organization whose purposes
include but are not limited to providing or recommending legal ser-
vices."6 7 Clearly this rule goes beyond what was called for in Primus,
for not only would the provision encompass those organizations who
engage in litigation as a vehicle for political expression and association,
such as the ACLU and the NAACP, but would also extend to a host of
other organizations whose purposes are not limited to providing or rec-
ommending legal services (e.g., labor unions, college or professional
fraternities, and religious organizations). The proposed rule, however,
does not specify exactly what relationship the attorney must have to the
organization or define under the auspices. It invites much abuse by
lawyers whose sole purpose in associating with such an "approved" or-
ganization is to find a loophole in the rule against in-person solicitation.
There are, however, certain limitations placed upon allowable
forms of solicitation. Since the common law originally banned solicita-
tion proponents for the continued ban have asserted that solicitation
may harm the client by hindering his free choice in the selection of a
lawyer.6 8 Recognizing these concerns, the Court in Primus took great
care in pointing out that the solicitation in that case was allowed to go
undisciplined only because there was no overreaching, misrepresenta-
tion, coercion, duress, or harassment involved.69 In light of these con-
siderations, Proposed Model Rule 9.3(a) provides that:
A lawyer shall not initiate contact with a prospective client if: (1) The
lawyer reasonably should know that the physical, emotional, or mental
state of the person solicited is such that the person solicited could not
67 PROPOSED MODEL RULE 9.3(b)(3).
68. DRINKER, supra note 1, at 210-12.
69. 436 U.S. at 434-37.
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exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer; (2) the person
solicited has made known a desire not to receive communications from
the lawyer; or (3) the solicitation involves coercion, duress, or harass-
ment."
Although these provisions will work to bar those forms of solicita-
tion characteristic of harassment, undue influence, and "ambulance
chasing," they by no means speak to all of the problems. Advocates for
the continued ban on solicitation maintain that the restrictions are nec-
essary in order to avoid the stirring up of litigation.71 Although Pro-
posed Rule 9.3 does not address this issue, there are other provisions
within the Proposed Model Rules which will provide a sufficient hedge
against such improper behavior. 2 In any event, however, the United
States Supreme Court has indicated that the interest in preventing the
"stirring up" of frivolous or vexatious litigation no longer offers a rea-
sonable justification for the discipline administered to the lawyer who
solicits. 73
ABA MODEL RULES AND RECENT STATE CASES ON SOLICITA-
TION BY MAIL
The ABA Proposed Model Rules also address the issue of whether
and in what situations an attorney may solicit clients by mail. Specifi-
cally, Proposed Rule 9.3(b)(2) states that a lawyer may initiate contact
with a prospective client "by a letter concerning a specific event or
transaction if the letter is followed up only upon positive response by
the addressee. '7 4 The rule clearly extends the scope of protection af-
forded by Primus since it does not require the solicitation to be under
the auspices of a non-profit "political" organization. In addition, the
70. PROPOSED MODEL RULE 9.3(a).
71. The common law referred to this type of behavior as "barratry." See Note,
Advertising, Solicitation, and Prepaid Legal Services, 40 TENN. L. REV 439, 451
(1973).
72. See, e.g., PROPOSED MODEL RULE 3.2 (mandating a spirit of fairness in deal-
ing with opposing party and counsel), PROPOSED MODEL RULE 2.3 (proscribing the
giving of advice to a client concerning wrongful conduct), and PROPOSED MODEL RULE
3.1 (mandating a high degree of candor in the lawyer's representations to a tribunal).
73. See 436 U.S. at 436-37.
74. PROPOSED MODEL RULE 9.3(b)(2).
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letter may even concern a specific event, such as a traffic accident; and
the purpose of any resulting litigation would not have to amount to a
form of "political expression," as was required in Primus. However,
although Primus involved a solicitation by mail, the Court did not spe-
cifically address this issue, as the case was decided on the basis of first
amendment rights of association and political expression. The issue has
been addressed, however, in several post-Primus state court decisions.
In Kentucky Bar Association v. Stuart,75 the Kentucky Supreme
Court cited Bates, Ohralik, and Primus in holding that a law firm's
letter to real estate agencies describing the firm's qualifications, ser-
vices, and process for title searches and deed and mortgage prepara-
tions did not constitute a violation of the Kentucky State Bar Associa-
tion's rule prohibiting "in-person solicitation,' 7 but rather fell within
the confines of constitutionally protected advertisements. 7 In dis-
missing the complaint, the court stated that the letters did not pose the
threats of any of the noted evils of solicitation since there was no pres-
sure or demand which would encourage a person to make a hasty, unin-
formed decision.78 The court pointed out that the potential for decep-
tion exists in all forms of advertising, not just letters, and the fact that
this case was prosecuted demonstrated that the enforcement of ethical
standards would not be impossible. 79 This was the rationale used to
codify Proposed Model Rule 9.3(b)(2). The reasoning stems from the
fact that solicitation by mail appears reasonably subject to control and
therefore can be made almost completely free of the potential for over-
reaching of in-person solicitation.
It should be noted that the letters sent in Stuart were of a "gener-
alized" nature, i.e., the letters were not directed to potential clients
with an identified present need for legal services. As mailings become
more specifically drafted and provide more of a quasi-personal link,
however, courts have been less tolerant of them as a form of solicita-
tion. Letters which are directed to targeted potential clients concerning
"specific events or transactions" have been held to constitute improper
75. 568 S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1978).
76. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-103(A), supra note
48 (adopted by the Supreme Court of Kentucky).




Nova Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1981], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol5/iss2/1
solicitation.80
Although such letters would be allowed under Proposed Rule
9.3(b)(2), it is not clear whether the states would be quick to adopt its
provisions. In Allison v. Louisiana State Bar Association,81 the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court reached a holding that was directly antithetical to
the ABA proposed codification. In that case, a group of attorneys had
mailed to certain employers a letter describing services offered as part
of a prepaid employees' "legal plan" which the attorneys were attempt-
ing to market. Although there was no direct solicitation to the employ-
ees, the court found that there was a "private" solicitation (by letter)
to the employer to engage in a specific transaction.82 Considering the
difficulties in regulating the potential for abuse, the court denied the
injunctive relief requested by the attorneys that would have prevented
the Louisiana State Bar Association from enforcing its disciplinary
rule.83 In addition, the court held that the state's prohibition against
direct solicitation of this kind had no adverse impact upon the attor-
ney's first amendment rights.'
The Allison and Stuart cases, however, are distinguishable The
letters in Allison were not of a "generalized" nature as they were in
Stuart; rather, the letters were directed to potential clients with an
identified present need for legal services. In addition, the offer in the
Allison letter was privately made and not in the public domain for all
to receive, as in Bates (newspaper ad) and Stuart (real estate
agencies).
New York has also indicated its reluctance to expand the permissi-
ble scope of solicitation by mail beyond that of a "generalized" letter.
In re Koffler85 concerned a group of attorneys who mailed approxi-
mately eight thousand letters to homeowners and real estate brokers.
80. See, e.g., In re Lee, 242 Or. 302, 409 P.2d 337 (1965) (holding as improper
a solicitation by letter to represent an accident victim); Bayton Bar Ass'n v. Herzog,
173 Ohio St. 313, 181 N.E.2d 880 (1962) (holding as improper the solicitation by mail
of individuals who had filed claims for workmen's compensation benefits).
81. 362 So. 2d 489 (La. 1978).
82. Id. at 496.
83. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-103 (adopted by the
Supreme Court of Louisiana).
84. 362 So. 2d at 496.
85. 70 A.D.2d 252, 420 N.Y.S.2d 560 (App. Div. 1979).
2-35 1Advertising, Solicitation and Specialization5:1981
77
et al.: Nova Law Review Full issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1981
236 Nova Law Journal 5:1981
The court stated that it was concerned not because the mail had been
used to contact certain interested individuals, but because the "con-
tent" of the letters indicated a seeking out of those people interested in
a transaction. The court believed that if such letters are sent, there
should not be a statement in the letter asking to establish a "personal
and private relationship . ..peculiarly geared to a particular legal
transaction. '8 6 As the court pointed out, "[a] member of the Bar must
never forget that he is a lawyer first and only then, if proper, an
entrepreneur "7
COMPARISON: RECENT STATE RULES ALLOWING SOLICITATION
Not all states have been as conservative in their approach toward
solicitation as have Louisiana and New York. Since Primus, several
jurisdictions have attempted to codify extremely liberal and controver-
sial rules toward solicitation. 8 The most dramatic revision has been the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals' amendment to its Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility. Under these newly enacted provisions, solicita-
tion will be prohibited only if it involves the use of "false, fraudulent or
deceptive claims, if it involves the use of undue influence or if the po-
tential client is apparently in a physical or mental condition that would
make it unlikely that he or she could exercise a reasonable, considered
judgment as to the selection of a lawyer."89 These limitations are quite
similar to the ABA Proposed Model Rules' limitation on solicitation.
The D.C. rules, however, do not require the lawyer to be "under the
auspices" of a public, charitable, or legal services organization, that his
solicitation be by letter, or that the lawyer not solicit those who make
known a desire not to be solicited.90 This "right to be let alone" was
considered by the United States Supreme Court in Rowan v Post Of-
86. Id. at _, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 573.
87 Id. at _, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
88. See Welch, Bates, Ohralik, Primus-The First Amendment Challenge to
State Regulation of Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation, 30 BAYLOR L. REv 585
(1978).
89. D.C. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-103(A). (Complete text
of D.C. Code of Professional Responsibility is reprinted in Welch, supra note 88, at
609.)
90. This requirement is included in PROPOSED MODEL RULE 9.3(a)(2), infra
note 95.
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fice Department.1 In that case, a group of direct mail advertisers chal-
lenged a federal statute92 under which an individual could restrain a
particular sender from mailing advertisements to his home if he found
such mailings to be offensive. In upholding the statute the Court held
that a householder has the right to determine what material enters the
zone of privacy surrounding his home and refused to allow any greater
protection for material consigned to the mail.93 To do so would be to
permit a form of trespass, a result found to be untenable since the Con-
stitution guarantees only the right to speak, not the right to force
others to listen.9 '
The D.C. Rule's disregard for the solicited person's right "to be let
alone" would permit offensive behavior on the part of some lawyers.
For example, in situations where the need for legal services is readily
identifiable (e.g., where there has been an automobile accident or a
death in the family), the race to be the first lawyer on the scene may be
most offensive to the victim or his family. By including limitations,
such as rules 9.3(a)(2) and 9.3(a)(3) against forced solicitation, the
ABA's proposed rules seek to avoid these kinds of problems.95
91. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
92. 39 U.S.C. § 4009 (1970).
93. 397 U.S. at 736.
94. Id.
95. PROPOSED MODEL RULE 9.3 reads in its entirety:
(a) A lawyer shall not initiate contact with a prospective client if:
*(1) the lawyer reasonably should know that the physical, emotional, or
mental state of the person solicited is such that the person could not exer-
cise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer;
(2) the person solicited has made known a desire not to receive communi-
cations from the lawyer; or
(3) the solicitation involves coercion, duress, or harrassment.
(b) Subject to the requirements of paragraph (a), a lawyer may initiate contact
with a prospective client in the following circumstances:
(1) if the prospective client is a close friend or relative of the lawyer;
(2) by a letter concerning a specific event or transaction if the letter is
followed up only upon positive response by the addressee; or
(3) [under the auspices] of a public or charitable legal services organiza-
tion or a bona fide political, social, civic, fraternal, employee, or trade
organization whose purposes include but are not limited to providing or
recommending legal service.
(c) A lawyer shall not give another person anything of value to initiate contact
79
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The District of Columbia, however, is not alone in its liberal ap-
proach toward attorney solicitation. In 1978, the Board of Governors of
the California State Bar tentatively approved a change in its Rules of
Professional Conduct to permit in-person solicitation. The twelve to six
vote tentatively adopted a rule change very similar to that of the Dis-
trict of Columbia. Once finally approved, California lawyers may seek
out clients and offer to represent them in specific cases unless
the statements the lawyer makes are false, misleading or tend to confuse
the client; the potential client is in such a physical, mental or emotional
state that he or she would not be expected to exercise reasonable judg-
ment in hiring a lawyer; or the lawyer's approach to the client involves
any kind of intrusion, coercion or harassment.98
With this last provision, the California rule is very similar to the ABA
proposed rule. It is noteworthy that this influential jurisdiction has gone
as far as it has toward adopting a rule which is no less radical than the
ABA's proposed rule.97
The ABA rules would prove a better guide than the District of
Columbia or California rules in determining the legality of solicitations
falling between these two poles, but all three attempts can be seen as
providing some assistance. All three require that the solicitation be
truthful and presented in a noncoercive, nondeceitful manner to a po-
tential client who is emotionally and physically capable of making a
rational decision either to accept or reject the representation. In the
average case where honest unpressured commercial solicitation is in-
volved, i.e., in a situation not presented in either Primus or Ohralik,
these three attempts will serve their States' interests in protecting the
public, while avoiding those sweeping nonsolicitation rules which only
prevent the free flow of information.
with a prospective client on behalf of the lawyer.
96. St. B. of Cal. Rep., Aug. 1978, at 1.
97 One lawyer-member of the California Board of Governors, who voted for the
proposal, commented: "[i]t is about time we give the little guy a chance to hustle and
get a little business." Id. at 6-7
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INDICATION OF SPECIALIZATION IN ADVERTISEMENT
SOLICITATION
Although the current ABA Disciplinary Rules prohibit a lawyer
from holding himself out as limiting his practice to specified areas of
law, the ABA has recently adopted the position that indications of spe-
cialization are useful in assisting the pubic in obtaining information
about legal services 8 and are deserving of first amendment protec-
tion.99 According to Proposed Rule 9.4(b), a lawyer whose practice is
limited to a specified area of law may communicate that fact in accor-
dance with the provisions on designation of the particular state.
Seven states currently have specialization programs which permit
the lawyer to be "certified" or "designated" in more than one field of
law if he meets the established standards. 100 Florida's "designation"
program is the current proposed model for most other states.101 It re-
quires, among other things, the designation of certain board-approved
areas of specialty, a minimum of three years practice of law, and sub-
stantial experience in the designated specialty area. In addition, no
more than three areas of specialty can be designated, and renewal of
the right to designate is required every three years.
The "certification" programs alluded to in ABA Proposed Rule
9.4 have their genesis in the pilot programs adopted in Texas, Califor-
nia and Arizona. 2 These programs are limited to only a few areas of
law and require recertification, peer ratings, continuing education, spe-
cific practice time requirements in the area of specialty, and most im-
portantly, an examination. "Certification" plans obviously involve a
more demanding procedure for recognition of specialization than do
"designation" plans. This is due to the obvious fact that the states have
a different definition of, and different standards fbr, specialization. This
is the reason why Rule 9.4(b) of the ABA Proposed Model Rules re-
98. See ABA COMM. ON ADVERTISING AND SPECIALIZATION DISCUSSION DRAFT,
35 Bus. LAW. 303 (1979).
99. ABA COMM. ON SPECIALIZATION, INFORMATION BULL. No. 4 at 8 (Report
to the House of Delegates Feb. 1978).
100. Id. The states are Florida, Iowa, New Mexico, Connecticut, Arizona, Cali-
fornia, and Texas.
101. FLA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-105.
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quire the particular state to insert its own provisions of specialization,
and therein lies its greatest fault, i.e., the failure to provide uniform
standards for attorney specialization programs. 10 3 The ABA should
have included within its proposal some form of compromise specializa-
tion plan or choice of plans which would involve elements of both "cer-
tification" and "designation." The states, of course, would not be bound
to adopt this ABA Model Rule, but at least the states would have some
national guide as to how to model their own rules. This is, after all, the
purpose of the Model Rules. By leaving Rule 9 4(b) in its present form,
however, the ABA will be inviting much confusion as states choose be-
tween countless variations of the Florida and California plans.
CONCLUSION: THE STATES ARE FREE To CHOOSE
In response to the recent Supreme Court decisions of Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v Virginia Citizens Consumer Council and
Bates v State Bar of Arizona, granting commercial speech (which in-
cludes attorney advertising) first amendment protection, the ABA has
proposed a complete revision of their Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct. The Proposed Rules are extremely liberal with respect to their
applicability to attorney advertising, more than satisfying the mandate
in Bates that information which brings the public's attention to the
need for legal services flow freely. The limitations in the Proposed
Rules facilitate this mandate by proscribing only those advertisements
which contain misrepresentations or unjustified statements concerning
the quality of a lawyer or his services.
The Proposed Rules, however, are more restrictive in their regula-
tion of attorney solicitation. This is due to the greater potential for
abuse in permitting a lawyer, a professional trained in the art of per-
suasion, to initiate in-person contact with a prospective client. The con-
stitutionality of this position is well established, considering the Su-
preme Court's recognition in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association
that for purposes of constitutional analysis, in-person solicitation in not
equivalent to advertising, and that the State may regulate in-person
103. Even proponents of bar-operated specialization plans recommend the
establishment of uniform national and regional education programs to assist the public
in interpreting these designations. See ABA COMM. ON SPECIALIZATION, INFORMATION
BULL. No. 5 (Sept. 1978).
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solicitation for pecuniary gain under those circumstances likely to re-
sult in adverse consequences. 10 '
However, the Proposed Rules are still quite liberal in their ap-
proach, going beyond the Supreme Court's mandate in In re Primus,
allowing solicitation as a means of political expression, by permitting
an attorney to solicit if done "under the auspices" of a bar-approved
organization, and not limiting the organization or the attorney to a
strictly non-profit motive. In addition, the Proposed Model Rules would
permit an attorney to solicit by mail even though not done under the
auspices of a bar-approved organization. Although several states have
indicated a willingness to permit solicitations of this nature, most have
required that the content of the solicitation be of a generalized nature
and not restricted to a specific event or circumstance.
It appears, nonetheless, that the ABA Proposed Model Rules will
be considered, in large part, acceptable to many states. Two influential
jurisdictions, California and the District of Columbia, have recently
adopted solicitation rules which are even more liberal than the Pro-
posed Model Rules. This trend will, in all probability, continue until a
more sensible code is adopted which will permit more liberated forms
of advertising. That code will in all likelihood have a form quite similar
to the ABA Proposed Model Rules.
104. 436 U.S. at 462.
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Videotape As A Tool In The Florida Legal Process
Florida is one of the pioneer states using videotape as evidence in the
courtroom.' Commenting that "[t]he rule governing admissibility into
evidence of photographs applies with equal force to the admission of
motion pictures and video tapes,"2 the Florida Supreme Court gave the
Florida jurisprudential system a new tool to use in its search for jus-
tice.3 In the intervening years since videotape's introduction into the
courtroom, there has been more conjecture than actual evidence re-
garding the nature of that tool and its place in the legal system.
Videotape has been used to overcome such diverse problems as un-
available witnesses, preservation of reliable testimony for use at trials,
demonstrations for discovery and trial, and as a means of demonstrat-
ing the mental state of a defendant.
Judge McCrystal of Erie County, Ohio, long an advocate of using
videotape to present the entire trial testimony to the jury in certain
types of litigation,5 proposes the use of videotape to record wills, con-
tracts, police bookings, criminal arraignments, pleas, sentencing, proba-
1. Paramore v. Florida, 229 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 1969) (videotaped confession of
defendant admissible in criminal trial).
2. Id. at 859.
3. See Note, Video Tape: It's Admissibility in Evidence and Other Uses, 5 GA.
ST. B.J. 393, 402-03, 408-09 (1969), for a discussion of Florida's pioneering role in
various uses of videotape.
4. Id. at 408. A plea of manslaughter was accepted by the judge after viewing a
videotape of the defendant's session with a psychiatrist.
5. McCrystal, Video Tape Trials, 44 OHIO B. 639 (1971); MeCrystal, Ohio's
First Video Tape Trial: The Judge's Critique, 45 OHIo B. 1 (1972); McCrystal &
Young, Pre-recorded Videotape Trials - An Ohio Innovation, 39 BROOKLYN L. REV.
560 (1973); McCrystal, Videotape Trials: Relief for Our Congested Courts, 49 DEN.
L.J. 463 (1973); McCrystal, The Videotape Trial Comes of Age, 57 JUDICATURE 446
(1974); McCrystal & Kornblum, The Prerecorded Videotape Trial: A Status Report,
25 FED'N INS. COUNSEL 121 (1975); McCrystal, The Case for PRVTT's, 12 TRIAL 56
(July 1976); McCrystal, Videotaped Trials; A Primer, 61 JUDICATURE 250 (1978);
McCrystal & Maschari, Will Electronic Technology Take the Witness Stand?, 11
TOL. L. REV. 239 (1980).
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tion hearings, and even surgical procedures.' Completely videotaped
testimony7 in civil trials has been optionally employed in Erie County8
courts for the past six years.9 The result has been a reduction in pend-
ing cases; and although filings have increased, there has been no con-
comitant increase in court facilities or personnel.10 Thus PRVTT's have
helped to ease burdens on the judiciary, while preserving a jury trial for
the litigants.1
Opponents of videotape voice concern over its effect on jurors,
fearing that trials will become confused with entertainment and that
valuable elements of the judicial process will become distorted in an
overprocessed one-eyed view of courtroom interactions. 2 Additionally,
videotape in criminal trials raises numerous constitutional problems
pertaining to self-incrimination, the right to confront one's accusers, to
have assistance in one's defense, and the right to a public trial.1
This survey will discuss the scope, present use, and possible future
adaptations of videotape in the legal system; and will distinguish fact
from fiction in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of videotape in
the judicial system.
THE MECHANICS OF VIDEOTAPE EVIDENCE
Many courts simply lump videotape together with pictures and
motion pictures.1 4 Scott15 clearly distinguishes videotape from movie
6. McCrystal & Maschari, Will Electronic Technology Take the Witness
Stand?, 11 TOL. L. REV. 239, 246 n.15 (1980).
7. Such trials are generally referred to as PRVTT's (pre-recorded video tape tri-
als). See text accompanying notes 87-100 infra.
8. Erie County is the twelfth largest in Ohio for personal injury litigation, six-
teenth largest for total civil litigation. McCrystal, The Case for PRVTT's, 12 TRIAL 56
(July 1976).
9. McCrystal & Maschari, supra note 6, at 253.
10. Id. at 246 n.15.
11. Morrill, Enter - The Video Tape Trial, 3 J. MAR. PRACT. & PROC. 237, 238
(1970).
12. Peters & Wilkes, Videotaping of Surgery for Use as Demonstrative Evidence
in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 16 DUQ. L. REV. 359, 367 (1977-78).
13. See text accompanying notes 52 to 72 infra.
14. See Morrill, supra note 11, at 253-54 n.24, 254 n.27, 255-56 n.32 (1970); C.
SCOTT, PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE § 1294 n.18.5 (2d ed. Supp. 1980); Annot., 60
A.L.R.3d 333 (1974).
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film: on videotape "there are no individual pictures or frames, the im-
age and the sound are both recorded in the form of electronic impulses
on a magnetic tape. Like a sound tape recording these videotapes re-
quire no processing and can be played back immediately."16
Videotape is recorded with a video camera connected to a video
recorder. This equipment is commonplace and is now sold for home use
as a more expensive alternative to home movie cameras.1 7 Playback is
accomplished by using a player and a video screen (a television). Tapes
can be in color, or black and white, and a time/date generator can be
used to record a readout on the film which is useful in locating specific
portions on the film. 8 The tape cannot be edited easily by splicing, thus
making it an excellent vehicle for evidence. Objectionable material can
be removed, if necessary, by blanking out the sound on a copy, blacking
out pictures and sound on a copy, or re-recording only the acceptable
parts of the material. The original tape can be preserved as a full
record.' 9
While videotape equipment is still relatively costly, it is now read-
ily available to the legal community. Court reporters often use the
equipment, or have sufficient information to direct an attorney to local
facilities where taping can be performed. Current taping costs range
from $90-$250/hour2 0 including technician time and purchase of the
tape. Playback charges are $50-$75/hour, but playback equipment is
inexpensive enough to purchase if desired. While in the early days of
videotape use, stringent requirements were adopted by some courts re-
garding the type of equipment that could be used,21 today the test is
whether the tape gives an accurate representation of what had actually
15. C. SCOTT, PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1969).
16. Id. § 714. However, he concludes that as long as the tape presents a ver-
ifiably fair representation of its subject it can be admitted into evidence on the same
basis as movie film. Id. at § 1294.
17. CONSUMER REP., Nov. 1980, at 690.
18. 23 AM. JUR. Trials § 171 (1976).
19. McCrystal, Videotaped Trials: A Primer, 61 JUDICATURE 250, 252-53
(1978).
20. Dickerson, Video-taped Wills Offer Deceased the Last Word, Miami Herald,
Nov. 12, 1980, § EP (Magazine), at 3, col. 3.
21. Kallen v. Nexus Corp., 54 F.R.D. 610, 614-15 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (required
that sound recording be done with individual lavalier microphones, backup recorder,
and provision to make all copies simultaneously).
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occured.22 In criminal investigations, such as undercover surveillance or
automatic monitors in banks and stores, tapes may be of poor quality.
When the tape has both video and audio tracks, one can be used with-
out the other if one is of unacceptable quality.2"
Deposition tapes should be taken with an eye toward possible use
at trial. An uncluttered desk is a possible setting24 for the deposition, as
is an actual courtroom. 25 Several cameras may be used for the wit-
nesses, attorneys, and for an overall view. It is possible to project all
images at once to the viewer, using a split screen technique.26 Special
lighting is unnecessary, but it has been reported that a black and white
tape of a black witness in a poorly lighted situation may lose some of
the facial expression present.2
USES OF VIDEOTAPE IN CIVIL PRACTICE
In 1970 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended28 to
include depositions by videotape on motion of a party29 to the litigation.
22. 229 So. 2d at 859.
23. Williams v. State, - Ind. __ 383 N.E.2d 444 (1978) (clear picture with
partially inaudible sound has probative value). People v. Fenelon, 14 Ill. App. 3d 622,
303 N.E.2d 38 (1973) (video portion of D.W.I. tape admissable without sound
portion).
24. Miller, Videotaping the Oral Deposition, 18 PRAC. LAW. 45 (1972).
25. Merlo and Sorenson, Video Tape: The Coming Courtroom Tool, 7 TRIAL 55,
57 (Nov. 1971) (suggesting a flag in the background for a more formal effect).
26. See text accompanying notes 128-43 infra.
27. Bermant, Chappel, Crockett, Jacoubovitch & McQuire, Juror Responses to
Prerecorded Videotape Trial Presentations in California and Ohio, 26 HASTINGs L.J.
975, 984 (1975).
28. See United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 43 F.R.D. 447 (S.D. N.Y.
1968) (urging adoption of the proposed rule). See generally Kennelly, The Practical
Uses of Trialvision and Depovision, 16 TRIAL LAW GUIDE 183, 201-05 (1972); Note,
Videotape Depositions: An Analysis of Use in Civil Cases, 9 CuM. L. REV. 195, 204-10
(1978).
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(4):
The court may upon motion order that the testimony at a deposition be
recorded by other than stenographic means, in which event the order shall desig-
nate the manner of recording, preserving and filing the deposition, and may in-
clude other provisions to assure that the recorded testimony will be accurate and
trustworthy. If the order is made, a party may nevertheless arrange to have a
stenographic transcription made at his own expense.
1246 Nova Law Journal 5:19811
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These motions are now routinely granted, overcoming the early confu-
sion surrounding the guidelines for granting them.30 The court's order
may include provisions for signing or authenticating the tape, mechani-
cal specifications, operator qualifications, storage, filing and duplication
requirements.3 1 Presently, the use of depositions at trial is limited to
impeachment, 2 or circumstances where a witness is unavailable,33 or
under extraordinary circumstances.3 Videotaped demonstrations may
be admitted as photographs3 5 in federal courts.
In Florida, videotaped depositions are permitted by court order
under Rule 1.310 (b)(4)."6 They may be used at trial pursuant to Rule
1.330,37 based on its federal rule counterpart, but allowing routine use
when the witness is an expert or skilled witness.38
Depositions can be taken for two different purposes. When used
simply for discovery, the scope of inquiry can be broad, even permitting
inadmissible matter to be discovered if its use is calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible material.3 9 Videotaped depositions can be
valuable in situations where movement contributed to or caused the in-
jury0 which is the subject matter of the pending suit.
30. Proposed Amendments to Civil Rules, 43 F.R.D. 211, 239-40 (1967). The
Advisory Committee Notes state "in order to facilitate less expensive procedures." This
prompted one court to refuse a motion for a videotaped deposition unless such cost
savings were shown. Perry v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 63 F.R.D. 603 (D.S.C. 1974).
31. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(4).
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(1).
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(A)-(D).
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3)(E) requires "that such exceptional circumstances
exist as to make it desirable... to allow the deposition to be used."
35. FED. R. EvID. 1001(2).
36. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.310 (b)(4):
Upon motion, the court shall, subject to the provisions of Rule 1.280(c) and the
guidelines provided by Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.070(d), order that the testimony at
a deposition be recorded on videotape and may order that the testimony at a
deposition be recorded by other than stenographic means at the initial cost of the
movant. A party may also arrange for a stenographic transcription at his own
initial expense.
37. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.330.
38. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.330(a)(3).
39. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b). FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b).
40. Brown v. Brigges, 327 So. 2d 874, 875-76 (Fla. 1976) (defendant instructor
was ordered to participate in a videotaped exhibition of karate manuevers with an ex-
247[1
88
Nova Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1981], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol5/iss2/1
248 Nova Law Journal 5:1981 1
Depositions may also be taken expressly for trial presentation.
Videotaped depositions of geographically distant experts for use as trial
testimony can help expand the range of an attorney's presentation. It
may conceivably be much cheaper for attorneys to travel to the expert's
locale and tape his testimony at local facilities rather than bring him to
the trial. Scheduling is simplified, performed at the convenience of the
participants without reference to docket openings. Also the impact of
charts and graphs used by the expert can be significantly enhanced by
the use of zoom lenses.41
As insurance against the possibility of a witness' unavailability at
a later date, fresh testimony of the witness can be preserved on video-
tape for use at trials held years later.42
Demonstrations are an excellent area for the use of videotapes.
Line of sight at an accident, the operation of a piece of machinery,
product failure under stress, and other experiments are considerably
more impressive on videotape than in photos or verbal descriptions. 43
Evidence of the appearance of the injured party shortly after the acci-
dent can also be preserved for later use at trial.
Judge McCrystal envisions videotape for recording the "execution
of wills, contracts and other legal documents,"'44 to preserve the intent,
competence and volition of the parties.'5 Videotaped execution of wills
is currently available in Florida. 46 However, under the Florida Probate
planation of his teaching techniques).
41. Note, Videotape Depositions: An Analysis of Use in Civil Cases, 9 CUMB. L.
REv. 195, 199 (1978). See generally Annot., 66 A.L.R.3d 637 (1975).
42. See 23 AM. JUR. Trials § 109-10 (1976); Kennelly, supra note 28, at 186-95.
43. In one striking case, Zollman v. Symington, 438 F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1971), a
car fell from a garage hoist. Taped experiments made by the defendant hoist manufac-
turer showed that the car would fall only if improperly positioned on the hoist. These
tapes were shown to the jury. At trial plaintiff claimed that the hoist had spontaneously
shifted, a defect that could have been cured by a simple design modification. That
evening the defense modified the hoist and taped new tests. The results were un-
changed. Since the tape needed no processing, it was ready for use at trial the next
morning. On appeal, the court ruled that the laws of science demonstrated on defen-
dant's tapes, challenged only by plaintiff's unsupported claims, left no question of fact
for the jury on that matter. Id. at 31. See Stewart, Videotape: Use in Demonstrative
Evidence, 21 DEF. L.J. 253 (1972).
44. McCrystal & Maschari, supra note 6, at 249.
45. Id.
46. Dickerson, supra note 20, at 3, col. 3.
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Code, a will must be in writing47 and executed by the correctly per-
formed signatures of the testator and witnesses. 8 Any taping is purely
optional and has no legal effect on the will's validity. While taping may
preserve a record of the mental state and intent of the testator, it would
only be admissible as evidence in rare circumstances under the statute.
Nevertheless it does personalize an event that the law has served to
depersonalize.4 9
It has even been suggested that all surgical procedures be video-
taped, 50 making frivolous malpractice claims easier to detect; and possi-
bly providing useful evidence in the event of actual malpractice.5 1
USES OF VIDEOTAPE IN CRIMINAL PRACTICE
Generally, material that would be admissable in writing or photo-
graphic form is admissable in videotape form. 2 However, special
problems bear further consideration. A defendant has the right to have
an attorney aid in his defense.5 3 Thus, a videotaped booking cannot be
used for identification of the suspect by the victim if the suspect had
not had counsel available at the booking. The use of tapes in such a
matter constitutes a lineup thereby requiring counsel to be present."
Tapes have been used for confessions, booking, interrogations, surveil-
lance, and to record a defendant's presence or behavior at the scene of
the alleged crime. After viewing these tapes, many defendants do not
contest the charges against them and plead guilty.55
It has been asserted that the use of videotape infringes on a defen-
47. FLA. STAT. § 732.502 (1976).
48. FLA. STAT. § 732.502(1) (Supp. 1980).
49. "A lot of people just want to sound off." Dickerson, supra note 20, at 3,
col. 4.
50. Peters & Wilkes, supra note 12.
51. Id. at 361-62.
52. 229 So. 2d at 859. State v. Lusk, 452 S.W.2d 219 (Mo. 1970).
53. Hutchins v. State, 286 So. 2d 244, 246 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
54. Cox v. State, 219 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1969).
55. Comment, Judicial Administration-Technological Advances-Use of Video-
tape in the Courtroom and the Stationhouse, 20 DE PAUL L. REV. 924, 947 (1971).
See generally Short, Florence, & Marsh, An Assessment of Videotape in the Criminal
Courts, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REV. 423, 430-37 (1975) (uses, precautions, and appropriate
equipment).
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dant's right against self incrimination." While the courts have admit-
ted videotapes of the defendant under the same restrictions that apply
to use of his oral statements, which can be read or testified to, it has
been suggested that the defendant may not be aware of the breadth of
his videotaped admission. The defendant's demeanor and appearance
may work against him in a manner that no written transcript could.57
Harsh lighting can exaggerate facial irregularities or scars. 58 In fact, a
videotaped confession may be the functional equivalent of "requiring
the defendant to take the stand and testify against himself.'"59
Notwithstanding, videotape may offer more protection to a sus-
pect. Jurors can see the actual event, not the prosecution's retelling of
it. For example, videotape may show how a confession was obtained.60
In one case a defendant used a videotape of his session with a psychia-
trist to convince a judge of his diminished capacity, thus permitting
him to plead guilty to a lesser charge of manslaughter.61 The psychia-
trist stated that his testimony was simplified by having the judge view
the taped session.6 2
The use of videotaped witness testimony presents special constitu-
tional problems,63 particularly in light of the constitutional requirement
that a criminal defendant has the right to confront any witnesses
against him.64 Previously the courts had vacillated in deciding whether
this confrontation must occur before the jury; the decisions now hold
that it need not be.65 The defendant may demand to be present at any
56. U.S. CoNsr. amend. V, cl. 8 provides in pertinent part: "nor shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself...."
57. Hendricks v. Swenson, 456 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1972) (Heaney, J.,
dissenting).
58. Id. at 509.
59. Id.
60. McCrystal & Maschari, supra note 6, at 248.
61. Note, Video Tape: It's Admissibility in Evidence and Other Uses, 5 GA. ST.
B.J. 393 (1969) (discusses the plea).
62. Id. at 408.
63. See Cunningham, Videotape Evidence: Technological Innovation in the Trial
Process, 36 ALA. LAW. 228, 342-46 (1975); Short, Florence & Marsh, supra note 55,
at 454-56.
64. U.S. CONST. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall en-
joy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him. .. ."
65. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
1250 Nova Law Journal
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deposition that will be used at trial in lieu of live testimony,66 and any
videotaped depositions taken without the intent to use them instead of
live testimony at trial cannot be used.6 7 One court has held that the use
of videotape does not filter the testimony so as to deprive the criminal
defendant of due process.68
As long as the rights of the defendant are protected, videotape can
be an extremely important tool in criminal trial work.69 It could be
used for example, to preserve the testimony of witnesses who might be
unavailable at trial, including experts, officers with conflicting subpoe-
nas and speedy trial deadlines to meet, laboratory personnel, or hospi-
talized victims. An application that might have particular use in Flor-
ida involves the testimony of aliens subject to deportation, who are
potential witnesses in cases involving the smuggling of drugs or illegal
aliens.70 If the government can detain and even incarcerate those aliens
it wishes to use as potential witnesses and deport all others who may
have witnessed the same acts, the rights of the defendant are violated.71
To avoid the necessity of keeping all potential witnesses available until
the trial date, videotaped depositions made expressly for use at trial
may be an excellent alternative.71
VIDEOTAPE To PRESERVE THE RECORD IN CIVIL OR CRIMI-
NAL TRIALS
Alaska, faced with a shortage of court reporters, uses videotape for
66. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(a); FLA. R. CIuM. P. 3.190(j).
67. State v. Basiliere, 353 So. 2d 820, 825 (Fla. 1977). But a taped deposition of
the victim in the hospital is not too potent to show the jury (rather than reading the
written transcript). State v. Jackson, 259 N.W.2d 796 (Iowa 1977).
68. People v. Moran, 39 Cal. App. 3d 398, 114 Cal. Rptr. 413 (Ct. App. 1974).
See text accompanying notes 128-43 infra.
69. See generally Barber & Bates, Videotape in Criminal Proceedings, 25 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 1017 (1974).
70. See Note, Videotape Depositions: An Alternative to the Incarceration of
Alien Material Witnesses, 5 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 376 (1975).
71. United States v. Mendez-Rodriguez, 450 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1971).
72. The defendant's right to a public trial (U.S. CONsT. amend. VI) includes a
corollary right of the public to attend the trials. Extensive use of taped testimony may
violate this right if provision is not made for public access to the depositions. This may
be difficult to effectuate. Cunningham, supra note 63, at 246.
251 11 5:1981
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trial transcripts.7" Videotape has an advantage over voice recordings
since it is easy to see who said what.7 4 The behavior of trial partici-
pants that might constitute reversible error may not be sufficiently pre-
served on stenographic .transcripts for an appellate court to rule on it.75
Nevertheless, by allowing appellate judges to see the witnesses as the
jury saw them, the nature of the appellate process might be signifi-
cantly changed.76 Most appeals should be decided on questions of law,
without reviewing the jury's decision on the credibility of the
witnesses.7
Appellate judges seem to prefer written transcripts to compare dif-
ferent parts of the record.78 For example, appellate judges reviewing
Judge McCrystal's videotaped trials requested written transcripts.79
Transcription of the audio part of the tape is much slower than tran-
scription of stenographic notes.80 An eighteen month experiment with
videotape transcripts with no written transcripts was discarded when
judges found that it actually slowed down the appeal process.81
Since Florida presently allows cameras in courtrooms,8 2 videotapes
can be used to preserve court records with no legal barriers. A rape
trial, where the victim is deaf, retarded and suffering from cerebral
palsy has been videotaped so that the victim's testimony, through ges-
ture and sign language to an interpreter, can be fully preserved "in
case there's an appeal." 83
73. Madden, Illinois Pioneers Videotaping of Trials, 55 A.B.A. J. 457, 457
(1969).
74. Id. at 458.
75. Shelley v. Clark, 267 Ala. 621, 103 So. 2d 743, 747 (1958) (attorney's shak-
ing finger in face of witness not noted in trial record, therefore not grounds for appeal.
See generally Morrill, supra note 11, at 240 n.3.
76. Cunningham, supra note 63, at 239.
77. Id.
78. Kosky, Videotape in Ohio, 59 JUDICATURE 230, 233 (1975). Mr. Kosky was
past president of the National Shorthand Reporters Association. Id. at 238.
79. Id. See text accompanying notes 87-100 infra for a description of these trials.
80. Id. at 233. Transcription of tapes yields 20-25 pages per day; transcription of
stenonotes yields 80-120 pages per day.
81. Burt, The Case Against Courtroom TV, 12 TRIAL 62, 63 (July 1976). All
the cases were from a county criminal court in Tennessee.
82. Petition of Post Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 370 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1979).
83. Miami Herald, Oct. 26, 1980, § BR, at 19, col. 2.
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TECHNIQUES FLORIDA COURTS Do NOT USE
Proponents of videotape in trial settings have long championed the
option of litigating trials wherein all of the testimony is videotaped . 4
PRVTT's are seen as an answer to reducing overcrowded dockets and
long delays for trial dates.85 For comparison purposes, Judge McCrys-
tal compared a hypothetical simple personal injury case tried in the
traditional manner with a PRVTT trial.8 6 The study reveals the major
changes in the trial process.
Testimony is taken from all parties and witnesses at their conve-
nience.s7 The completed tapes are given to the judge together with a
list of objections keyed to their location on the tape.8 The objections
can be ruled on at the convenience of the judge, and can often be done
quickly. 9 Complicated rulings can be made after careful evaluation,
thereby reducing the chances of reversal on appeal.90 However, since
all objections must be made in writing, an additional burden may be
cast upon the attorneys.9" If the case is proper for a directed verdict, no
jury need be impaneled. 92 The edited tape might form the foundation
for a settlement based on a "realistic evaluation of an accurate picture
of the trial."93 The editing aate would be the effective date of settle-
ment, and would shorten the length of the case.94 If the case does pro-
ceed to trial, the attorneys select a jury, then give opening statements
84. See note 5 supra.
85. McCrystal & Maschari, supra note 6, at 246. With an increase of 33% in
filings, the number of pending cases was reduced 31%. Brennan, Videotape-The Michi-
gan Experience, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 5 (1972). A three-day trial yielded one day of
admissible material after deletion of inadmissible material, conferences and motions.
86. McCrystal & Maschari, supra note 6, at 241-46.
87. Id. at 242.
88. Id.
89. McCrystal, Videotape Trials: Relieffor Our Congested Courts, 49 DEN. L.J.
463, 469 (1973). Fifteen minutes were needed to rule on all of the motions submitted
at the first videotape trial that J. McCrystal did.
90. Morrill, supra note 11, at 242.
91. Salvan, Videotape for the Legal Community, 59 JUDICATURE 222, 236
(1975).
92. Note, Videotape Trials: Legal and Practical Implications, 9 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROB. 363 (1973).
93. Morrill, supra note 11, at 247.
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based on what the evidence accurately reflects, not on what they hope
it will show.9 5 The jury then views the edited tape. The jury can be left
alone to view the trial with a tape viewer and a bailiff, saving the pre-
siding judge's time;96 alternatively, the judge, attorneys and parties
could remain with the jury.97 The possibility of mistrial from miscon-
duct is significantly lessened in either case.98 The attorneys then give
their summation; the judge charges the jury; and deliberation begins.
Appeals can be made based on the trial tape and unedited tape. 9 If
retrial is necessary, the same tape, edited in compliance with the appel-
late court's ruling could be used. 100 This would prevent a change in
tactics on retrial, not necessarily a beneficial result. If the new edition
of the tape is acceptable for retrial, the saving of time and money
would be significant.
Opponents of PRVTT's note that depositions are not the proper
place for impeaching witnesses, and that two encounters with each wit-
ness or party would still be necessary,101 thus rendering some of the
time savings illusory. Since objections are not ruled on immediately,
attorneys may pursue long lines of inadmissable material when making
the trial tape.102 Alternate approaches to information may have to be
taped, a tedious and frustrating situation.03 Additionally, videotape is
not ideal for use in complicated trials, although simple personal injury
cases have proven amenable to PRVTT.104 While some attorneys fear
95. McCrystal, Videotape Trials: Relief for Our Congested Courts, supra note
89, at 476.
96. Id. at 473.
97. Bermant, Chappell, Crokett, Jacoubovitch & McGuire, supra note 27, at
986.
98. Note, Videotape Trials: Legal and Practical Implications, supra note 92, at
363.
99. McCrystal & Maschari, supra note 6, at 239.
100. Id. FLA. EVID. CODE § 90.803 (22) already provides that in retrial of a civil
case, the former testimony of a witness given at the original trial can be used as evi-
dence at the retrial, regardless of whether the witness is available. "Thus, in a retrial of
a case it is unnecessary to call as a witness a person who testified during the first trial."
FLA. STAT. § 90.803, Sponsor's note (22) (1979).
101. Kornblum, Videotape in Civil Cases, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 9, 29 (1972).
102. Hartman, Second Thoughts on Videotaped Trials, 61 JUDICATURE 256,
257 (1978).
103. Id.
104. McCrystal & Maschari, supra note 6, at 246.
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that television is regarded as "entertainment" in the public's mind, 10 5
the increased business uses of computer display terminals may be
changing that image.106
The use of PRVTT's in Ohio came after the Ohio Supreme Court
changed that state's rules of civil procedure. 107 It is the function of the
judges and attorneys to adapt the legal processes necessary to meet the
needs of the people.' 0 8 If valid results can be obtained with the in-
creased use of technology, the increased efficiency may provide an al-
ternative to further expansion of the courts. Nevertheless, there is a
need to be sure that a "canned"'' 09 trial produces valid results. This is
an area which, although presently filled with conjecture, is nonetheless
yielding to scientific study.
THE EFFECT OF VIDEOTAPE EVIDENCE ON THE TRIAL
PROCESS
Some attorneys feel that a trial solely using taped testimony would
be sterile, interfering with the traditional interaction between attorney,
jury and witnesses. Their carefully calculated courtroom presence may
lose its effectiveness on videotape," 0 especially if the camera focuses on
105. Doret, Trial by Videotape - Can Justice Be Seen to Be Done? 47 TEMP.
L.Q. 228, 249 (1974).
106. Id.
Also, a medium which has brought us such events as the funeral of assassinated
President John F. Kennedy, the landing of the first man to reach the moon, and
the Hearings on Watergate and Related Activities Before the Senate Select
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities cannot be altogether without se-
rious content.
Petition of Post Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 370 So.2d 764, 776 (Fla. 1979).
107. See McCrystal, supra note 89, at 478-82.
108. Courts are the only branch of the government operated by a single profes-
sion. McCrystal & Maschari, supra note 6, at 239. The court has the power to change
its own rules. Morrill, supra note 11, at n.14.
109. Brennan, supra note 85, at 5.
110. Note, Videotape Trials: Legal and Practical Implications, supra note 92, at
390 (citing an address by Judge McCrystal at the 1972 Sixth Circuit Judicial Confer-
ence, Cincinnati, Ohio, May 18, 1972:
[T]he first thing that occurs to the trial lawyer is, "This takes me right out
of the trial and my good looks, and my gray hair, and my new suit, and my
theatrical skills and dramative abilities are all gone." Well, gentlemen, the an-
2551
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the witness and not the attorney. Nevertheless, it is the jury's function
to consider the testimony of the witnesses, not the charm of the attor-
ney, and the "live parts" of the trial still present a sufficient opportu-
nity for personal interaction. Attorneys may be against PRVTT's until
they actually try one.'11
Useful data about attorney response to PRVTT's is sketchy. Judge
McCrystal notes that only 25% of those cases automatically set for
PRVTT'S based on the nature of the case are removed from the taped
docket by the parties." 2 This would seem to indicate satisfaction with
PRVTT'S by those who use them regularly.
A massive survey of attorney's attitudes regarding the use of
PRVTT'S has been conducted."a 3 Various factors which distinguish
PRVTT'S from traditional trials were rated as desirable, neutral or un-
desirable. A few of the factors were worded in less than neutral terms,
actually amounting to unsupported conclusions." 4 The results showed
that attorneys generally approved of the time and money savings that
could be realized by the appropriate use of PRVTT's,"a5 and of the
protection PRVTT's provide for the jury by excluding inadmissible ma-
terial and reducing long trial delays, 1 6 and of the degree of pretrial
control attorneys had over their trial presentation. 1 7 Attorneys were
unhappy however, over any proceeding done without a judge present to
aid the jury"" and were generally negative concerning the jury's reac-
swer is, "Yes," but not your legal skills. Try as I will . . . I have never found
under the definition of "due process" a subtitle "dramatic skills" and I don't
think it is a part of our due process system.
111. McCrystal, Videotaped Trials: A Primer, supra note 94, at 254 (noted this
effect).
112. McCrystal & Maschari, supra note 6, at 246 n.14.
113. Comment, Opening Pandora's Box: Asking Judges and Attorneys to React
to the Videotape Trial, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REV. 487 (1975). Eight hundred members of
the Defense Research Institute and eight hundred members of the Association of Trial
Lawyers of America were polled. About one third of those polled had used videotapes
in some aspect of trial work. Id. at 517.
114. Id. at 505. For example, "Jurors enjoy a taped trial less than a live one."
Id.
115. Id. at 495.
116. Id. at 503.
117. Id. at 499.
118. Id. at 503.
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tion to PRVTT's. l 19
The judges surveyed in the same study were generally more
favorable to all the factors present in PRVTT's except for their inabil-
ity to question the witnesses.1 20 They did not feel as strongly as the
attorneys that their own presence was as necessary during the viewing
of the tape. 1
Witnesses in Ohio's first PRVTT 122 claimed to be less nervous in
front of the camera than they would have been in court. 2 3 An attorney
noted the same effect in a San Francisco PRVTT.12 " A large scale in-
court taping of witness testimony at preliminary hearings showed no
difference in stress between courtroom appearances untaped or
taped. 25 If only some of the testimony is pretaped, the witnesses most
likely to be taped are those who already spend a significant amount of
time in court, people whose testimony would be little affected by the
change in procedure. For witnesses unaccustomed to the courtroom, a
quiet room with the parties, attorneys and technician is less distracting
than a public room with strangers coming and going. 26 Reliability of
testimony remains basically unchanged. 127
Jury reaction is the main concern of the trial lawyers surveyed. 128
There is now available data that should allay their worst fears and
show that the use of videotape may not be such a radical departure
from traditional jury trials as once was feared.
119. Id. at 507. This was the area where the factors became less objectively
worded. Plaintiff's attorneys were less negative about jury response.
120. Id. at 499. Judges find videotape better for depositions presented at live trial
than the reading of transcripts. Jurors are instructed to evaluate the demeanor and
frankness of the witness-an impossibility using readings of written transcripts.
121. Id.
122. McCall v. Clemens, Civil No. 39301 (C. P. Erie County, Ohio, Dec. 6,
1971.).
123. Watts, Comments on a Video Tape Trial, 45 OHIo B. 51, 55 (1972).
124. Bermant, Chappell, Crockett, Jacoubovitch & McGuire, supra note 27, at
987.
125. Short, Florence & Marsh, supra note 55, at 447. "[S]eventy three percent
of the attorneys sampled agreed with the statement, 'witnesses behave the same
whether they are being videotaped or not.'" (footnote omitted).
126. Morrill, supra note 11, at 246. Doret, supra note 105, at 246.
127. Short, Florence & Marsh, supra note 55, at 443.
128. See text accompanying note 119 supra.
2571
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Judge McCrystal notes that an independent survey of 250 jurors
who participated in 45 PRVTT's showed that 75% of the respondents
would actually prefer a videotaped trial if they were a party in a simi-
lar civil suit1 29 (simple personal injury action). The jurors in the San
Francisco PRVTT 130 generally felt that the conduct of the trial and the
presentation of the case were satisfactory and gave them sufficient in-
formation to decide the case. 31
Jurors from both of the above surveys were asked if they would
choose a videotape trial if they were a criminal defendant. Sixty-five
precent of the jurors over 40 years of age answered affirmatively, as did
26% of those under 40,1-2 leading to the possibility that the "video gen-
eration" is more skeptical of videotape. 3
The most exhaustive research of juror response to videotape has
been carried out in Michigan.' 34 Surveys of large numbers of actual
jurors, in what they perceived as actual trials, showed few significant
differences in how trial evidence and participants in the trial were per-
ceived by the jurors. A live presentation was compared to the same
presentation videotaped and replayed in color or black and white, with
one camera, and on split screen three camera presentations. Black and
white seemed to yield greatest retention of fact, color next, and live the
least.' 35 As the length of the presentation increased, fact retention im-
proved with videotaped presentation.38" A test of the effect of deleting
inadmissible material showed no appreciable difference between retain-
ing and deleting it, 37 whether the material was deleted by clean edit-
129. McCrystal, The Case for PRVTT's, supra note 8, at 57.
130. Liggons v. Hanisko, Civil No. 637-707 (Super. Ct. San Francisco County,
Cal., Sept. 19, 1973).
131. Bermant, Chappell, Crockett, Jacoubovitch & McGuire, supra note 27, at
985. The judge, attorneys and parties remained with the jury during viewing of the
tape.
132. Id. at 993.
133. Id.
134. Miller, Fontes & Dahnke, Using Videotape in the Courtroom: A Four-Year
Test Pattern, 55 J. URB. L. 655 (1978).
135. Id. at 680. But this must be traded off against the loss of perception of
flushed faces; these are more perceptible in color presentation. Hartman, supra note
102, at 257.
136. Miller, Fontes & Dahnke, supra note 134, at 655.
137. Id. at 671.
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ing using retaping, blacking out only sound, or blacking out sound and
picture, although the latter was considered more distracting.' 8
In another series of experiments, the same researchers found that
the ability of a subject to detect lies told by strangers remained unaf-
fected by different modes of communication (live, videotape, written
transcript or audio tape) even where the subjects were forewarned that
lies would be told.139 In fact, in all modes, detection of lies was poor.1 40
While results of jury perception surveys dealing with large num-
bers of jurors show little difference between traditional and PRVTT
trials,'141 evaluation of a trial where only the opposing experts were
presented either live or taped showed differences in juror response
based on the mode of presentation. 142 One witness was more effective
for the client he was testifying for live, one taped. Full length shots
were preferred over close-ups in this survey.1 43
CONCLUSION
Videotape is not the salvation of an overburdened legal system, but
it is a useful tool that lawyers should not be afraid to use under the
proper circumstances. Early fears regarding the undesirable effects of
videotaped testimony have been greatly allayed by sound research in
the field. It is the responsibility of the legal profession to best use the
tools available to it to serve the needs of the people. "The legal profes-
sion did not stop using scriveners until 300 years after the Gutenberg
flatbed press had been developed. . . .(I)t is hoped that the time be-
138. Id. at 677. Other jurors have noted that courtroom noises may be amplified
to an annoying degree (paper rustling). Murray, Use of Videotape in the Preparation
and Trial of Lawsuits, 11 FORUM 1152, 1158 (1976).
139. Miller, Fontes & Dahnke, supra note 134, at 693. The speakers were also
put under stress to approximate a witness situation. Audio tape was the least effective
mode for detection of lies.
140. Id.
141. See Bermant, Critique-Data in Search of Theory in Search of Policy, 1975
B.Y.U. L. REV. 467 (1975), for a critique of the surveys of Michigan and Ohio sub-
jects; Bermant & Jacouvitch, Fish Out of Water: A Brief Overview of Social and Psy-
chological Concerns About Videotaped Trials, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 999 (1975).
142. Miller, Fontes & Dahnke, supra note 134, at 668.
143. Id. at 695.
259 11 5:1981
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tween availability and use [of videotape] will be somewhat less than in
the earlier case."1 44
Rita Dee
144. Salvan, supra note 91, at 229.
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COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE:
FLORIDA STATUTE § 627.7372.
In an attempt to reduce automobile insurance rates1 and the cost of
automobile accidents2 in Florida, the legislature enacted the "Florida
Automobile Reparations Reform Act" in 1971.8 This act, which be-
came effective in 1972, contained basic concepts of no-fault insurance,
personal injury protection (PIP) benefits, and certain "threshold re-
quirements. ' 4 The plan, however, did not serve to reduce the cost of
automobile insurance, causing the Florida Legislature to modify the
act.'
Though innovative in some regards, the modified no-fault legisla-
tion failed to produce the reduction in insurance rates promised by its
drafters. Once again, the Florida Legislature attempted to resolve the
problem, and in 1977 the "Florida Automobile Reparations Reform
Act of 1977" emerged.8 It was here that section 627.7372 of the Flor-
ida Statutes, regarding the admissibility of payments made by collat-
eral sources, was initially created.7 Since 1977, the Legislature has seen
fit to amend this act and it is likely that legislative innovation, as well
as experimentation, will continue in this field.9
1. Levin, Visiting Florida's No-Fault Experience: Is It Now Constitutional?, 54
FLA. B.J. 123 (1980).
2. J. ALPERT & P. MURPHY, FLORIDA AUTOMOBILE REPARATIONS § 1-1 (1980).
See, e.g., Powers, Automobile Accident Reparations Controversy: Current Status, 44
FLA. B.J. 186 (April 1970).
3. FLA. STAT. §§ 627.730-741 (1971).
4. J. ALPERT & P. MURPHY, supra note 2.
5. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION COMMITTEE, THE FLA. BAR, FLORIDA No-
FAULT INSURANCE PRACTICE (2d ed. 1979). See J. ALPERT & P. MURPHY, supra note
2 for more detailed information on this legislation.
6. FLA. S.B. 1181 (1977) creating ch. 77-468, 1977 Fla. Laws 2057.
7. Id. § 34.
8. Ch. 78-374, 1978 Fla. Laws 1041.
9. Change will in fact occur by virtue of the automatic repeal of the Act on July
1, 1982.
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF SECTION 627.7372
The 'collateral source rule' states that "total or partial compensa-
tion for an injury received by an injured party from a collateral source
wholly independent of the wrongdoer will not operate to lessen the
damages recoverable from the person causing the injury."10 With few
exceptions, this rule has been adhered to by the Florida courts"" and
continues to be in use today.1 2 However, in recent years, an exception
to this rule has emerged in cases involving the operation of a motor
vehicle within the confines of the no-fault act.1 3
A. 1977. Florida Statute § 627.7372
Florida Statute § 627.7372 entitled "Collateral Souces of Indem-
nity" became effective on July 1, 1977 and provides that:
(1) In an action for personal injury or wrongful death arising out of
the ownership, operation, use or maintenance of a motor vehicle, the
court shall admit into evidence the total amount of all collateral sources
which have been paid to the claimant prior to the commencement of the
trial. The- court shall also admit into evidence any amount paid by the
claimant to secure such collateral source.14
The second part of the statute enumerates payments to the claimant
that will be considered "collateral sources."1 5 An illustration of this
10. 15 AM. JUR. Damages § 198 (1938); 25 C.J.S. Damages § 99 (1941).
11. 17 FLA. JUR. 2d Damages § 39 (1980); Paradis v. Thomas, 150 So. 2d 457
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
12. Hartnett v. Riveron, 361 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1978).
13. The Florida Insurance and Tort Reform Act of 1977, § 34, FLA. STAT. §
627.7372 (1977). Exception to the collateral source rule has also been taken in medical
malpractice suits by virtue of FLA. STAT. § 768.50 (1979). Much of the information in
this note may be applied to section 768.50. However, some underlying differences do
exist between the two statutes. This note will be confined to a discussion of section
627.7372.
14. FLA. STAT. § 627.7372(1) (1977).
15. (2) For purposes of this section, "collateral sources" means any pay-
ments made to the claimant, or on his behalf, by or pursuant to:
(a) The United States Social Security Act; any federal, state, or local income
disability act; or any other public programs providing medical expenses, disabil-
ity payments, or other similar benefits.
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rule is as follows:
Plaintiff is injured in an automobile accident with defendant caus-
ing plaintiff to institute a suit against the defendant tortfeasor. How-
ever, prior to the commencement of the.trial, plaintiff collects $10,000
through her PIP benefits provided under her insurance policy. Sbction
627.7372 provides that this $10,000 payment will be admissible evi-
dence at the time of trial.16
B. 1978: Florida Statute § 627.7372
Upon the continuation of soaring insurance rates in Florida, in
1978 the legislature, once again, amended the collateral source statute
to read:
(1) In any action for personal injury or wrongful death arising out
of the ownership, operation, use, or maintenance of a motor vehicle, the
court shall admit into evidence the total amount of all collateral sources
paid to the claimant, and the court shall instruct the jury to deduct
from its verdict the value of all benefits received by the claimant from
any collateral source.17
Two major changes were adopted in the 1978 amendment. First,
the statute no longer allows into evidence amounts paid to secure the
collateral source. Second, the court must now instruct the jury to de-
duct from its verdict the value of all collateral source benefits received
by the claimant. This statute became effective January 1, 1979 and
remains in effect at the time of publication of this note.18
(b) Any health, sickness, or income disability insurance; automobile accident in-
surance that provides health benefits or income disability coverage; and any other
similar insurance benefits except life insurance benefits available to the claimant,
whether purchased by him or provided by others.
(c) Any contract or agreement of any group, organization, partnership, or corpo-
ration to provide, pay for, or reimburse the costs of hospital, medical, dental, or
other health care services.
(d) Any contractual or voluntary wage continuation plan provided by employers
or any other system intended to provide wages during a period of disability.
16. This hypothetical assumes compliance with all aspects of the no-fault act.
17. FLA. STAT. § 627.7372 (Supp. 1978) (emphasis supplied). It should be noted
that section 627.7372(2) remained the same.
18. Effective August 1, 1979, the statute was amended to include: "(3) Notwith-
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II. RECENT CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
"The constitutionality of most no-fault laws has been based on a
1916 United States Supreme Court decision .. ."1 The first constitu-
tional, challenge to reach the Florida Supreme Court, however, oc-
curred in 1973.2o The court in Kluger v. White ruled that Florida Stat-
ute § 627.73821 was unconstitutional.22 The court held that this statute
denied a plaintiff the right of access to the courts for redress of a par-
ticular injury without providing a reasonable alternative to protect that
right.2" The threshold requirements of the Florida no-fault act 2' faced
constitutional challenges in Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co.25 However,
the court rejected all the arguments set forth in Kluger and upheld the
provisions of no-fault. "We now hold, however, that with one exception,
the personal injury aspects of F.S. 627.737, F.S.A., are valid and
constitutional. ' 26
Recently, there has been a great deal of controversy concerning
the collateral source provision of the no-fault act. A growing number of
circuit court judges throughout the state have held the statute unconsti-
tutional, thus prohibiting the admission into evidence at trial of collat-
standing any other provisions of this section, benefits received under the Workers'
Compensation Law shall not be considered a collateral source." FLA. STAT. §
627.7372(3) (1979).
19. Levin, supra note 1, at 124 (citing to Atlantic Coastline R.R. Co. v. Mims,
242 U.S. 532 (1916)).
20. J. ALPERT & P. MURPHY, supra note 2, at § 1-20 (citing Kluger v. White,
281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973)).
21. This statute, which abolished the traditional right of action in tort for prop-
erty damage arising from an automobile accident, required the plaintiff to seek prop-
erty damage compensation from his own insurer unless he was not insured for property
damage and met a $550 threshold requirement.
22. 281 So. 2d at 5. The court found the statute was in violation of FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 21.
23. 281 So. 2d at 4.
24. FLA. STAT. § 627.737 (1971).
25. 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974).
26. Id. at 13. The exception declared unconstitutional was that portion of the
statute allowing recovery for pain and suffering when the injury was a fracture to a
weight-bearing bone, even if the $1,000 threshold of the Act was not met. Additionally,
four years later, ch. 77-468, § 42, 1977 Fla. Laws 2087, which dealt with the "Good
Drivers Incentive Fund" was severed from the Act on the basis of its constitutionality.
State v. Lee, 356 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1978).
1264 5:1981 1
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eral source benefits paid to the claimant.27 In so doing, the courts have
embraced the constitutional arguments as set forth in Kluger and
Lasky. These arguments include: denial of access to courts,28 invasion
of the court's rulemaking authority,29 impairment of the right to con-
tract,30 denial of equal protection s' and due process.3 2
A. Access to Courts
Article I, Section 21 of the Florida Constitution guarantees every
citizen his day in court. "The courts shall be open to every person for
redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale,
denial or delay."133
In Kluger v. White, the Supreme Court of Florida determined that
the legislature could not abolish a common law or statutory cause of
action "without providing a reasonable alternative to protect the rights
of the people.. ., unless the legislature can show an overpowering pub-
lic necessity ... ." The same argument is now sought to be applied to
the collateral source statute. 5
In applying this argument to the collateral source statute, it must
be noted that the statute was intended to prevent the duplication of
27. Puchaty v. Teague, No. 79-5183 (Fla. 18th Cir. Ct., filed Feb. 26, 1980);
Womble v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., No. 79-9107 (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct., filed Mar. 21,
1980) (prohibiting the admission of collateral sources, but not explicitly declaring the
statute unconstitutional); Berman v. Poole, No. 78-21175 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct., filed Apr.
23, 1980); Jenkins v. Rafferty, No. 79-4593 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct., filed Oct. 1, 1980)
(prohibiting the admission of collateral sources, but not explicitly declaring the statute
unconstitutional); Cooper v. Pepper, No. 79-8819 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct., filed Oct. 21,
1980). These orders represent part of a growing number. But see note 69 infra.
28. FLA. CoNsT. art. I, § 21.
29. FLA. CoNsT. art. II, § 3; FLA. CoNsT. art. V, § 2(a).
30. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 10.
31. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
32. FLA. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. This challenge, although
asserted, has not been expounded on by either plaintiffs' or defendants' motions or the
respective orders. See cases cited in note 27 supra. This article will not therefore spe-
cifically address this challenge.
33. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
34. 281 So. 2d at 4.
35. See plaintiffs' motions in connection with their respective orders for the cases
cited in note 27 supra.
106
Nova Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1981], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol5/iss2/1
266 Nova Law Journal 5:1981
benefits..8 There is, however, no Florida law, statutory or otherwise,
which grants the right of a claimant to a double recovery. Secondly,
the statute continues to preserve a claimant's right to seek legal redress
against a tortfeasor. It. is the threshold requirements that may deny a
claimant his day in court, but it is the collateral source statute that
limits claimant's damages to a single recovery.37
An argument has been asserted that the admission of evidence re-
garding a claimant's receipt of collateral sources "involves a substantial
likelihood of prejudicial impact."3 8 However, the possibility of
prejudice should be weighed (as a matter of public policy) against the
possibility of double recovery. This will further have to be balanced
with the underlying purpose of the "Florida Insurance and Tort Re-
form Act of 1977," which is to reduce insurance premiums.39
Another problem arises when a particular collateral source insurer
maintains a subrogated interest in the claimant's recovery, thus result-
ing in a double reduction. 40 The courts have not addressed this issue
with respect to the constitutional validity of Section 627.7372. One via-
ble approach is the argument that since a plaintiff does not have the
right to recover these amounts, an insurance company, thus, cannot
maintain the right to subrogation. 1
The question of whether Section 627.7372 denies a claimant's con-
stitutional right of access to the courts raises some valid arguments on
both sides of the issue. When this statute is reviewed by higher courts
in Florida, this concern may very well be the focus in determining the
constitutional validity of the statute.
36. This would in turn, hopefully, assist in decreasing insurance rates.
37. The statute states in part: "[T]he court shall instruct the jury to deduct from
its verdict the value of all benefits received by the claimant from any collateral source."
FLA. STAT. § 627.7372(1) (Supp. 1978) (emphasis supplied). The collateral source
statute becomes moot if a jury does not find the defendant liable.
38. Eichel v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 375 U.S. 253, 255 (1963).
39. FLA. S.B. 1181 (1977). Furthermore, it would not be in the province of the
courts to decide that these conditions no longer exist. "When the validity of the law
depends on the existence of certain facts necessary to be determined by the legislature,
the court will presume the requisite facts are established to that body's satisfaction."
Florida State Bd. of Architecture v. Wasserman, 377 So. 2d 653, 657 (Fla. 1979).
40. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 5, at § 5.31.
41. Id.
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B. Invasion of the Court's Rulemaking Authority
Article II, Section 3 of the Florida Constitution espouses the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine and reads in part:
"No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any power ap-
"142pertaining to either of the other branches ....
Article V, Section 2(a) of the Florida Constitution enumerates
certain powers of the Supreme Court:
"The Supreme Court shall adopt rules for the practice and proce-
dure in all Courts ....
As a result of these two constitutional provisions, the state legisla-
ture is prohibited from adopting any statute which regulates practice
and procedure in the courts." Whether this collateral source statute is
substantive or procedural is another basis for determining its validity.
The area of substance versus procedure has been described as a
"twilight zone. ' 5 In Parker v. Wideman," the Fifth Circuit addressed
this issue and held that the question of admissibility of collateral
sources is a substantive one. "But the fact of the matter is that under
Florida law the rule is a substantive rule of law which applies whether
or not evidence of collateral compensation is introduced.' 7
However, the portion of the statute which requires the court to
instruct the jury on the effect of the evidence presents a more difficult
substantive versus procedural problem. This mandatory jury instruction
clearly seems procedural in nature. As Justice Adkins noted,.
"[p]ractice and procedure pertains to the legal machinery by which
substantive law is made effective."'" If this portion of the statute is
determined by the courts to be a matter of procedure, it would be pos-
sible for the Supreme Court to adopt it in their rules of practice and
42. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3.
43. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a).
44. In re Clarification of Fla. Rules of Practice and Procedure, 281 So. 2d 204
(Fla. 1978).
45. In re Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure; 272 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1972) (Adkins,
J., concurring), affd, 272 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1973).
46. 380 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1967).
47. Id. at 436. See Finley P. Smith, Inc. v. Schectman, 132 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Annot., 68 A.L.R. 2d 876 (1959); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 92,
Comment e at 620.
48. 272 So. 2d at 65 (Adkins, J., concurring).
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procedure.4 9 When the Civil Rules of Procedure were adopted, statutes
which were procedural but did not supersede or conflict with the rules,
remained in effect.50
The admissibility .of collateral sources is arguably substantive in
light of the holding in Parker. However, the purpose of admitting this
evidence is effectuated if the jury is instructed to deduct the amount
from its verdict. This mandatory instruction, which was added to the
original statute in the 1978 amendment,51 expanded the collateral
source rule with the intention of reducing final verdicts and aiding in
the overall intent of reducing automobile insurance rates.52 The statute
could be amended, however, to eliminate the jury instruction, which
would result in a statute similar to the one in 1977. 53
C. Impairment of the Plaintiffs Right to Contract
It is undisputed that legislative enactments impairing a person's
right to contract are a constitutional violation." Article I, Section 10 of
the Florida Constitution reads:
"No bill of attainder, ex post facto law or law impairing the obli-
gation of contracts shall be passed."55 It has been argued that the col-
lateral source statute violates this provision by impairing the value of a
plaintiff's contract with his insurer."
The term impairment has been defined in Florida as "[a]ny con-
duct on the part of the legislature that detracts in any way from the
49. 281 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1973). See Sun Ins. Office Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So. 2d 735
(Fla. 1961).
50. In re Fla. Rules of Civil Procedure (1967 Revision), 187 So. 2d 598 (Fla.
1967).
51. FLA. STAT. § 627.7372 (Supp. 1978).
52. FLA. S.B. 1308 (1978). See Senate Staff Analysis and Economic Statement,
June 1, 1978 (Brainerd).
53. "If, when the unconstitutional part of a statute is striken, that which remains
is complete in itself and capable of being executed in accordance with the apparent
legislative intent, the valid portion of the statute will be sustained." Lasky v. State
Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d at 21.
54. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 10.
55. Id.
56. See Memorandum of Law in support of plaintiff's motion in limine, Lang v.
Halfpenny, No. 79-3470 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct., filed Sept. 11, 1980).
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value of the contract . . .. The Florida Supreme Court was con-
fronted with a similar situation when they considered the question
whether the enactment of the anti-stacking statute58 impaired the value
of a claimant's pre-existing insurance policy.59 The court upheld the
statute and decided it was "a reasonable exercise of the state's undis-
puted authority to regulate the insurance industry in furtherance of
the public welfare."60 It is possible the court will follow this reasoning
when considering the collateral source statute.
D. Equal Protection
It has been advanced that Section 627.7372 violates the equal pro-
tection clause of the United States Constitution61 and Article I, Section
2 of the Florida Constitution as it applies only to actions for personal
injury or wrongful death arising out of the operation, use or mainte-
nance of a motor vehicle.62 However, "[w]hen the difference between
those included in a class and those excluded from it bears a substantial
relationship to the legislative purpose, the classification does not deny
equal protection." 63
It is undisputed that Section 627.7372 creates a classification of
persons injured in motor vehicle accidents. However, this classification
is probably not arbitrary since it is a valid legislative response to the
57. Pinellas County v. Banks, 19 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1944) (emphasis supplied).
58. FLA. STAT. § 627.4132 (1976).
59. Gillette v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 374 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 1979).
Although this issue was brought up a year earlier, the question of the statute's constitu-
tional validity was left open. The court merely invalidated the application of the stat-
ute to the particular facts at bar. Dewberry v. Auto-owners Ins. Co., 363 So. 2d 1077
(Fla. 1978).
60. 374 So. 2d at 526 (emphasis supplied).
61. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
62. See Memoranda of Law filed on behalf of plaintiffs' motions in connection
with the cases cited in note 27 supra. Some of these memoranda suggest the statute
also discriminates against tortfeasors by providing an unwarranted benefit to the negli-
gent motor vehicle operator and not to one who is negligent in some other manner, but
causes identical injuries. However, research did not reveal any cases whereby a
tortfeasor, or his insurance company, asserted a claim based on a denial of equal pro-
tection because his unfortunate victim is without collateral source benefits, which could
have been deducted from a potential judgment rendered against him.
63. 296 So. 2d at 18.
2691Collateral Source Rule15:1981
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insurance crisis which confronted the public in the 1970's. Further-
more, classifications which discriminate between persons injured in mo-
tor vehicle accidents are not unconstitutional. The Florida Supreme
Court in Lasky" was called upon to examine this identical classifica-
tion to determine whether the threshold requirements of the no-fault
act were a denial of equal protection. The court decided this classifica-
tion did not violate the equal protection clause even though the classifi-
cation determined a person's right of access to the courts."8
In addition to being non-arbitrary, Section 627.7372 must bear a
substantial relationship to the legislative purpose in order to sustain its
validity.66 This requirement is arguably met after viewing this statute
as an overall scheme to resolve the insurance crisis. "Merely because
the Legislature has seen fit to remedy a perceived evil in one area, it is
not compelled to extend that remedy to all areas in which it might be
applied."' 67 Compelling the legislature to pursue an all or nothing ap-
proach would not be favorable.6 8 In light of the holding in Lasky, it
seems unlikely that higher courts in Florida will find this statute to be
in violation of the equal protection clause.69
Lori M. Lapin
64. Id.
65. Id. at 22.
66. Id. at 18.
67. Id. at 22.
68. Id.
69. Shortly before publication of this note, a unanimous First District Court Ap-
peal upheld the constitutionality of section 627.7372. The court rejected all the argu-
ments raised in this note except the constitutionality of the jury instruction, which was
not raised. McKee v. City of Jacksonville, 1981 Fla. Law Weekly 4 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. Jan. 6, 1981).
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Post-Majority Support In Florida:
An Idea Whose Time Has Come?
In this age of sophisticated technology and economic complexity with the
necessity of development of special skills to qualify for pursuit of a trade,
profession or to obtain employment, a person over 18 and less than 21
may indeed be dependent on the help of others to obtain what education
and training is needed to be competitive in the economic system in which
he must make his way.'
Despite these words of the state Supreme Court, Florida courts have
not expressly held that a divorced parent, with the financial ability to
do so, is required to provide his child with a college education.2 Gener-
ally, the obligation of a parent to support a child ceases when the child
reaches majority.' The issue of support to provide college funds became
pertinent in Florida in 1973 when the age of majority was lowered
from twenty-one to eighteen." Prior to that time most children were
close to completion of a college education when they reached majority
and the question of support-during college was seldom raised.5
Although Florida does not yet recognize a duty of support beyond
the age of majority, recent decisions indicate that the courts are not
totally opposed to the idea of requiring a divorced parent to provide
1. Finn v. Finn, 312 So. 2d 726, 731 (Fla. 1975).
2. In Finn, the court recognized the importance of education in dictum. See notes
7-9 & 22-24 infra and accompanying text.
3. Perla v. Perla, 58 So. 2d 689, 690 (Fla. 1952).
4. FLA. STAT. § 1.01(14) (1979) states: "the word 'minor' includes any person
who has not attained the age of 18 years." FLA. STAT. § 743.07(1)(1979) provides:
The disability of nonage is hereby removed for all persons in this state who are
18 years of age or older, and they shall enjoy and suffer the rights, privileges and
obligations of all persons 21 years of age or older except as otherwise excluded
by the state constitution immediately preceding the effective date of this section.
These sections were created by Ch. 73-21, 1973 Fla. Laws 59, effective July 1, 1973.
5. See generally Nicolay v. Nicolay, 387 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1980).
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funds for a child's college education. This note will examine Florida
cases dealing with this issue, and will explore the ramifications of a
finding of a duty of post-majority support, including the possibility of
an equal protection challenge, by examining decisions of other states
whose courts have ordered divorced parents to provide support beyond
majority for educational purposes.
I. FLORIDA DECISIONS
A. Pre-Existing Support Obligations
Florida Statute § 743.07, which removes the disability of nonage
for persons who are eighteen years of age or older, operates prospec-
tively rather than retrospectively.' In Finn v. Finn,' the Supreme Court
held that a final judgment in a dissolution proceeding rendered prior to
July 1, 1973, the effective date of section 743.07, was not affected by
the statute. The 1971 judgment, in addition to granting dissolution of
the marriage of the parties and awarding custody of the adoptive chil-
dren to the mother, ordered the father to pay weekly child support
The Court rejected the father's contention that section 743.07, by oper-
ation of law, modified the duration of the child support ordered so as to
terminate it when the children reached eighteen, and held that the final
judgment, rendered when the age of majority was twenty-one, had im-
pliedly set the duration of legal dependency to extend until the children
reached twenty-one."
The District Courts of Appeal have adhered to the view that judg-
ments for support entered prior to the effective date of the statute low-
ering the age of majority, and which provide for support to "majority,"
6. FLA. STAT. § 743.07(3) (1979) provides "[t]his section shall operate prospec-
tively and not retrospectively and shall not affect the rights and obligations existing
prior to July 1, 1973."
7. 312 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1975).
8. The court in a dissolution proceeding has authority to order child support per
FLA. STAT. § 61.13(1) (1979) which provides in part that "[i]n a proceeding for disso-
lution of marriage, the court may at any time order either or both parents owing a duty
of support to a child of the marriage to pay such support as from the circumstances of
the parties and the nature of the case is equitable."
9. 312 So. 2d at 729. See also Daugherty v. Daugherty, 308 So. 2d 24 (Fla.
1975).
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"until emancipation," or "until age twenty-one," are binding and en-
forceable. The new age of majority does not affect the duration of sup-
port payments ordered by such judgments.10
B. Agreements to Provide Post-Majority Support
In spite of the general rule that a parent does not owe support to
children after they reach majority, specific agreements to support chil-
dren beyond majority or through college will be enforced., A father
who has agreed to pay for a child's college education under the terms
of a separation agreement will be required to pay for these educational
benefits regardless of the statutory age of majority. The court will not
remake an agreement. 2 A wife, as custodial parent and a contracting
party, has standing to seek enforcement of such an agreement. 8
C. What is a "Dependent Person?"
Although the age of majority, and consequently the duration of
the parental obligation of support, has been lowered to eighteen. Flor-
ida Statute § 743.07(2) provides that a court may require support for a
dependent person beyond the age of eighteen years.1 4 Much litigation
10. Burgdorf v. Burgdorf, 372 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979). Hoff-
man v. Hoffman, 371 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979). Manganiello v. Man-
ganiello, 359 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978). Swallick v. Swallick, 351 So. 2d
1119 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977). Drotos v. Drotos, 311 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1975).
11. Holmes v. Holmes, 384 So. 2d 1295 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980). Martinez
v. Martinez, 383 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980). See also Veron, Parental
Support of Post-Majority Children in College: Changes and Challenges, 17 J. Fam. L.
645, 652-54 (1979).
12. Martinez, 383 So. 2d at 1155. See also Mohammed v. Mohammed, 371 So.
2d 1070 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (trial court's order of support, based on father's
offer to pay for his two children's college expenses for four years, affirmed).
13. Holmes, 384 So. 2d at 1296. Accord, Fagan v. Fagan, 381 So. 2d 278 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980). Dissolution court is the proper forum to enforce child support
payments for an adult child.*
14. FLA. STAT. § 743.07(2) (1979) states:
This section shall not prohibit any court of competent jurisdiction from requiring
support for a dependent person beyond the age of 18 years; and any crippled
child as defined in chapter 391 shall receive benefits under the provisions of said
chapter until age 21, the provisions of this section to the contrary notwithstand-
273 1
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has focused on the meaning of "dependent person" as used in the
statute.
It has long been recognized that a parent's support obligation may
continue after a child has reached majority when the child is, from
physical or mental deficiencies, unable to support himself.1" Depen-
dency in this sense has not been equated with incompetency. Evidence
that a child was able to hold a part-time job under close supervision
while attending a junior college, but was unable to be self-sustaining
because of his mental condition, has been held sufficient to uphold a
finding of dependency and requirement of support.16 Florida courts are
divided, however, as to whether a full-time student without physical or
mental disabilities may be a dependent person and therefore entitled to
support after reaching the age of eighteen, per §743.07(2).
In White v. White,17 a case decided shortly after the age of major-
ity was lowered to eighteen, the First District Court of Appeal reversed
an order of the trial judge which required a father to pay support for
his eighteen year old son who in the trial court's opinion was entitled to
a college education at the expense of his parents.18 The appeal court
postulated that the term "dependent person" in section 743.07 was in-
tended by the legislature to mean a person over eighteen years of age
unable by reason of physical or mental incompetency or inability to be
independent,1 9 and held that it was not empowered to require the fa-
ther to support his able-bodied son. In a dissent which was subse-
quently cited and approved by the state Supreme Court,20 Judge Mc-
Cord expressed the view that if the legislature intended to limit
dependent persons to disabled persons it would have done so, and that
the reasonable pursuit of an education is relevant to the question of
ing. (emphasis added).
15. Perla, 58 So. 2d at 690. Accord, Fincham v. Levin, 155 So. 2d 883 (Fla. Ist
Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (father ordered to support unmarried adult daughter who had
been an epileptic since birth and was mentally and physically unable to care for or
support herself). •
16. Fagan v. Fagan, 381 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
17. 296 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
18. Id. at 621.
19. Id. at 623.
20. Finn, 312 So. 2d at 731.
115
et al.: Nova Law Review Full issue




The Supreme Court of Florida, in Finn v. Finn2 2 stated in dic-
tum 23 that the interpretation of "dependent person" as one who is de-
pendent because of physical or mental incompetence or inability is too
narrow24 and that one pursuing an education in good faith with a need
for help beyond his own reasonable capacity to provide for himself may
be a dependent person. 5 Nevertheless, the District Courts of Appeal
have held that "the mere fact that a person is attending a university or
college does not render him or her dependent" 26 and they have failed to
hold that financial inability to support oneself while pursuing a college
education may constitute dependency within the meaning of the
statute.
D. No Support Beyond Age Twenty-One
While the supreme court's dicta in Finn indicates that a student
without physical or mental disabilities may nevertheless be dependent,
and therefore entitled to parental support beyond the age of eighteen, it
also implies that dependency in this situation ends at age twenty-one.2
Shortly after Finn was decided, the Fourth District Court of Appeal
reversed that portion of a marriage dissolution judgment which ordered
the husband to pay the college tuition of the parties' twenty-three year
old son. The court recognized Finn's apparent holding that dependency
as a result of the bona fide pursuit of education may exist as to one
between eighteen and twenty-one years of age, but did not interpret
either section 743.07 or Finn "as authorizing a court to require a par-
ent to support a child over twenty-one years of age, whether for educa-
21. 296 So. 2d at 625.
22. 312 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1975).
23. The holding, enforcing a judgment ordering child support until the parties'
children reached age twenty-one, was based on the fact that the judgment was ren-
dered prior to the effective date of § 743.07. See notes 7-9 supra and accompanying
text.
24. 312 So. 2d at 731.
25. Id. at 730.
26. Dwyer v. Dwyer, 327 So. 2d 74, 75 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976). Accord,
Genoe v. Genoe, 373 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979); French v. French, 303
So. 2d 668 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
27. See note I supra and accompanying text.
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tional purposes or otherwise, unless the child is dependent as a result of
physical or mental deficiencies." 28
Other Florida courts are in agreement that orders of support for
education beyond the age of twenty-one are not justified.29 In a recent
case, the Second District Court of Appeal commented "that while the
legislature in lowering the age of majority to eighteen did not intend to
eliminate any requirement for parents to pay their children's way
through college, there is nothing to indicate that the legislature wished
to enlarge parental obligations."30
E. Is There A Duty to Educate Adult Children?
Florida courts have based their refusal to order support to healthy
children beyond the age of eighteen on the general rule that the obliga-
tion of parental support ends at majority,3 1 and on the holding that
attendance at college does not necessarily make a person "dependent,"
within the meaning of Florida Statute § 743.07.32 In 1978, the Fourth
District Court of Appeal went a step further by declaring that a parent
does not owe a duty to an adult child to provide a college education. 33
Although recognizing that a full-time college student in active and sin-
cere pursuit of an education may be dependent upon his parents for
support, the court reversed a lower court order requiring a father to
provide a college education for his adult child upon a finding of no
28. Briggs v. Briggs, 312 So. 2d 762, 762 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
29. Watterson v. Watterson, 353 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977);
Winikoff v. Winikoff, 339 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
30. Nicolay v. Nicolay, 387 So. 2d 500, 505-06 n.5 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1980). See notes 40-43 infra and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Genoe v. Genoe, 373 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979);
Rollings v. Rollings, 362 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Krogen v. Krogen,
320 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Kowalski v. Kowalski, 315 So. 2d 497
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975). See also Cyr v. Cyr, 354 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1978); Baldi v. Baldi, 323 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (holding the
trial court was without authority to order child support beyond age of eighteen years
and that question of support as dependent children should be determined by the court,
if requested, at the time of the attainment of majority of each child).
32. See Dwyer v. Dwyer, 327 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Genoe v.
Genoe, 373 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979); French v. French, 303 So. 2d
668 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
33. Kern v. Kern, 360 So. 2d 482, 485 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
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legally enforceable obligation. 4 The court noted that Florida Statutes
§§ 61.13 35 and 743.0736 must be read together and that before a court
may order support for an adult child, "it must find (1) that the parent
owes a duty of support, and (2) that the child is dependent upon that
parent for such support. ' 7
While parents have a duty to educate minor children, 38 no such
duty has been recognized as to children beyond the age of majority.
Providing a college education for children may be a moral obligation of
some parents, but it is not presently recognized as a legal one. 9
F. Indirect Provision for Post-Majority Support
The Second District Court of Appeal in a 1980 decision, Nicolay
v. Nicolay,'° gave the first inkling that Florida is willing to recognize a
child's needs for higher education by affirming an order of increased
alimony to a mother for the sole purpose of allowing her to furnish her
daughters with a college education.41 After reviewing the decisions of
all the district courts. of appeal regarding post-majority support, as well
as the supreme court's decision in Finn v. Finn, the court stated its
34. The court also held that even if a duty of support for an adult child does
exist, a dissolution proceeding is not the proper forum in which to establish the exis-
tence of that obligation. Id. at 485. This case should be distinguished from those involv-
ing an agreement to support an adult child. A dissolution proceeding is the proper
forum in which to seek enforcement of an agreement. See note 13 supra and accompa-
nying text.
35. See note 8 supra for text of statute.
36. See note 14 supra for text of relevant portion of statute.
37. 360 So. 2d at 484.
38. FLA. STAT. § 744.361 (1979) provides in part: "(1) It is the duty of the
guardian of the person to take care of the person of the ward, to treat him humanely,
and, if he is a minor, to see that he is properly educated and that he has the opportu-
nity to learn a trade, occupation or possession." (emphasis added).
39. Kern, 360 So. 2d at 485. French v. French, 303 So. 2d 668, 669 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1974). See generally Washburn, Post-Majority Support: Oh Dad, Poor
Dad, 44 Temple L.Q. 319, 325-29 (1971).
40. 387 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
41. The upward adjustment in alimony was ordered to help Mrs. Nicolay main-
tain the standard to which she was accustomed while married. The standard, according
to the court, "was such that she could rightfully expect to be able to provide her chil-
dren with a college education, particularly since they were exceptionally bright and
hence were outstanding candidates for college." Id. at 506.
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belief that the legislature, in lowering the age of majority, did not in-
tend to deprive worthy children of the funds needed to attend college.42
Since the appeal was based on alimony rather than child support, the
court was not required to overrule any prior decisions. However, they
stated that if the case had been an appeal from an order raising child
support, they would have been "inclined to hold that in a dissolution
proceeding a court could find a child under the age of twenty-one de-
pendent by reason of attendance at college and order one or both of his
parents to provide support" since "there is no fixed rule forbidding an
order of increased child support to finance a child's college education
up to the age of twenty-one."' 43
It remains to be seen whether Florida's courts will expand upon
the logic of the Second District Court of Appeal's decision and find
full-time college students dependent and therefore entitled to parental
support beyond the present age of majority. The remainder of this note
will deal with the possible consequences of such a finding.
II. EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE
As support for their refusal to order post-majority support to
finance a child's education, Florida courts have noted that since off-
spring of married parents do not have a legal right to parental support
while attending college, children of divorced parents should not have
this right." As Judge Boyer of the First District Court of Appeal
phrased it, "[t]he fact that domestic whirlwinds cause a severance of
the marriage does not enhance the rights of the children nor alter the
obligations of the parents.' 4 5
In Kern v. Kern, the court recognized the potential equal protec-
tion problem in noting that the state would have no reasonable grounds
to treat the adult children of divorced parents any differently than the
adult children of married parents.4' This rationale, however, overlooks
the fact that children whose parents are still married often continue to
receive support beyond the age of majority and therefore have an ad-
42. Id. at 505.
43. Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis supplied by the court).
44. Dwyer, 327 So. 2d at 75; White, 296 So. 2d at 623.
45. 296 So.2d at 623.
46. 360 So. 2d at 485.
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vantage over children of divorced parents.'7
Under an equal protection challenge, the rational relationship test
is applied to a statutory classification and, if shown to be rationally
related to some legitimate government interest, the statute is upheld.4
8
State statutes which specifically permit courts to order support for
adult children who are pursuing an education have withstood equal
protection attacks.
The Supreme Court of Iowa, in In re Marriage of Vrban, ' noted
the state's recognition of the increasing importance of education, as evi-
denced by ever-increasing appropriations for educational purposes, and
concluded that higher education was a matter of legitimate state inter-
est.50 Next, the court found that the state statute51 allowing a trial
court to order a divorced parent to pay support for an adult child who
is a full-time student bore a rational relationship to the state interest.
In making this determination, the court took note of the differences in
circumstances between married and divorced parents. 2
Similarly, in Kujawinski v. Kujawinski,5 3 the- Illinois Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of a state statute which permits a
court in a dissolution proceeding to order post-majority support to chil-
47. Washburn, supra note 39, at 329 n.55.
48. Childers v. Childers, 89 Wash. 2d 592, 575 P.2d 201 (1978). For a complete
discussion of post-majority support and equal protection, see Veron, supra note 11, at
668-78.
49. 293 N.W.2d 198 (Iowa 1980).
50. Id. at 202.
51. IOWA CODE § 598.1(2) (1977) provides in part:
"Support" or "support payments" means any amount which the court may re-
quire either of the parties to pay under a temporary order or a final judgment or
decree, and may include . . . child support . . . and any other term used to
describe such obligations. Such obligations may include support for a child who
is between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two years who is regularly attending
an approved school . . ., or is, in good faith, a full-time student in a college,
university, or area school; or has been accepted for admission to a college. . .; or
a child of any age who is dependent on the parties to the dissolution proceeding
because of physical or mental disability.
52. 293 N.W.2d at 202. The court noted that married parents usually support
their children through college years while divorced parents, when deprived of custody,
sometimes react by refusing support. See also Harris v. Harris, 585 P.2d 435 (Utah
1978).
53. 71 11. 2d 563, 376 N.E.2d 1382 (1978).
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dren for educational purposes, by finding that "the imposition of such
an obligation upon divorced parents is reasonably related to a legiti-
mate legislative purpose." '54 The court noted the major economic and
personal impact of divorce on the lives of those involved, including the
fact that divorced parents are often unwilling to voluntarily provide
support to the same extent as married parents.55
In a frequently cited case on the issue of post-majority support,
Childers v. Childers,5 the Supreme Court of Washington held that re-
quiring a divorced parent, under certain circumstances, 57 to support a
child beyond the age of majority while a college education is pursued,
is not violative of equal protection. Like Florida, Washington does not
have a statute specifically empowering a court to order support for edu-
cation of an adult child, but does allow a court to order support to a
dependent child to whom a duty of support is owed.58
In Childers, the court defined dependent in this context as "one
who looks to another for support and maintenance, one who is in fact
dependent, [or] one who relies on another for the reasonable necessities
of life,"59 and held that this definition encompassed full-time college
students. In support of their finding of a duty of post-majority support
for higher education, the court cited earlier cases which found a duty to
educate minor children, and to provide a college education if the parent
would suffer no significant hardship and the child showed aptitude. The
duty was based in part on the court's recognition of the state's public
policy that a college education should be had, as evidenced by the
maintenance of several institutions of higher learning at public ex-
54. Id. at _, 376 N.E.2d at 1389.
55. Id. at _, 376 N.E.2d at 1389-90.
56. 89 Wash. 2d 592, 575 P.2d 201 (1978). See also 17 J. FAM. L. 604 (1979).
57. The court stated that the factors to be considered before support is ordered
include the child's age, needs, prospects, desires, aptitudes, abilities, and disabilities,
and the parents' level of education, standard of living, and current and future re-
sources. A court should also consider the amount and type of support the child would
have been afforded had his parents remained married. 89 Wash. 2d at -, 575 P.2d at
205.
58. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.100 (1973) provides in part: "the court may order
either or both parents owing a duty of support to any child of the marriage dependent
upon either or both spouses to pay an amount reasonable or necessary for his support."
59. 89 Wash. 2d at - 575 P.2d at 205.
121
et al.: Nova Law Review Full issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1981
5:1981 Post-Majority Support In Florida 281
pense.60 Since the new statute used the term "dependent" rather than
"minor," the court reasoned that the parental duty to educate is no
longer limited by minority and that trial courts should now have discre-
tion to determine when a duty of support is owed, based on the facts
and circumstances of each case.61 The court then held that this inter-
pretation of the statute does not violate equal protection since it is ra-
tionally related to the legitimate governmental interest of minimizing
the disadvantages of children whose parents have divorced.
It appears that the establishment of a duty of post-majority sup-
port for education of offspring, whether done explicitly by enactment of
a new statute or through judicial interpretaton of an existing statute,
can withstand an equal protection challenge. Courts have recognized
the impact of divorce on children and the need for higher education in
today's society in upholding decisions ordering a divorced parent to
contribute toward the education of his adult child.
III. FACTORS WHEN ORDERING'SUPPORT
No court has held that the duty to support an adult child while he
is pursuing an education is absolute. The decision as to whether post-
majority support should be ordered, in those states which recognize the
allowance of such an order, is within the sound discretion of the trial
court.62 Several factors must be considered, including the parent's abil-
ity to pay, the child's aptitude and willingness to further his education,
and whether the child would have received the education if the mar-
riage had not been dissolved. 3 In addition, courts have recognized the
60. Id. at -, 575 P.2d at 206. See also Marriage of Eusterman, 41 Or. App. 717,
598 P.2d 1274 (1979).
61. 89 Wash. 2d at ., 575 P.2d at 204, 207.
62. See, Nicholls v. Nicholls, 33 Conn. Supp. 210, 371 A.2d 400 (Super. Ct.
1977); Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 71 111. 2d 563, 376 N.E.2d 1382 (1978); In re Mar-
riage of Vrban, 293 N.W.2d 198 (Iowa 1980); Childers v. Childers, 89 Wash. 2d 592,
575 P.2d 201 (1978).
63. See, e.g., Nicholls v. Nicholls, 33 Conn. Supp. 210, 371 A.2d 400 (Super. Ct.
1977); Khalaf v. Khaiaf, 58 N.J. 63, 275 A.2d 132 (1971); Ross v. Ross, 167 N.J.
Super. 441, 400 A.2d 1233 (1979) (father ordered to continue support payments until
daughter completed law school); Commonwealth ex rel. Ulmer v. Sommerville, 200 Pa.
Super. 640, 190 A.2d 182 (1963); In re Marriage of Campbell, 22 Wash. App. 560,
589 P.2d 1244 (1978). See generally Washburn, supra note 39, at 326-27.
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increasing importance of higher education:
[W]e are living today in an age of keen competition, and if the children
of today who are to be the citizens of tomorrow are to take their rightful
place in a complex order of society and government, and discharge the
duties of citizenship as well as meet with success the responsibilities de-
volving upon them in their relations with their fellow man, the church,
the state and nation, it must be recognized that their parents owe them
the duty to the extent of their financial capacity to provide for them the
training and education which will be of such benefit to them in the dis-
charge of the responsibilities of citizenship. It is a duty which the parent
not only owes to his child, but to the state as well, since the stability of
our government must depend upon a well-equipped, a well-trained, and a
well-educated citizenship."
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Florida has not definitively ruled on the
issue of post-majority support for education. The district courts of ap-
peal are divided in their views as to whether a court should order a
divorced parent, in the absence of a specific agreement, to provide sup-
port to an adult child for college expenses. Florida Statute § 743.07
empowers a court to order support to a dependent person beyond the
age of eighteen years, but no court has based an order of support on
the finding that a full-time college student is dependent.
Other states have recognized the special needs of children whose
parents have divorced and the increasing importance of education, by
imposing, under certain circumstances, a duty on divorced parents who
can afford it, to support their children through college. The statutes
establishing this duty have withstood equal protection challenges.
Florida courts have recognized that an adult college student may
be dependent upon others for support. Perhaps they will soon acknowl-
edge the growing trend toward providing post-majority support to chil-
dren of divorced parents to enable them to obtain an education and
64. Pass v. Pass, 238 Miss. 449, 458, 118 So. 2d 769, 773 (1960). See also Finn
v. Finn, 312 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1975).
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overcome the disadvantage they presently suffer in relation to their
peers with married parents.
Barbara B. Wagner
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Right To Appointed Counsel: The Outer Limits.
Davis v. Page
Abandoned, abused, neglected, surrendered, run-away, truant, and un-
controllably disobedient children in Florida are neatly categorized by
the law as "dependent." 1 Dependency proceedings are diverse and com-
plex attempts by the court to
delicately balance a number of conflicting claims: the need to protect the
health, safety and welfare of the child; the right of the parent to have
custody of and to care for the child; and the state's sometimes conflicting
interest in protecting both the family unit and the best interest of the
child .2
This comment examines whether due process, under the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution, requires the provision of
court-appointed counsel to protect the interest of indigent parents in all
Florida dependency proceedings.3
1. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(9) (1979) reads in full as follows:
(9) "Child who is found to be dependent" means a child who, pursuant to this
chapter, is found by the court:
(a) To have been abandoned, abused, or neglected by his parents or other
custodians.
(b) To have been surrendered to the department or a licensed child-placing
agency for purpose of adoption.
(c) To have persistently run away from his parents or legal guardian.
(d) To be habitually truant from school while being subject to compulsory
school attendance.
(e) To have persistently disobeyed the reasonable and lawful demands of his
parents or other legal custodians and to be beyond their control.
2. Bell, Dependency Law In Florida, 53 FLA. B.J. 652 (1979).
3. The conjunctive issue of the source for payment of fees for court-appointed
counsel was treated in detail by the Florida Supreme Court which determined a
formula recognizing both "[t]he common law obligation of the profession to represent
the poor without compensation . . [and the government's] obligation to provide legal
representation when such appointment is required by the constitution " In the
Interest of D.B., 385 So. 2d 83, 92 (Fla. 1980).
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Decisions of the United States courts on the right to counsel are
not in accord. Recently, in a closely divided opinion, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc in the case of
Davis v. Page,4 recognized an absolute right to counsel for indigent
parents in all dependency proceedings.5 The Ninth Circuit has, how-
ever, recognized only a qualified right to counsel, adopting a case-by-
case approach.'
At the time the federal court decided Davis, the only Florida Su-
preme Court decision on point had applied the case-by-case approach
under the rationale of the Ninth Circuit.7 Directing the judges of Flor-
ida's Eleventh Judicial Circuit (Dade County, Florida) to follow the
absolute rule, the federal district court had repudiated the reasoning of
both the Ninth Circuit and the Florida Supreme Court.8 Less than six
months later came the Florida Supreme Court's reply. Expressly re-
jecting the federal district court's Davis decision, the Supreme Court of
Florida explicitly instructed the judiciary of the state (with the excep-
tion of the Eleventh Circuit) to utilize the case-by-case approach. 9 A
second major issue was thus raised by the Fifth Circuit's panel opinion:
whether it was an abuse of the federal courts' discretion to hear the
Davis case in the first place, since "it would have been more prudent to
leave the ultimate disposition of this case to the Florida State courts." 10
DAVIS V. PAGE: BACKGROUND
Hilary Davis spent the night of January 30, 1976 in the hospital
with her fourteen-month-old son, Carl Thor Davis, who was suffering
4. No. 78-2063 (5th Cir. Mar. 23, 1981) (13-11 decision), a ffg 618 F.2d 374
(5th Cir. 1980), affg 422 F. Supp. 258 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
5. Other federal district court cases which have recognized an absolute right to
counsel are: Smith v. Edmiston, 431 F. Supp. 941 (W.D. Tenn. 1977) and United
States ex rel. Reed v. Tinder, No. 75-0454 (S.D. W. Va. 1975).
6. Cleaver v. Wilcox, 499 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1974).
7. Potvin v. Keller, 313 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1975).
8. 442 F. Supp. 258 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
9. 385 So. 2d at 95. It is noted in this opinion that the Dade County judges.had
responded to the Davis district court decision by appointing counsel not only for indi-
gent parents but for the indigent child as well, "whose interests may be adverse to the
desires of his parents and the State . . .in order to protect the interest [sic] of the
child." Id. at 88-89.
10. 618 F.2d at 387 (partially dissenting opinion).
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from a broken arm. Carl's arm had been fractured as a result of a
beating by his father.11 After she turned to the state for assistance, the
Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services initiated a
dependency proceeding to obtain custody of the child. The facts sur-
rounding Hilary Davis' initial involvement with the State Department
of Health and Rehabilitative Services, leading up to the initiation of
formal dependency proceedings, are in dispute.1 2
Custody of the child was granted to the Florida Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services at a "detention hearing"13 held in
the Dade County Circuit Court, Family Division, on February 4,
1976.14 Custody of the child had been awarded to the state on a tempo-
rary basis, pending the "adjudicatory hearing"15 scheduled to take
11. 442 F. Supp. at 260.
12. According to the court records, Mrs. Davis voluntarily sought foster care
placement for her son to assure that he would be cared for while she relocated and
obtained work. Mrs. Davis' attorneys, however, contend that a hospital staff member
initiated contact with the State Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services by
filing a child abuse report with that agency. Relying on this report, agency representa-
tives decided that the child should be removed from the custody of his parents. Case
Note, Juvenile Dependency Proceedings - Critical Analysis Used In Criminal Proceed-
ings Governs Timing Of Right To Counsel In Child Dependency Proceedings (Davis v.
Page, S.D. Fla. 1977), 8 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 99 (1980).
It is possible that this factual dispute may have arisen from either the social
worker's misunderstanding the nature of the type of assistance Hilary Davis was re-
questing, or the social worker's unwillingness to accept, without further investigation,
the claim that it was the child's father, rather than Hilary Davis herself, who beat and
injured the infant.
13. Ch. 75-48, § 15, 1975 Fla. Laws 85 (current version at FLA. STAT. §
39.01(15) (1979)) reads in full: "'Detention hearing' means a hearing at which the
court determines whether it is necessary that the child be held in detention care, shelter
care, some other placement outside his own home, or in his own home under court-
imposed restrictions, pending a hearing to adjudicate delinquency or dependency . "
14. 618 F.2d at 375.
15. Ch. 75-48, § 15, 1975 Fla. Laws 85 (current version at FLA. STAT. §
39.01(3) (1979)) reads in full: "'Adjudicatory hearing' means a hearing at which the
court makes its finding of fact and enters an appropriate order dismissing the case,
withholding adjudication, or adjudicating the child to be a delinquent child or a depen-
dent child."
The adjudicatory hearing is a formal court proceeding conducted by the judge
without a jury. The Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure and the rules of evidence used
in civil cases are applied. FLA. STAT. § 39.09(1)(b) (1975) (current version at FLA.
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127
et al.: Nova Law Review Full issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1981
288 Nova Law Journal 5:1981
place on March 4, 1976. Thus, Carl Davis was released by the hospital,
not to his mother, but tb the State of Florida.
Mrs. Davis appeared at the February 4, 1976 detention hearing
without an attorney. It is undisputed that she was indigent at that time.
The judge did not offer to appoint an attorney on that date, but he did
advise her to have counsel present at the adjudicatory hearing set for
March 4, 1976. Because of her lack of funds, however, Mrs. Davis was
unable to hire an attorney to represent her at the adjudicatory hearing.
She made some attempts to obtain a lawyer through Legal Services of
Greater Miami, but appeared at the March 4, 1976 hearing without
counsel. At that time, Carl was adjudicated dependent and committed
to the temporary legal custody of the Florida Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services.16 Hilary Davis was advised, at the conclu-
sion of the hearing, to contact a lawyer. She was not advised of her
right to appeal from the adjudication of dependency. 7
Two weeks after the expiration of the thirty-day period allowed for
filing an appeal to the Florida District Court of Appeal, Mrs. Davis
obtained the services of Florida Rural Legal Services, Inc.18 On May
11, 1976, she filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Su-
preme Court of Florida, which was denied by Order on May 18, 1976,
without opinion. 19
On June 24, 1976, a petition was filed by Mrs. Davis for Writ of
STAT. § 39.408(1)(b) (1979)).
16. When a child is adjudicated dependent, the court may place him under pro-
tective supervision in his own home, commit him to a licensed child-caring agency,
commit him to the temporary legal custody of the state, or under specified circum-
stances, permanently commit the child to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services or a licensed agency to receive the child for subsequent adoption. OFFICE OF
EVALUATION, FLA. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, AN EVALUA-
TION OF FLORIDA'S CHILD WELFARE SERVICES (1979).
When the child is committed to the temporary legal custody of the state, the com-
mitment continues until terminated by the court, which may be done at any time, or
until the child reaches the age of eighteen years. Ch. 75-48, § 16, 1975 Fla. Laws 104
(current version at FLA. STAT. § 39.41(4), (6) (1979)).
17. 442 F. Supp. at 261.
18. Supplemental Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 13, Davis v. Page, 618 F.2d 374
(5th Cir. 1980). Mrs. Davis' attorney certified therein that he was retained by Hilary
Davis on April 19, 1976.
19. Id.
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Habeas Corpus and Complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
in addition to class action status in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida.2 ° On December 22, 1976, Mrs. Davis'
motion for class action status was granted by the district court.21 Sub-
sequent to filing her petition and complaint in federal court, Mrs. Davis
filed a petition in the Dade County Circuit Court seeking the return of
custody of her son. Her petition was granted and the court returned
custody to Mrs. Davis,22 subject to continuing supervision of the De-
partment of Health and Rehabilitative Services and the continuing ju-
risdiction of the Dade County Circuit Court.23
The federal district court concluded that there is an absolute right
to counsel for indigent parents in dependency proceedings in Florida.24
Defendants in the federal district court action (the Florida judges of
the Eleventh Judicial Circuit) appealed the district court's decision,
and on June 6, 1980, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision.25 On March 23, 1981, this decision was affirmed
by the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc.26
RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN DEPENDENCY HEARINGS
Due process, as accorded by the fourteenth amendment, is the
basis upon which the Fifth Circuit rested its holding. To determine
whether due process requirements applied, the court looked "not to the
'weight' but to the nature of the interest at stake .. .to see if the
interest [was] within the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty
and property. ' 27 The right to family integrity as a fundamental right is
20. Supplemental Brief for Appellants at 3, Davis v. Page, 618 F.2d 374 (5th
Cir. 1980).
21. Pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the class was
defined as "all indigent persons who have been or may be defendants in dependency
and neglect proceedings in the Juvenile and Family Division of Dade County Circuit
Court, without being afforded the right to counsel at state expense and without being
advised of their right of counsel." Id. at 4, citing Record on Appeal at 124-28.
22. Supplemental Brief for Appellants at 3-4, 618 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1980).
23. Supplemental Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 49, 618 F.2d 374 (5th Cir.
1980).
24. 442 F. Supp. 258 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
25. 618 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1980).
26. Davis v. Page, No. 78-2063 (5th Cir. Mar. 23, 1981).
27. 618 F.2d at 378 (emphasis in the original) (restated in Davis v. Page, No.
289 11 5:1981
129
et al.: Nova Law Review Full issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1981
290 Nova Law Journal 5:1981
well established28 and was not at issue in the clash between the federal
judiciary and the Florida Supreme Court. Rather, at issue was the
proper method to employ to adequately safeguard that fundamental
right. The Florida Supreme Court, subsequent to the district court's
decision in Davis, reaffirmed its own recognition of a "constitutionally
protected interest in preserving the family unit and [in] raising one's
children."29 However, the court also indicated that "[t]he extent of
procedural due process protections varies with the character of the in-
terest and nature of the proceeding involved."' 0
In examining the nature of the proceedings involved in cases in
which the United States Supreme Court has established an absolute
right to counsel,31 the Florida Supreme Court concluded that this right
applies only in criminal cases and flows principally from the sixth
amendment right to counsel, applied to the states through the fourteenth
amendment, rather than from the fourteenth amendment due process
guarantee. Right to counsel in dependency proceedings, on the other
hand, is governed by due process considerations, rather than the sixth
amendment.32
According to the Florida Supreme Court, due process considerations
flowing from the fourteenth amendment are adequately safeguarded by
application of the criteria adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Cleaver v.
Wilcox,33 but rejected by the Fifth Circuit in Davis v. Page. The court
78-2063 (5th Cir. Mar. 23, 1981)).
28. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
LeFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); May v. Anderson,
345 U.S. 528 (1953); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
29. 385 So. 2d at 90.
30. Id. at 89, citing Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (emphasis added).
31. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (right to counsel in a capital case);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel for serious noncapital
offenses); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to counsel for juveniles in juvenile
delinquency proceedings where the issue is commitment of the juvenile for criminal
conduct); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (right to counsel for petit of-
fenses whenever imprisonment could be imposed).
32. 385 So. 2d at 89.
33. 499 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1974).
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expressly affirmed the use of these criteria on a case-by-case basis in its
landmark decision of Potvin v. Keller."' It recently reaffirmed its posi-
tion in In the Interest of D.B., decided subsequent to the district court's
decision in Davis. The Florida Supreme Court, however, expressed par-
tial agreement with the Davis decision in In the Interest of D.B., indi-
cating that to meet due process considerations counsel is "always re-
quired in proceedings where permanent termination of custody might
result [or] when the proceedings .. .may lead to' criminal abuse
charges." 35 Proper application of the Potvin test will always require
appointment of counsel in these situations, so an absolute rule is not
viewed as necessary.3 6 In other dependency situations, under the
Cleaver analysis, due process requirements may be met by the statu-
tory provision for notice and opportunity to be heard.3 7 Another Florida
case on point prior to In the Interest of D.B. reversed an adjudication
of dependency on the grounds that the indigent parent was not afforded
counsel at the adjudicatory hearing.38 This decision was reached by a
Florida District Court of Appeal, utilizing the Potvin case-by-case
approach.3 9
Examining the nature of dependency proceedings in Florida, the
Fifth Circuit concluded that the case-by-case approach is "unwork-
able."40 The court based this holding upon an analysis of a dependency
34. 313 So. 2d at 706 (footnotes omitted). The criteria include:
(i) the potential length of parent-child separation,
(ii) the degree of parental restrictions on visitation,
(iii) the presence or absence of parental consent,
(iv) the presence or absence of disputed facts, and
(v) the complexity of the proceeding in terms of witnesses and documents.
The Cleaver criteria not only comport with constitutional due process require-
ments, they offer a sensible set of guidelines for determining the inherent unfair-
ness of a custody proceeding.
The Fifth Circuit, in its en bane decision rejected these criteria as being, "often
unknowable in advance of the proceeding." No. 78-2063, slip op. at 5058.
35. 385 So.2d at 90-91.
36. Id. at 90.
37. The essence of due process is the requirement that one in jeopardy of serious
loss be given notice of the case against him and the opportunity to meet it. Matthews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
38. In the Interest of R.W.H., 375 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
39. Id.
40. 618 F.2d at 383.
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action as one which is procedurally comparable to a criminal court pro-
ceeding. The court started by noting that the United States Supreme
Court rejected the case-by-case rule of Betts v. Brady 1 in its landmark
decision, Gideon v. Wainwright,42 which established the absolute right
of indigent criminal defendants threatened with imprisonment to ap-
pointed counsel. 43 From Gideon, the Supreme Court found an absolute
right to counsel for indigent juveniles faced with delinquency proceed-
ings in the case of In re Gault.44 The Fifth Circuit, recognizing the
potentially serious consequences to the parent, held that the indigent
parent involved in a dependency proceeding stands in virtually the
same position as the indigent juvenile faced with a delinquency pro-
ceeding. 45 The court concluded that the parent in this situation "needs
the assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law, to make skilled
inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and
to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit it."'46
Does the parent in a dependency hearing, who is not referred to as
a "defendant," require a defense? "As a practical matter. . . the state
through the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services accuses
the parent of abuse or neglect of a child.' However, the language
from Gault may not be as broad as interpreted by the Fifth Circuit.
Gault continues: "[t]he child 'requires the guiding hand of counsel at
every step in the proceedings against him.' ",48 This language appears
to emphasize the formal accusations lodged against the juvenile defen-
dant. The Supreme Court in Gault quoted from its decision establish-
ing an absolute right to appointed counsel for an indigent defendant in
a capital case.49 The Gault Court stressed heavily the fact that a juve-
nile in a delinquency hearing, like an adult in a criminal prosecution, is
41. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
42. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
43. 618 F.2d at 384.
44. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
45. 618 F.2d at 381.
46. Id., citing 387 U.S. at 36.
47. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION COMMITTEE, THE FLA. BAR, FLORIDA JU-
VENILE LAW AND PRACTICE 218 (1979-80)(emphasis added). See note I supra, demon-
strating that the parent is not always the accused in a Florida dependency action.
48. 387 U.S. at 36, citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. at 69 (emphasis added).
49. Id.
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confronted with the "awesome prospect of incarceration." 50
In a partially dissenting opinion, Judge John R. Brown of the Fifth
Circuit pointed out that "[e]very case on which the majority . . . [re-
lied] in support of its holding of an absolute right to counsel for parents
in a child dependency proceeding, is a criminal case involving the sixth
amendment, or at least involving the potential confinement of the per-
son to whom the absolute right is granted." 51 Judge Brown reflects the
position of the Florida Supreme Court that the right to counsel in a
dependency hearing flows, not from the sixth, but from the fourteenth
amendment, and is therefore a right of different constitutional
dimensions.
A criminal defendant's right involves his protection of his own lib-
erty; a parent's right in a dependency proceeding involves maintaining
custody of his child. In the latter case, it is the child's best interest
which is paramount. A dependency proceeding, unlike a delinquency
proceeding, is not against the child. To the contrary, Samuel P. Bell,
majority leader of the Florida House of Representatives, stated,
"[b]roadly defined, the 'delinquent' is a child who has committed an
act in violation of the law; the 'dependent' is the innocent victim of
actions or conditions over which he has little or no control. 52 A depen-
dency hearing is against neither parent nor child, rather, it is for the
child. Bell indicates that the attorney representing a parent in a depen-
dency action must be cautious because "[t]he natural tendency is to
want to represent the adult against an agency or professionals who are
questioning the adult's behavior, rather than recognizing there is a
deep-seated problem with the family or the child." 53
The Fifth Circuit in Davis, however, concentrates on the severe
consequences which may flow to the parent after the adjudication of
dependency is made. In order to regain custody of the child, the parent
must petition the court to return the child through a "disposition hear-
ing."" At this hearing, the parent bears the burden of proof to demon-
50. 387 U.S. at 36.
51. 618 F.2d at 388-89. Judge Brown, joined by ten of his colleagues, reiterated
this position in a strong dissent in the en bane decision.
52. Bell, supra note 2, at 652.
53. Id. at 658.
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strate that, because of subsequent developments, restoration of custody
is in the best interest of the child.55 The effect of shifting the burden
can be disproportionate. 6
In a recent evaluation of Florida's child welfare services, the Flor-
ida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services found that the
mean stay in foster care for dependent children is two years and ten
months.57 Cases were documented in which children had been in foster
care for over seventeen years.58 In over thirty-six percent of the cases
examined, children had remained in foster care for more than five
years.59 The effect of an adjudication of dependency can be a commit-
ment of the child to the temporary custody of the state, which contin-
ues until terminated by the court, following a disposition hearing, or
until the child reaches the age of eighteen years.6 0 Since temporary
custody may encompass the entire period prior to a child's reaching
legal adulthood, Davis raises the question of whether a temporary com-
mitment might always carry the potential of permanently terminating
a parental custody. Viewed in this light, temporary commitment pro-
ceedings would always come under the Florida Supreme Court's post-
Davis rule, requiring appointment of counsel to indigent parents when-
ever permanent termination of parental rights is threatened.61
55. 618 F.2d at 380.
56. Evidence inadequate to support a finding of dependency may nevertheless be
"adequate to support [a] . . . refusal to restore custody," even when the parents
demonstrate their fitness, ability, and willingness to properly rear their child. Pendarvis
v. State, 104 So. 2d 651, 652 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
57. OFFICE OF EVALUATION, FLA. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE
SERVICES, AN EVALUATION OF FLORIDA'S CHILD WELFARE SERVICES (1979).
58. Id. at 30-31.
59. Id. at 71-73.
60. See discussion at note 16 supra.
61. 385 So. 2d at 90-91. Thirty-one states now provide an absolute right to
court-appointed counsel for indigent parents in juvenile dependency hearings. They are
as follows: ALA. CODE § 15-63(b) (1977); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-225 (1974);
CAL. CIV. CODE § 237-.5 (West 1971); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 24A-1701(d), 24A-2001(a)
(1976); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 802-1 (1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 16-1606(c), 16-1608
(1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-20(1) (1975); IND. CODE § 34-1-1-3 (1973);
IOWA CODE § 232.28 (1969); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3792 (1980); MD. Crs.
& JUD. PROC. CODE § 3-821 (1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 29 (West
1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.155(2) (1971); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43.205.06 (1978);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 604A-1 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.43 (West 1976);
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THE JURISDICTION QUESTION: SHOULD THE ISSUE BE RESOLVED
BY FLORIDA COURTS OR BY FEDERAL COURTS?
Hilary Davis was not advised by the Dade County Circuit Court
of her right to appeal the adjudication of her child's dependency under
Florida law. 2 She did not obtain the services of an attorney until the
expiration date for filing a state appeal had passed.6 3 Her petition for
habeas corpus to the Florida Supreme Court was denied.0' At that
point, she had exhausted her state remedies and consequently, sought
federal habeas corpus relief.
Whether the federal district court abused its discretion in adjudi-
cating Mrs. Davis' claim is an issue raised by Judge John R. Brown of
the Fifth Circuit in his partially dissenting opinion. 5 The Dade County
judges in their supplemental brief for the rehearing en banc, argued
that although no particular petition was before the state court at the
time Mrs. Davis filed her federal action, the jurisdiction of the state
circuit court had been invoked and was continuing.6 Therefore, argu-
ably, she had not exhausted state remedies. In fact, acting upon a peti-
tion subsequently filed by Mrs. Davis, the state circuit court returned
custody of her child to her,6 7 exercising its continuing jurisdiction.8 In
contrast, Mrs. Davis argued that she was properly before the district
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-27 (1978); N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 1043(a) (McKinney 1975);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-26 (1975); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.352 (Page 1976);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1109(b) (1966); OR. REv. STAT. § 419-498 (1979); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 6337 (Purdon Supp. 1980); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-31 (1970);
S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 26-8-22.2 (1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-35 (1978); VA.
CODE § 16.1-266(c)(2) (Supp. 1980); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.25(6) (West Supp. 1978);
Smith v. Edminston, 431 F. Supp. 941 (W.D. Tenn. 1977); In re Myricks, 85 Wash.
252, 533 P.2d 841 (1975); State ex rel. Lemaster v. Oakley, 157 W. Va. 590, 203 S.E.
2d 140 (1974).
62. 442 F. Supp. at 261.
63. See Supplemental Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 13, Davis v. Page, 618 F.2d
374 (5th Cir. 1980). Mrs. Davis' attorney certified therein that he was retained by
Hilary Davis on April 19, 1976.
64. Id.
65. 618 F.2d at 387-89.
66. Supplemental Brief for Appellants at 39, 618 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1980).
67. Id. at 3-4.
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court, having satisfied the requirements of Younger v. Harris69 and
Moore v. Sims,7 0 since there were adjudicatory proceedings pending.
The jurisdiction question was dealt with by the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals in its rehearing of the case en banc. A bare majority ac-
knowledged the propriety of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction in the
case.7 '
CONCLUSION
The Florida Supreme Court's rule (based on the Ninth Circuit's
case-by-case approach) has now been declared unconstitutional by the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Judicial fireworks may yet be antici-
pated in view of the split which now exists between the Ninth Circuit,
which maintains the case-by-case approach, and the Fifth Circuit's ab-
solute rule.
As noted in the beginning of this comment, Florida law classifies a
great many different types of children as "dependent." This compli-
cates the question of whether the indigent parents of a child involved in
dependency proceedings should always, or only under certain circum-
stances, be granted the right to court-appointed counsel. For example,
a child may have been abandoned by the parents, or may find himself
presented to the court by his parents, who charge that he is "ungovern-
able" in that he persistently disobeys their reasonable and lawful de-
mands.72 In these situations, should the state pay for the parent's attor-
ney? Certainly there are dependency situations in which the child
needs legal counsel at least as much as the parent, such as the case of
alleged parental abuse. In dependency proceedings, there are always
three interests: the child, the parent, and the state. These interests may
align and realign in various permutations, particularly according to the
category of dependency involved. To achieve fairness of all parties, a
rule should be adopted with sufficient flexibility to adequately protect
each interest within the context of each dependency situation. How-
69." 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
70. 442 U.S. 415 (1979), extending the Younger doctrine to matters involving
child custody.
71. No. 78-2063 (5th Cir. Mar. 23, 1981).
72. FLA. STAT. §39.01(9)(e) (1979). Regardless of the category involved, an ad-
judication of dependency can result in loss of parental custody. See note 16 supra.
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ever, in the adoption of such a rule, the protection of the child's best
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The Demise Of Lex Loci Delicti: Bishop v. Florida
Specialty Paint Co.
Where a Florida resident incurs injuries as a result of tortious conduct
perpetrated by another Florida resident in a foreign state, and an ac-
tion to recover for the injuries is subsequently initiated in Florida,
should the law of the place of the wrong1 govern the substantive rights
and liabilities of the parties concerned? Prior to the decision rendered
by the Supreme Court of Florida in Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint
Co.,2 state courts were mandated to adhere to the doctrine of lex loci
delicti and apply the law of the place of the wrong irrespective of any
other factors. 3 In Bishop, guest passengers in an aircraft were injured
when the aircraft, en route from Jacksonville, Florida to North Caro-
lina, experienced engine difficulties and crashed in South Carolina. The
trial court, applying the doctrine of lex loci delicti, granted a summary
judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the law of
South Carolina4 governing the standard of care imposed on a pilot and
an owner of an airplane should be the controlling guideline rather than
the law of Florida. 5 Whereas Florida law merely required a showing of
1. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 377 (1934).
2. 389 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1980), answering the certified question issued by the
First District Court of Appeal in 377 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
3. Olsen v. State Farm Auto Ins. Co., 1980 Fla. L. Weekly 1509 (5th Dist. Ct.
App. Aug. 8, 1980); Ganem v. Ganem de Issa, 269 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1113 (1973); Tom v. Messinger, 235 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Lescard v. Keel, 211 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968);
Beasley v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 401 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1968); Astor Elec. Serv. v.
Cabrera, 62 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1952).
4. S.C. CODE § 55-1-10 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
No person transported by the owner or the operator of an aircraft as his guest
without payment for such transportation shall have a cause of action for dam-
ages against such aircraft, its owner or operator for injury, death or loss in case
of accident unless such accident shall have been intentional on the part of such
owner or operator or caused by his heedlessness or reckless disregard of the
rights of others.
5. FLA. STAT. § 320.59 (1940), the Florida guest statute, was repealed by ch. 72-
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ordinary negligence, South Carolina law required a showing of either
"heedless or reckless disregard of the rights" of others or that the acci-
dent was intentional. Plaintiffs conceded they could not satisfy the bur-
den imposed by South .Carolina law.
On appeal, plaintiffs, relying on Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft
Corporation,7  argued that a modern approach to choice-of-law
problems in tort actions should be adopted by the court. They advo-
cated the adoption of the "most significant relationship" approach. 8
Upon affirming the trial court's decision, the District Court of Appeal,
First District, articulated:
Despite the uncertainties created by the court's action in Hopkins of first
receding from the lex loci delicti rule (by a vote of 4 to 3) and then, on
rehearing granted, reversing its original opinion (by a vote of 4 to 3), we
conclude that the net effect of the decision was to leave in the rule as
1, 1972 Fla. Laws 113. Consequently, a host may be sued by his guest for ordinary
negligence. Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co., 377 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1979).
6. S.C. CODE § 55-1-10 (1976).
7. 201 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1967). In Hopkins, the plaintiff urged the Supreme
Court of Florida to adopt a modern approach to choice-of-law problems. The Court
agreed with the plaintiff, but on rehearing, it reversed its decision stating that it was
not yet time to recede from the doctrine of lex loci delicti given the objectivity with
which the doctrine could be applied. Id. at 752.
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971). Section 145
reads as follows:
§ 145. The General Principle
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the
most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the princi-
ples stated in § 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to deter-
mine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is
centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue.
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previously established and generally followed by the Florida courts.9
The district court, in light of the "great public interest"10 attached to
the issue, then certified to the Supreme Court of Florida the following
question:
Does the lex loci delicti rule govern the rights and liabilities of the par-
ties in tort actions, precluding consideration by Florida courts of other
relevant considerations, such as the policies and purposes underlying the
conflicting laws of a-foreign jurisdiction where the tort occurred, and the
relationship of the occurrence and of the parties to such policies and
purposes?11
As previously indicated, the Supreme Court of Florida responded
to the certified question in the negative. The Court acknowledged the
"consistency and stability [promoted] by [the] application of a stable
and objective standard [i.e., the doctrine of lex loci delicti] for choice-
of-law determinations.1 12 However, it also stated that there were sev-
eral factors in the Bishop case which disclosed the need for and
prompted the Court to adopt a more flexible rule. The Court noted:
In the present case, for instance, the weekend trip was to begin and end
in Florida, plaintiffs and defendants are all Florida residents, and the
host-guest relationship between the parties arose in Florida. The rela-
tionship of South Carolina to the personal injury action is limited to the
happenstance of the plane coming into contact with South Carolina soil
after developing engine trouble in unidentified airspace. 13
In light of these tactors, the Court announced that the time had
arrived for a choice-of-law rule which would encompass factors of this
nature. It therefore proclaimed the adoption of the "most significant
relationship" approach.
To evaluate and fully comprehend the impact that the Bishop case
will have upon future litigation, one needs to analyze the roots, criti-
9. 377 So. 2d at 768.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co., 389 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1980).
13. Id.
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cisms and applications of the two concepts - the doctrine of lex loci
delicti and the '"most significant relationship" approach. This comment
initially seeks to trace the birth of the traditional rule and to elaborate
upon the factors which justified its original popularity as well as those
which ultimately provoked its demise. Thereafter, it examines the mod-
ern approach to ascertain whether it will rectify the problems encoun-
tered under the traditional rule.
THE DOCTRINE OF LEX Loci DELICTI
The doctrine of lex loci delicti was conceived as early as the mid-
nineteenth century.1 4 It emanated from the "vested rights"15 theory
which dictated that "a right to recover for a foreign tort owes its crea-
tion to the law of the jurisdiction where the injury occurred and de-
pends for its existence and extent solely on such law."1 , Its chief propo-
nent was Professor Joseph H. Beale.17 Courts and legal scholars have
articulated numerous and varied justifications for the doctrine. In First
National Bank in Fort Collins v. Rostek,16 the Supreme Court of Colo-
rado justified the doctrine on the basis that "[in the mid-nineteenth
century, conditions were such that people only occasionally crossed
state boundaries. Under those circumstances, there was legitimacy in a
rule which presumed that persons changing jurisdictions would be
aware of the different duties and obligations they were incurring when
they made the interstate journey."19 In Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft
Corporation,0 the Supreme Court of Florida was impressed by the
doctrine's objectivity, consistency and stability. The Court stated that
"[t]here are obvious virtues, in consistency and stability, supporting the
application of laws whenever possible in a cohesive rather than piece-
14. First Nat'l Bank in Fort Collins v. Rostek, 182 Colo. 437, 514 P.2d 314, 316
(1973).
15. For a treatment of this theory, see Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict
of Laws: Their Role and Utility, 58 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1945).
16. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 281, 240 N.Y.S.2d
743 (1963).
17. Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 L. & CONTEMP.
PROn. 679, 679 (1963).
18. 182 Colo. 437, 514 P.2d 314.
19. Id. at -, 514 P.2d at 316.
20. 201 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1967).
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meal fashion. In other words, the applicability or inapplicability of for-
eign law should so far as possible be based on objective and stable stan-
dards.' It has also been suggested by William Reese, one of the
Reporters of the Restatement (Second), that the doctrine was justified
by man's proclivity to make things as easy as possible:
For it is in the nature of men to seek certainty and simplicity in the law.
They will wish to regulate a field by a few simple rules if rules of this
nature can be devised to handle adequately the problems involved. And
if a few simple rules will handle all, or at least the great majority, of
problems that have arisen in a great field, men will be tempted to believe
that the same rules can satisfactorily be applied to handle all other
problems with which they may thereafter be faced.22
Finally, supporters of the doctrine emphasized the expediency, uni-
formity, certainty and predictability23 which the doctrine promoted.
24
As society grew increasingly mobile, and even before Professor
Beale had completed his task of embodying the doctrine of lex loci
delicti into the first Restatement, the doctrine was subjected to strict
scrutiny by legal scholars in the field.25 The criticism proved warranted.
While application of the doctrine appeared to pose no inequities to sin-
21. Id. at 752.
22. Reese, supra note 17, at 680.
23. But see Reese, supra note 17, at 681. Reese contends that "rules cannot
bring certainty and predictability to a subject in which these values do not exist. Of
necessity, many conflicts rules must be fluid in operation and leave much to be worked
out by the courts." On another occasion, Reese expanded upon his criticism of the
traditional rule:
In retrospect, it seems clear that rules of this sort, at best in areas of contract
and torts, could not prove successful. There are many different kinds of contracts
and torts. The number of issues that can arise in these two areas of law and the
variety of ways that relevant contacts can be grouped among the interested states
border on the infinite. Certainly it would be miraculous if all issues could be
satisfactorily decided by application of the law of the place of [the wrong].
Reese, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development In Conflict of Laws,
63 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1252 (1963).
24. See Note, A Suggested Method for the Resolution of Tort Choice-of-Law
Problems in Place-of-the-Wrong Rule Jurisdictions, 1 FLA. ST. U. L. R. 430, 469
(1973).
25. See, e.g., Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws,
23 YALE L. J. 736 (1924).
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gle state torts, the perfunctory application of the doctrine to cases
where several states, especially the forum state, were significantly re-
lated to the occurrence proved problematic and frequently produced
harsh results.26To circumvent these unjust decisions, and frequently to
invoke their own state laws, courts began to employ "manipulative de-
vices"'2 7 including characterization,28 public policy,2 9 and renvoi.3 ° As
26. See Note, supra note 24, at 464-65, analyzing Tom v. Messinger, 203 So. 2d
357 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1967). In Messinger, two Florida residents, who had em-
barked on a round-trip journey to Washington, D.C., were killed when their automobile
collided with a bridge abutment in North Carolina. The passenger's minor child
brought a wrongful death suit under sections 768.01 and 768.02, Florida Statutes,
against the driver's estate. The suit was subsequently dismissed with prejudice when
the court concluded that North Carolina law governed, precluding suit by individuals
other than the representative of a decedent's estate. Acknowledging that the decedents
were both residents of Florida, that the guest-host relationship originated in Florida,
that the journey was commenced and terminated in Florida, the court articulated that
nevertheless it had an inviolable duty to adhere to the doctrine of lex loci delicti. The
inequity manifested itself in the court's refusal to consider these factors and the fact
that North Carolina had no interest in applying its law. The policy behind its law -
distribution of recovery through the law of descent and distribution - would not have
been advanced by the interjection of North Carolina law into an action involving Flor-
ida residents and Florida property.
27. See Sedler, Choice of Law in Michigan: A Time to Go Modern, 24 WAYNE
L. REv. 829, 839-47 (1978); Leflar, The Torts Provisions of the Restatement (Sec-
ond), 72 COLUM. L. REv. 267, 271-74 (1972); LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW
212-18 (1968).
28. See Leflar, supra note 27, at 212, 215. Leflar criticizes characterization, but
acknowledges its virtues.
It is an essential early step in almost any legal analysis, but the step is one that
can serve the purposes of the legal artist as well as the legal logician. If more
than one characterization is logically available on a set of facts and permissible,
the choice between the characterizations may turn on a judicial desire to achieve
justice in the particular case, on a public policy preference for one rule of law
over another, on a preference for the forum state's own law or on something else
other than pure logic.
Id. at 212.
[I]t is an elementary aspect of legal reasoning. But it should not be made to
perform functions beyond its own purpose, which is classificatory only. Charac-
terization is a proper initial step in any legal problem, including choice-of-law
problems. If more than one traditional characterization is available on a given set
of facts, all possible characterizations should be identified and brought into the
open. Not until this is done is it possible to see what proper choice influencing
1 304 Nova Law Journal 5:1981 1
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the courts' propensity to employ these devices increased, the once advo-
cated virtues of the doctrine of lex loci delicti became progressively
illusory. This judicial propensity to escape the strict application of the
doctrine indicated that with the "horse and buggy days"3' gone, the
time had ripened for the adoption of new choice-of-law theories which
would embrace considerations of policy, fairness and other relevant
factors.32
THE MOST SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP APPROACH
In 1963, a response to the overwhelming dissatisfaction with and
the harshness of the doctrine of lex loci delicti was articulated by the
New York Court of Appeals. In Babcock v. Jackson,3 3 that court pro-
claimed its abandonment of the doctrine and its adoption of the most
significant relationship approach posited in the Restatement (Second)."
Elaborating upon his theory selection, Judge Fuld declared:
Justice, fairness and "the best practical result" ... may best be
achieved by giving controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction which,
because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties,
has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation.
considerations are relevant in the case.
Id. at 215.
29. The public policy manipulative device was employed when a forum deemed
the law of the jurisdiction whose law was to govern to be "shocking." See Sedler, supra
note 27, at 841 (1978). According to Judge Cardozo in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co.,
224 N.Y. 99, 111, 120 N.E. 198, 202 (1918), a law was deemed "shocking" if enforce-
ment thereof would "violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent con-
ception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of common weal." Sedler, supra
note 27, at 841 n.68. It is demonstrated in Gillen v. United Servs. Auto. Assoc., 301
So. 2d 613 (Fla. 1974) and Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201 So. 2d 743 (Fla.
1967) that Florida courts do subscribe to the use of this device.
30. See, e.g., Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962). In Richards, the
Court, by employing the renvoi device, ruled that a federal district court was obligated
to apply not only the internal law of the state where the negligent act or omission
transpired, but the whole law, including the choice of law rules of the state.
31. Ideal Structures Corp. v. Levine Huntsville Dev. Corp., 396 F.2d 917, 922
(5th Cir. 1968).
32. See 377 So. 2d at 768.
33. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
34. REsTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971).
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The merit of such a rule is that "it gives to the place 'having the most
interest in the problem' paramount control over the legal issues arising
out of a particular factual context. . . ." 35
Since Judge Fuld rendered his decision in Babcock, numerous states,
Florida now among them, have adopted one of several modern ap-
proaches to conflicts-of-law problems.3"
As applied, the most significant relationship approach entails a
two-prong test. Failure to respect either prong will only be counter-
productive.37 It is imperative that those variables listed under Section
14538 of the Restatement (Second) be examined in light of the vari-
35. 191 N.E.2d at 283.
36. Twenty-five states and the District of Columbia have already rejected the
place of the injury rule and adopted one of several modern approaches. Armstrong v.
Armstrong, 441 P.2d 699 (Alaska 1968); Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562, 447
P.2d 254 (1968); Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 261 Ark. 622, 550 S.W.2d 453
(1977); Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 550, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967); First
Nat'l Bank v. Rostek, 182 Colo. 437, 514 P.2d 314 (1973); Ingersoll v. Klein, 46 Ill. 2d
42, 262 N.E.2d 593 (1970); Fuerste v. Bemis, 156 N.W.2d 831 (Iowa 1968); Arnett v.
Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1968); Jagers v. Royal Indem. Co., 276 So. 2d 309
(La. 1973); Beaulieu v. Beaulieu, 265 A.2d 610 (Me. 1970); Pevoski v. Pevoski, 371
Mass. 358, 358 N.E.2d 416 (1976); Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d
408 (1973); Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968); Kennedy v. Dixon, 439
S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1969); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966); Mellk v.
Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226, 229 A.2d 625 (1967); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191
N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963); Issendorf v. Olson, 194 N.W.2d 750 (N.D.
1972); Brickner v. Goodin, 525 P.2d 632 (Okla. 1974); Casey v. Manson Constr. &
Eng'r Co., 247 Or. 274, 428 P.2d 898 (1967); Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc., 416 Pa.
1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964); Woodward v. Stewart, 104 R.I. 290, 243 A.2d 917, cert.
dismissed, 393 U.S. 957 (1968); Gutberrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979);
Johnson v. Spider Staging Corp., 87 Wash. 2d 577, 555 P.2d 997 (1976); Wilcox v.
Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965); Gaither v. Meyers, 404 F.2d 216
(D.C. Cir. 1968).
37. See Leflar, supra note 27, at 269.
38. The variables listed under Section 145 include:
(a) the place of the injury,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of busi-
ness of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971).
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ables enumerated under Section 639 of the Restatement (Second). It
was from these factors that the approach derived its flexibility and
earned judicial respect and recognition. This flexibility permitted courts
to eliminate "false conflicts,' 40 minimize the use of manipulative de-
vices4' and determine the applicable law on an issue by issue basis.42
Irrespective of the obvious attributes of the new approach as com-
pared with the doctrine of lex loci delicti, critics have revealed that the
most significant relationship is not the anticipated conflicts panacea, for
its viability is threatened by a few inherent infirmities. It has been sug-
gested that the language of Sections 6 and 145 of the Restatement
(Second) is rather indeterminate and without direction.'3 Interpretation
of terminology is left to the discretion or "idiosyncratic analysis" 44 of
courts. This discretion militates against the choice-of-law policies of
predictability of result and uniformity of application.' 5 Moreover,
39. Section 6 provides for consideration of the following factors:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of
those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law.
Id.
For a discussion of these factors, see Reese, supra note 17, at 682-91.
40. For a discussion on false conflicts, see Note, supra note 24, at 464 n.7.
41. See Leflar, supra note 27, at 272-73.
42. Id. at 273; Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d at 283-84. In other words, it is
conceivable that in a single case, one state's law may govern with respect to one issue
and another state's law may govern with respect to another issue. In contrast, the doc-
trine of lex loci delicti appeared omnipotent. Leflar states:
[The doctrine] covered all such aspects of the act and injury in question as the
state of mind with which the act was done, the motive if any, the surrounding
circumstances tending to indicate negligence or non-negligence, including con-
tributory negligence, privilege or other legal justification for the act, its causal
connection with produced results . . . and all other matters inherent in the act
and injury which go to determine their legal characteristics.
LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLIcrs LAW 317 (1968).
43. See Note, supra note 24, at 472.
44. Leflar, supra note 37, at 273.
45. See 514 P.2d at 318.
5:1981
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courts may be prone to construing the variables in a self-serving, as
opposed to neutral, fashion."
Critics also warn that the absence in the Restatement (Second) of
any direction as to the relative weight to be accorded to the variables of
Sections 6 and 145 will have adverse consequences. 4 They point out
that although the approach requires that the variables be qualitatively,
not quantitatively, 48 weighed, the absence of any direction allows the
courts, on a carte blanche basis, to subjectively assign greater signifi-
cance to one factor than to another.49 They predict that the ultimate
result of this exercise of judicial subjectivity will be a return to the
doctrine of lex loci delicti. Courts will be forced to place a premium on
the first consideration of Section 145, to wit, the place of the wrong!50
Finally, the critics warn the legal community that this complex
approach cannot be applied in a simplistic manner. They advise the
community that the approach should not be transformed into a mecha-
nism by which the factual contacts of each state involved are counted
and the law of the state with the greatest number of contacts be held
applicable.51
CONCLUSION
By exposing the infirmities of both the doctrine adhered to in the
past and the newly adopted approach, it is hoped that this comment
has defined the boundaries within which the Florida courts should ven-
ture in order to achieve the justice and fairness sacrificed in the past.
At this point, Florida courts enter into a transitional period during
46. See Ehrenzweig, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLUM. L. REV.
1212, 1244 (1963).
47. See, Note, "Rules" v. "Approaches". Choosing A Choice-Of-Law Principle
For Colorado: First National Bank in Fort Collins v. Rostek, 46 U. COLO. L. REV.
107, 121-2 (1974).
48. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 221 (1968).
49. See Leflar, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1212,
1248 (1963).
50. See Reese, supra note 17, at 704. Reese states that "again we are entangled
in the circular reasoning which refers us to the law under which the 'cause of action' is
alleged to have vested, and again the place of wrong, so often fortuitous, assumes its
predominant importance." Id. at 704.
51. LEFLAR, supra note 48, at 330.
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which they will learn to implement the requirements of this newly
adopted approach and learn from the experiences of sister courts in
other states who adopted the approach long ago.
Deborah Ohman-Zimet
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Douglas, William 0., The Court Years, 1939-1975: The Autobiography
of William 0. Douglas. New York: Random House, 1980. 434 pp.,
$16.95.
Reviewed by Michael M. Burns*
Since embarking on a career in the law, I have regarded William 0.
Douglas as one of a handful of outright "heroes." Such unsophisticated
adulation - or at least the admission thereof - hardly befits my pro-
fessorial station. As academics, we tend to be observers, not partici-
pants - self-appointed social critics, often cynical, arrogant and judg-
mental, removed from the fray, attuned to our intellects but rarely to
our hearts. We forget to have fun, and having heroes is fun. That is not
to say that I, as an adult, have felt the same way about William 0.
Douglas as I did, as a child, about Willie Mays. What I admired, and
virtually all that I knew, about Mr. Mays were his professional accom-
plishments at homeplate and in centerfield. On the contrary, my admi-
ration for Justice Douglas has less to do with his judicial opinions than
with the inspirational quality of his broad-ranged, extrajudicial life ex-
periences and, in turn, his deeply-held personal values.
Given these predilections, it is not surprising that I found The
Court Years far less interesting than Justice Douglas's first volume Go
East, Young Man.' The Court Years is largely a collection of dis-
jointed anecdotes, some of which are noteworthy, loosely gathered
under poorly selected chapter headings. In addition, the stylistic incon-
sistencies, due to the editors' contributions following the author's death,
disturb the flow and take their toll on the reader. Lawyers will find the
discussion of cases rather elementary and largely unrevealing; general
readers will understand the explanations of cases but will find little of
interest regarding the legal process or the human frailty of the justices,
especially if their bubbles have already been burst by The Brethren.'
Notwithstanding these criticisms, I recommend the book,3 although I
* Assistant Professor of Law, Nova University Center for the Study of Law. J.D.,
University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 1974.
1. W. 0. DOUGLAS, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN (1974).
2. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN (1979).
3. I would be greatly surprised to learn that there are, in fact, people who read
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am sure that even Justice Douglas himself would not regard it as a
great work.
On a purely informational level, there are some interesting anec-
dotes and observations. For example, Justice Douglas expresses his re-
grets about his Korematsu opinion,4 explains his writing both the
majority and minority opinions in Meyer v. U.S.,5 and gives a behind-
the-scenes view of the justices negotiating prior to the decision in
Brown v. Board of Education.6 He discusses the offers he received from
two presidents of the United States to be their running mates and the
movement to draft Justice Douglas as a presidential nomineeJ and
reveals the naivete of the Bible-toting, proselytizing Robert F. Kennedy
traveling through Russia.8
Many of us will find passing enjoyment in the tidbits of personal
gossip - information which is of admittedly marginal intellectual
value but which is no less intriguing than the slick pages which we
skim in the waiting room of our dentist's office or at the supermarket
check-out counter. Who among us can deny a sense of gleeful voyeur-
ism when a person of Justice Douglas's stature describes Lyndon
Baines Johnson as "Machiavellian,"" "obsessed with the desire to be
loved," 10 and as one who "gave the heritage of America away to the fat
cats and the official vandals who have despoiled us;"" or Richard
Nixon as an "underhanded," '1 2 "deceitful,"' 3 "amoral,"' 4 "unethical,"' 15
book reviews in the back pages of law journals for the purpose of obtaining advice on
whether to invest the necessary time and money in a book, but if such an audience
exists, it deserves an opinion.
4. W. 0. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, 1939-1975, at 279-80 (1980) [herein-
after cited as THE COURT YEARS].
5. Id. at 173-74.
6. Id. at 113-15.
7. Id. at 281-83, 289-90.
8. Id. at 306-07.
9. Id. at 317.
10. Id. at 333.
11. Id. at 318.
12. Id. at 342.
13. Id. at 343.
14. Id. at 351.
15. id.
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expedient"6 liar with an ego whose appetite was "devastating;"' 1 or
General Curtis E. LeMay as "The Stone Age Man."18 In the category
of celebrity trivia, is it widely known that Justice Douglas's butler
Rochester was the man "after whom Jack Benny was to name a fa-
mous radio and movie character?" 9
The book does contain, in addition, numerous thought-provoking
ideas and inspiring passages. The source of this inspiration is, I suggest,
the depth of Justice Douglas's own life experience, particularly his
childhood poverty and polio and his wilderness trips and world travels
throughout his life, references to which we find primarily in his earlier
books. If we are to accept Chief Justice Hughes's piece of advice to the
newly arrived Justice Douglas - "[Y]ou must remember one thing, at
the constitutional level where we work, ninety percent of any decision is
emotional. The rational part of us supplies the reasons for supporting
our predilections" 20 - one's life experience, one's developing instinct,
and one's view of mankind, become the vital ingredients in judicial
decisionmaking.2
A marvelous feature of teaching constitutional law is the opportu-
nity each year to share anew with students the values which have in-
spired the first amendment and the views of those who have shaped its
meaning. In a chapter in which Justice Douglas observes that
"[b]ehind the Nixon drive for conformity was a hasty disrespect for the
First Amendment, 22 the author reflects upon his own world travels
and upon the views of Thoreau, Gandhi, Faulkner and Solzehnitsyn,
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 250.
19. Id. at 269.
20. Id. at 8.
21. For example, Justice Douglas suggests that the mass picketing of Justice
Hugo Black's house in response to the revelation that he once had been a member of
the Ku Klux Klan "colored his decisions in all subsequent cases involving picketing,
mass demonstrations, and protest marches." Id. at 20. Legal commentators have had
difficulty in reconciling Justice Black's professed "absolutism" with his position in
"symbolic speech" cases, which, as Professor Alan Dershowitz observes, "is little more
than speech on a stick." Dershowitz, Inside the Sanctum Sanctorum, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 2, 1980, at 9, col. 1. Justice Douglas's explanation may be the best we are going
to get.
22. THE COURT YEARS at 262.
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noting that:
The philosophy of the First Amendment marks a bold venture, judged by
the problems of this troubled world. It is bold because ideas are danger-
ous - more dangerous than guns. Ideas unite people; they pass over
borders in spite of the battalions that guard those borders. They live on
and on - throughout time. Many still walk to the measure of the ideas
of Zoroaster, Buddha, Jesus, Mohammed and other men and women
with powerful concepts in religious, political or educational work. So
when we honor Gandhi, we honor the best in Eastern and Western civili-
zation - the power of the mind and the right of the mind to be free -
to consider, believe and speak what one thinks is the truth. . . . The
values the First Amendment protects are necessary in a multiracial,
multireligious, multi-ideological society of the kind we profess to be. The
First Amendment sets us apart from most other nations. It marks the
end of all censorship, it allows the ability of the mind to roam at will
over the entire spectrum of ideas, and the sanctity of one's beliefs. It -
not our bombs or air force or missiles or manufacturing skills or mer-
chandising methods or GNP - sets us apart. A symbol of our health is
the respect we show to First Amendment values.2"
Perhaps the one institution most readily associated with free
speech and independent thought is the university. During the McCar-
thy "witch hunt" era, this was not the case, and Justice Douglas em-
phasized the invaluable quality of debate and conflict:
With the passage of the loyalty security programs, university envi-
ronments did not relax; rather they hardened. The lessons of conformity
and the rewards it brought became subtle influences in academic circles.
Faculties walked more and more in goose step to the tunes of the Estab-
lishment. Universities were no longer places of ferment but became more
and more institutions dispensing information on how to get ahead and
sedatives that made students less and less responsive to the mighty forces
of rebellion that were making the nation seethe.
I believed, with William M. Birenbaum, that 'a campus without dis-
ruption is polluted, like a river without fish or a defoliated forest along
the Ho Chi Minh Trail ... ,24
314
23. Id. at 263, 266.
24. Id. at 110.
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Justice Douglas's travels helped mold his views on foreign policy
as well, views which stood in vivid contrast to the parochialism and
provincialism of our nation during the Korean War period:
[T]o understand what was happening, a person would have to leave the
country, go into the back regions of the world, lose himself there and
become absorbed in the problems of the peoples of different civilizations.
When he returned to America after a few months, he would probably be
shocked. He would be shocked not at the intentions or purposes or ideals
of the American people, but at the arrogance and intolerance ...re-
flected in many of our attitudes toward Asia. He would find that thought
was being standardized, that the permissible area for calm discussion
was being narrowed, that the range of ideas was being limited, that
many minds were closed to the reception of any ideas from Asia ...
We thought of Asia in terms of military bases, not in terms of peo-
ples and their aspirations. We wanted the starving people of Asia to
choose sides, to make up their minds whether they were for us or against
us, to cast their lot with us and against Russia.
We did not realize that to millions of these people the difference
between Soviet dictatorship and the dictatorship under which they lived
was not very great. We did not realize that in some regions of Asia it
was the Communist Party that had identified itself with the so-called
reform programs, the other parties being mere instruments for keeping a
ruling class in power. We did not realize that the choice between democ-
racy and Communisi was not, in the eyes of millions of illiterates, the
critical choice it was for us.
We forgot that democracy in many lands was an empty word; that
its appeal was hollow when made to illiterate people living at the subsis-
tence level. We ask them to furnish staging grounds for military opera-
tions whose outcome, in their eyes had no perceptible relation to their
own welfare.25
Unfortunately, Justice Douglas, with so rich and varied a back-
ground, is not our average lawyer. The legal profession, which exerts
such disproportionate power over people's lives, includes among its
members many who have never left the halls of academia and/or the
halls of justice, to say nothing of our nation's borders. I see lawyers and
judges making decisions for people whose life experiences are light
25. Id. at 65-66.
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years removed from their own. I see applicants for law professorships
who appear to have acquired nothing but fees and degrees and who
rarely define their "experience" as including anything beyond the law.
I see law students with little sense of the "renaissance person" which
the fine tradition of our profession rightfully demands. And I know per-
sonally that along with the intellectual excitement and comfort of
academia can come a subtle strangulation from stale air behind ivy-
covered walls. If I am fortunate, I will get that periodic kick in the rear
from Justice Douglas, pushing me out the office door and reminding me
of the differences between experience and understanding, between em-
pathy and sympathy.
Provocative ideas which challenge our complacency are laced
throughout The Court Years. When "[m]any people in the nation felt a
glow of sadistic satisfaction"2 in viewing newspaper photographs of
Ethel Rosenberg's face as the electric charge hit her, showing "visible
liquid excretions through the skin,"27 Justice Douglas was reminded of
having witnessed the custom in Afghanistan whereby a murderer was
put in a wire cage and hung from a tree while passersby assaulted him
with rocks and denouncements until he died of pneumonia.2 8 While
concluding that "capital punishment is barbaric, 29 the author dares us
to acknowledge our "orgasm of delight,"' 0 to admit to our societal hy-
pocrisy, and, if I may extrapolate, to consider televising our executions.
Self-important lawyers will undoubtedly cringe when Justice
Douglas reminds us that "nothing in the Constitution"3 1 requires the
President to appoint a lawyer to the Supreme Court; and that during
his final year on the Court, in an attempt "to see if fresh air blowing
from other disciplines would ventilate the law,"132 he selected law clerks
from fields other than law: sociology, government, psychiatry and eco-
nomics." Alternatively, he once suggested that the justices "experiment
26. Id. at 82.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 83.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 281.
32. Id. at 174.
33. Id.
I
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with doing our own work '' without the aid of clerks.
In numerous writings and speeches throughout his lifetime, Justice
Douglas attributed his well-known concern for "the underdog" to his
childhood polio and poverty, including, of course, his experiences riding
freight and his contacts with society's outcasts. Another manifestation
of these experiences is less attractive - that is, the insecurity which
breeds an 'apparent self-righteousness and vindictiveness, qualities
which surface periodically in The Court Years. There is a preoccupa-
tion with personal attacks, noted above, which says as much about the
speaker as the subject, and, at times, with self-serving, bitter remarks
("[Ike] of course, had the palatial suite in Ward 8 and I was in the
ordinary room down the hall.").35 To be sure, Justice Douglas, if not
entirely forthright, at least acknowledged this insecurity in a revealing
passage about his friendship with Joseph Kennedy's four daughters:
But though I admired them all, I never dated any of them. It would have
surprised Joe to know that his friend who took a freight train across the
country to law school could never marry a rich woman. The barrier was
too great for me to surmount; and I never allowed it to be tested by
becoming intimate with any of these wonderful Kennedy women. 8
When speaking of Robert F. Kennedy, he noted sympathetically that
"Bobby, being small in stature, was always overcompensating," 7 be-
havior which Justice Douglas himself exhibited as a polio-victim-
turned-avid hiker, but which he might well have denied while prefer-
ring a description carrying less Napoleonic connotations.
Perhaps the most striking, though not entirely unexpected, aspect
of The Court Years - and one which is particularly difficult to accept
in a "hero" - is Justice Douglas's failure to acknowledge women. The
one exception is, predictably, his mother, Julia Fisk Douglas, a strong-
willed, self-sacrificing woman with deep New England roots, who alone
raised the children after their father's early death.38 "[O]ut of rever-
ence for Father . . . [she] drummed into my ears from my earliest
34. Id. at 172.
35. Id. at 300.
36. Id. at 302.
37. Id. at 305.
38. Go EAsT, YOUNG MAN, Chapters I and II.
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days" her conviction that through the Douglas blood stream was ac-
quired "an indomitable will and capacity for achievement."' 9 She
would even recite a little speech nominating her son William for Presi-
dent of the United States.4 0 The pressure on a child of meeting such
expectations - especially in a household where venting emotion was
deemed inappropriate - was bound to create a festering anger, which
eventually seeped out, coloring not only his personal relationships but
his view of gender roles in society.
When a man chooses to write about thirty-six years of his life, it is
not insignificant that he refers to his wife only three times, never by
name, and only in passing as part of an unrelated anecdote. It may be
that Justice Douglas chose to write about his public, not his private,
life. That, however, does not explain the nature and the infrequency of
his reference to women in public life. Of the 612 people whom the
author mentions by name in this volume, only forty-one are women
and, of those, twenty-one are noted merely as wives, mistresses and sec-
retaries. Of the remaining twenty, only a handful are recognized for
qualities which would complement either sex: Lady Bird Johnson for
strength and wisdom,41 Rose Kennedy for nobility,42 and Bessie Margo-
lin 4 and Constance Motley44 for superb advocacy in arguments before
the Supreme Court. Other women were noted for delicious crab chow-
der,45 loveliness, modesty and reticence, 46 and for unreasonable ner-
vousness about bears.' 7
Justice Douglas does not discuss his opinion in De Funis v. Ode-
gaard"8 and Kahn v. Shevin," yet they are relevant in this context. De
Funis involved a challenge to a law school "affirmative action" admis-
sions program designed to help members of certain racial and ethnic
39. THE COURT YEARS at 393.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 312.
42. Id. at 309.
43. Id. at 184-85.
44. Id. at 185.
45. Id. at 224 (Mrs. Harlan Fiske Stone).
46. Id. at 292 (Mrs. Harry Truman).
47. Id. at 220 (Mrs. Charles Evans Hughes).
48. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
49. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
156
Nova Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1981], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol5/iss2/1
5:1981 The Court Years 319 1
groups who were perceived to have suffered from societal discrimina-
tion. Justice Douglas wrote at length in opposition to the program, as-
serting that implicit in such "benign" discrimination is the assumption
that the preferred minorities "cannot make it on their individual
merit,"50 thereby creating an impermissible "stamp of inferiority."51
In Kahn, however, decided just one day later, Justice Douglas re-
jected a challenge to Florida's $500 property tax exemption for widows
but not for widowers, deferring to the state's remedial policy of "cush-
ioning the financial impact of spousal loss" 52 on women in an effort to
rectify the effects of past discrimination. There is no mention of perpet-
uating the perception of inferiority, and we are left to ponder why of-
fensive paternalism in one context is regarded as a generous helping
hand in another. Old-fashioned chivalry, perhaps.
Justice Douglas would have us believe that he was in the vanguard
of promoting women's rights. He reminds us that in 1944 he became
"the first Justice to have a female law clerk . . . the very able and the
very conscientious Lucille Lomen."53 Twenty-eight years later he hired
two more female clerks." Of the fifty-four clerks he employed during
his tenure on the bench, three were women. Although expressing the
view that any law which drew a line between men and women was
inherently suspect, Justice Douglas alluded to oral arguments by "four
wondrous Amazons . . .who droned on and on in whining voices., 55
Judging from his comment that a "wife [is] more dependent on
social affairs," 58 I would surmise that, in his introspective moments,
Justice Douglas would have acknowledged a certain discomfort with
women outside their traditional roles. He may have shared more than a
love for the first amendment with his "hero," former Senator Sam Er-
vin of North Carolina, who said of his opposition to the proposed Equal
Rights Amendment: "I am trying to protect women and their fool
50. 416 U.S. at 343.
51. Id.
52. 416 U.S. at 355.
53. THE COURT YEARS at 171.
54. Id. at 416. Justice Douglas hired Janet Meik and Carol Bruch for the 1972-
73 term. An account of the abusive manner in which he treated the outspoken Bruch is
provided in THE BRETHERN at 240-43.
55. Id. at 185.
56. Id. at 129.
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friends from themselves." 57
Justice Douglas declined invitations to be a guest at the "summer
encampment" of the Bohemian Club, an exclusive men's club in Cali-
fornia, because "I knew I would chafe as a captive of an elitist group of
men, most of whom I did not admire."58 His objection Was apparently
grounded on his perception of the club's practices regarding social class
- perhaps including implicit qualifications of race, national origin and
religion - but not on the club's policy of excluding women. For though
he rejected the Bohemian Club, he was a member of the Order of the
Jungle Cock, whose members were to bring to each annual meeting "a
young man fifteen years of age and teach him fly casting."59 This club
could hardly be described as having an influential membership, yet
helping to perpetuate these "rites of passage" for young men did little
to stem the tide of sexism.
Whatever the effects of Justice Douglas's childhood on his view of
women, his exposure to the wilderness surrounding Yakima, Washing-
ton was the source of satisfaction and enrichment throughout his life.
His love for the outdoors and involvement in environmental causes is
legendary and is manifest in his earlier writings, both on and off the
bench. In only a few brief passages in The Court Years does Justice
Douglas write of his deep appreciation of nature, but the passages are
significant for they succeed in expressing a perspective which tran-
scends the sense of professional self-importance which he might other-
wise have maintained. When he returned home and shut out the world
at the end of a work day, it was with humility that he regarded the
bevy of quail, the Canadian geese, and "[m]ost impressive of all . . .
the white whistling swans that often settle for a rest on the river below
me and then take off in a tremendous armada."60 These lesser species,
he concluded, are "not craven, corrupt or deceitful," but are simply
"bent on using the biosphere to sustain and perpetuate their lives, not
to destroy it nor to exclude all others." 6'
Those who have read Justice Douglas's earlier works know that he
pulls few punches when speaking about other public figures and about
57. The Miami Herald, October 16, 1970, § C, at 4, col. 3.
58. THE COURT YEARS at 241.
59. Id. at 182.
60. Id. at 391-92.
61. Id. at 392.
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controversial issues, yet he does not readily reveal much of himself, and
we are forced to read between the lines. So often, it seems, we are best
able to acquire a feeling for Justice Douglas's human qualities through
his accounts of others. In one remarkable passage, he speaks with deep
affection of a friend, whoie description, in the eyes of this reader, bears
an uncanny resemblance to the Justice himself:
I had been drawn to Frank Dobie, distinguished author and teacher, by
his book The Voice of the Coyote. Dobie loved that canine as did I; and
out of his love grew an expertise in the importance of coyotes to our
environment and the up-lift that their calls give the spirit of man ...
Dobie was a free spirit like Walt Whitman in many ways; he was
steeped in Texas folklore, he was teacher extraordinary. He also spoke
out on controversial issues and made clear his stand ...
Dobie criticized universities that suppress plays, as well as newspa-
pers that suppress news or distort it. . . . When the [Texas] legislators
proposed to close the university to students from other states on the
ground that they occupied housing needed for Texans, Dobie spoke up.
The danger of outside students, Dobie said, was that "they bring new
ideas," and he added, "There are few people who need ideas more than
Texans do."
As a result of this kind of statement, Dobie was a ready target for
Texas orthodoxy. The powers that be denounced him as a troublemaker
(which he was, in the same sense that Socrates was), and manipulated
their rules and squeezed Dobie out of the faculty. He was a true Jeffer-
sonian and his life was a dramatic illustration of First Amendment val-
ues. He would say, "Positive zest for life and positive opposition of the
strangling of life go together." He once wrote in the student paper, the
Texas Ranger: "I do not see how anybody who cherishes liberty for
others as well as for himself can be intolerant of ideas. I do not see how
a vast country, the life of which is bound up in vast complexities, can be
governed wisely except by intellectual ability."
I was always indebted to the coyote for bringing Frank Dobie and
me together. We communicated not through letters but through that
wondrous canine and through the golden eagle, which was being cruelly
slaughtered by ignorant and lawless Texans, and through the gnarled
mesquite trees and live oaks which distinguish the Southwest. "I have
never smelled incense in a church as refreshing to the spirit as the spring
laden with aroma from a field of those wild lupines called bluebonnets,"
Frank once said.
1 5:1981
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His love for that environment was a part of his love of life. Another
part was his love for the emancipators of the human mind - including
Jefferson, Paine, Emerson and Thoreau. Freedom of the mind was
beauty to Frank Dobie, a beauty he considered essential to all men who
desire to stay fully alive.6
Justice Douglas has been a hero of mine because of his commit-
ment to the free flow of ideas and to the free flow of rivers. One who
believes in the first amendment and in the environment is willing to
listen to the words and sounds which surround us. Lawyers, in particu-
lar, are not good at listening. I guess what we have to say is too
important.
62. Id. at 89-90.
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